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The Great Depression of the 1930 1 s was international in scope. 
Lxon Wecter's Age 2f ~ Great Depression, 1929-1941 has already de-
Liled its ramifications for the American people. The present study 
lSS ambitiously attempts to deal with the few particulars of Tulsa's 
,cial life and institutions which the economic crisis most likely af-
tcted. This monograph is also limited to a lesser number of years, 
Lose from 1929 through 1932; the theory being that the depression's 
Litial impact was greatest. 
In focus throughout are those Tulsa people which the business de-
ine actually deprived of material necessities. But a. host of others 
ay leading parts at various stages of the narrative. Of great im-
rtance are those who tried to help the impoverished, whether they be 
ected or appointed publi~ servants, or men and women assuming the 
avy burden of the good deed. 
After a summary look at the causes of the economic collapse, an at-
mpt is made to establish the degree of hardship suffered by Tulsans. 
e balance of the first six chapters is devoted to the efforts of local, 
ate and federal officials to aid those distressed, and to the attempts 
the unemployed to alleviate their own ·condition through organization. 
e remainder of the study delves into the institutional impact of the. 
pression, thereby bringing the family, the schools and the churches to 
a front. 
My principal adviser has been Dr. Theodore L. Agnew of the Oklahoma 
lte University History Department. Without Dr. Agnew's continued confi· 
ice in my ability, I could never have reasonably concluded the study. 
offered many suggestions and made several requests, but gave no orders 
I laid down no demands. Others who, in an official capacity, have 
ld all or portions of the manuscript and given invaluable constructive 
Lticism include Dr. O. A. Hilton, Dr. LeRoy Fischer, Dr. Homer L. 
Lght and Dr. H.J. Henderson. 
Dr. John J. Beer loaned me a photocopy machine which enabted the 
1embling of much ·data that otherwise might have been missed. Oklahoma 
lte University's library staff assisted in the location of beneficial 
:uments. Officials in Tulsa at the Chamber of Commerce, Public Library 
1nty Courthouse, Public Schools, Ministerial Alliance, and the City Of-
:es opened their files, and provided desks to work at and materials to 
~k with. Several churches and nu~erous individuals extended long-term 
lns of useful documents. Close friends and relations offered over-
~ht lodging, transportation, and aid in the collection, arrangement 
I classification of statistical information. Mrs. Molly Reid, as she 
:urately typed the text, exercised her considerable experience and good 
lgment to prevent several mistakes. 
V 
CHAPTER I 
FROM PROSPERITY TO DEPRESSION 
Although numerous factors produced the Great Depression of the 
)'s, the regional and local importance of each cause varied widely. 
rulsa the most significant causes were rooted in the city's twentieth 
:ury economic development. 1 At Red Rock, across the Arkansas River 
a Tulsa, oil was discovered in 1901. This first oil well in the area 
not set any production records, but it did indicate the possibility 
l great new oil field. Only a slow and unreliable ferry connected 
1a with the oil activities. Several citizens of the town, therefore, 
.ta bridge across the Arkansas and erected a modern hotel in order 
Lttract the petroleum business. 2 The oil men took advantage of these 
mnnodation~.·and Tulsa thus began an,acceler.ated period of,developme~t 
:h continued for nearly thirty years. 
Tulsa offered ample facilities for the traditional "boom town" 
' 
.vi ties of the "roughnecks." It was to the II titans, 11 however, that 
city fathers directed their special appeal. They foresaw that the 
;ers would soon be gone, but they hoped that the owners and producers 
.d be enticed to establish permanent residences and corporation offices. 
1The best single account of the early history of Tulsa is: Angie 
, Tulsa: ~ Creek ~ !2, Oil Ca;eital (Norman: Univ~rsity of 
.homa Press, 1943). 
2workers of the Writers Program of the Works Progress Administration, 
homa: A Guide to the Sooner State (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
0941), P• Z08.-
2 
sa thus never became an oil town in the traditional sense of the 
m. Drilling rigs gradually disappeared from the surrounding area. 
ore they were gone, however, the city's special zoning laws, easy 
dit, reasonably priced building sites and excellent transportation 
ilities . had gained ·some of the leading names in oil for the ranks of 
permanent citizenry.3 As a logical result of the presence of the 
as and company headquarters of these men, Tulsa became the center of 
nority for the execution of oil operations in a five-state area. 
The speculative fibre of the oil industry's commercial network led 
turn to the development of special financial institutions which could 
would handle business propositions that other banks would not con-
er. Profits far exceeded losses, and these institutions were soon 
passed only by the banks of New York City in the financing of oil 
rations. No small part of the gains were used in the attraction of 
itional oil concerns to the city. Petroleum refining became Tulsa's 
ding industry, and the manufacture and distribution of products used 
the oil industry constituted its most important other enterprises. The 
r's importance as an oil center was increased by the acquisition of 
home offices of such organizations as the Mid-Continent Oil and Gas 
ociation, the Natural Gasoline Association of America, the Western Pe-
leum Refineries Association, and the American Association of Petroleum 
ineers. It also became the site for the annual In~ernational Petroleum 
osition. By 1929 Tulsa was internationally famous as the oil capital 
the world. 
This era of tremendous development caused a great population boom in 
3General Commercial Engineering Department, Southwestern Bell Telepho: 
pany, Economic Survey of Oklahoma (St. Louis: Bell Telephone Company, 
9), P• 258. 
3 
lsa. In 1900 it was a town with only 1,390 residents, but by 1929 it 





















Despite its colossal achievements in the first three decades of 
e twentieth century, the continued progress of Tulsa depended upon an 
stable set of factors. It was, to be sure, an oil metropolis, but its 
tural advantage for substantial growth in other industries and commer-
al areas had been largely ignored. The. city was confined to a single-
dustry economy, and, therefore, the possibility of a set~ack was never 
y more or less remote than the likelihood of a crisis in the highly 
eculative oil industry as a whole. 
An industry-by-industry analysis of Tulsa business activity during 
e 1920's reveals the precariously balanced nature of such an oil-
pendent economy. 5 Oil, of course, set the pace, the oil men enjoying 
e profits of a series of booms, which were, however, divided by an almo 
ually frequent number of declines. A large portion of the profits from 
ese periods of prolific oil production were regularly being converted 
4workers of the W. P.A. in the State of Oklahoma, Tulsa: A Guide 12 
! Oil Capital (Tulsa: Mid-West Printing Company, 1938), p. 247 
5The analysis which follows is base.d upon data in: United States 
partment of Commerce, Industrial Employment Survey Bulletin (Washington 
s. Government Printing Office, 1921-1930), Vols. I-IX. This bulletin, 
sued monthly, summarizes the industrial activity in each state and in 
ery major city. Taken together, therefore, they provide a rough out-
ne of the history of industrial activity in Tulsa for the entire 
cade. 
.to investments in other local industries. Tremendous expansion, there• 
,re, was usually taking place in these other industries at the same time 
.at declines were becoming noticeable in the oil industry. By the time 
.other spurt had taken place in oil production, the other industries--
.ich by now had expended most of the investments made by the oil men--
re beginning to decline. The economic expansion of the 1920's in Tulsa 
.n thus be best characterized as a series of off-setting alternating 
,oms. 
This unusual economic situation thus provided an unemployment safety 
lve. The bulk of the labor surplus consisted of unskilled and semi-
.illed workers. Such workers, because of the very nature of their work, 
uld easily switch from job to job, and ·such alternate employment was 
ually available. Many workers dislocated by a decline in the oil in-
stry were, therefore, readily absorbed by another.industry which was 
ing oil capital to carry out expansion. By thus making a transition 
om one industry to another, in tune:with the alternation of the booms, 
ny workers were able to maintain their membership in the active labor 
rce of the city. The relationship between oil and construction industr 
s particularly close. 
Even though the economy of the city rested on this rather uncertain 
undation, the outlook for the future seemed to be good. Large scale 
oduction in the Mid-Continent Oil Field was expected to continue for 
ny years. Additional manufacturers of oil field equipment would probab 
cate branch manufacturing plants in Tulsa in order better to serve the 
st producing area of which the city was the recognized metropolis. Tul 
d not, however, have to rely upon the rise or fall of production in nea 
fields. The transactions of the oil titans were not limited by state 
en national boundaries. The city's oil business was drawn from the ent 
5 
uthwestern United States and also from foreign countries such as Mexico 
d Venezuela.6 
Large numbers of the unemployed, particularly the hard-hit farmers, 
re attracted to Tulsa by each successive boom. Labor had soon far o'-*t·-
ripped the number of available jobs, even during the booms. The unem-
oyment safety valve soon began to falter. The climax came in 1929, 
e year of the great stock mark~t crash, when over-production drasticall 
wered prices in the oil industry. This resulted from the opening of th 
eat fields at Seminole, at Oklahoma City and in East Texas. With crude 
1 selling for one cent per barrel, the oil companies attempted system-
ically to reduce output. The curtailment of expansion in other city 
8 terprises followed naturally, and Tulsa's economy collapsed. 
6 Tulsa Chamber of Commerce, Industrial Survey of Tulsa (Tulsa: 
imber of Commerce, 1929), p. 88. 
7 Debo, Tulsa:~ Creek Town~ Oil Capital, p. 111. 
8The author is well aware that no one single factor was the cause 
this depression, and that such explanations are rightfully regarded 
th suspicion. The explanation here differs in emphasis rather than 
viewpoint from these more general interpretations. See Frederick 
ds Allent Only Yesterday (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931), pp. 
2-343 for a full list of causes. 
CHAPTER II 
RELIEF: THE FIRST WINTER 
Unemployment had been increasing in Tulsa since early in 1929. Lit1 
:tention had been given to it, however, either by local. officials or by 
le public in general. The very nature of Tulsa's economic institutions 
~obably played a part in concealing the true state of the city's unem-
.oyment situation. In 1929 only one-half of one percent of Tulsa's 
Lctories employed more than 1,000 wage earners.l Those employing more 
Lan 500 workers were only 1.4 percent of the whole, and but 3.4 percent 
1ployed more than 250. The numerically small group e~ploying more than 
.000 workers each, while including the largest employers, accounted for 
.ightly less than 25 percent of all wage earners. Plants which em-
.oyed 500 or less had 61.9 percent of all the workers on their payrolls. 
1ctories employing fewer than 100 workers constituted 87.2 percent of 
.1 manufacturing institutions and employed 28.8 percent of all the 
1rkers. None of the large plants, those employing more than 500 workers 
.ut down completely, but rather the~ let employees go slowly. The small 
ants did not employ, as individual units, enough workers for layoffs in 
y one plant to affect appreciably the .total employment picture. 
City and county officials may have been unaware at first that an 
1These percentages are calculated from basic data found in: United 
.ates Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of 
!: United States: Manufactures, 1929 {Washington: United States 
,vernment Printing Office, 1933), p. 431. 
7 
~rgency existed. At any rate, they took no steps to aid those affected 
· it. When charity agencies of the city and county began to report in-
·eased loads, city officials did little more at first than to suggest 
te institution of a placement bureau for the unemployed. While they de-
.ted the means of obtaining funds for such a program, on October 26, 
130, the Tulsa Tribune launched an Odd Job Bureau. The decision to open 
.e agency followed a minor labor disturbance in the downtown district. 
1lsa authorities believed that false rumors were responsible for the 
·ief trouble. Some local unemployed men thought that the labor involved 
. demolishing a half-block of buildings on the site of a new federal 
2 .ilding were 11out-of-towners." 
An alliance between city authorities and private enterprise was 
.erefore created, with the Tribune supplying funds and advertising and 
.e city providing an office for the project and a staff of city workers • 
. e Bureau stressed that it could not promise work to the hundreds of 
rsons expected to register. Registration lists were to be given to 
ntractors and they would be asked to use them if possible. The Tribune 
on announced that there were 2,300 persons in the city who were out of 
3 rk. Approximately seventy percent of the names listed in the unem-
oyed roles were those of white men, twenty-five percent Negro men, 
ree percent white women, and two percent Negro women. The majority 
the men registering were common laborers. Some, however, were seeking 
erical office work and others semi-skilled work. Between 72 and 73 
2 
Tulsa Tribune, October 26, 1930, p~ 1. 
3 ' 
Ibid, November 25, 1930, p. 1. 
8 
1rcent were married. 4 A month later the Tribune revealed that jobs had 
1en found for 3,208 persons. 5 These were in the majority of instances, 
111ever, temporary positions. 
Mayor George L. Watkins was convinced by early November that unem-
.oyment was so drastic that it demanded a more aggressive public policy. 
1 therefore requested Harry H. Rogers, a prominent local banker, to 
6 iad a mayor's committee on unemployment. This administrative system 
LS based on a suggestion made by President Hoover's Committee for Em-
.oyment. The President's Committee had suggested that such local com-
.ttees be staffed with representatives of labor and industry as well as 
7 .th public officials and welfare administrators. This suggestion was 
illowed closely in selecting personnel for the Tulsa committee. The 
1dy was made responsible for fund raising, the administration of work 
1lief, the coordination of direct relief, and for publicity and researcb 
A cautious spending policy was developing among employed laborers as 
result of their observations of heavy layoffs. If businessmen were 
,de aware of this, Mayor Watkins was convinced that they would "stop 
8 .ring and start hiring." The lliayor's committee tried to get all 
4 
Tulsa Tribune. November 25, 1930, p. 1. A federal census taken at 
1is time, but not published until several years later, reveals that thet 
ire actually 4,317 persons in the city without employment: United States 
1partment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the 
1ited States: Unemployment, 1930. (Washington: United States Governmen 
·inting Office, 1933), p. 816. 
5 Tulsa Tribune, November 25, 1930, p. 1. 
6Tuls,!. World, November 3, 1930, p. 1. 
7The President's Emergency Committee for Employment and the Presi-
1nt's Organization on Unemployment Relief, Community Plans !ill! Actions, 
1mbers 1-3 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1931-
132). 
8Tulsa World, November 3, 1930, p. 1. 
9 
>ssible Tulsa employers to agree that no reduction in the wage scale or 
te number of persons employed would take place in their establishments 
ccept for inefficiency. Favorable replies were quick in coming. The 
ld-Continent Petroleum Company endorsed the committee's continuous em-
loyment resolution, thus assuring its approximately 1,600 Tulsa em-
loyees of permanent positions with no salary cuts during the winter. 
te Tulsa offices of the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company restored 
,nfidence to its 600 employees by approving the plan a few days later. 
, Thanksgiving Day it was estimated that some 12,000 Tulsans had re-
iived pledges that their jobs were secure in this movement. 9 
In early December, 1930, a city employment bureau was established. 
differed from the earlier Tribune-sponsored organization in that it 
,ught jobs of a more permanent nature for the applicants it received. 
'.ulsa jobs for jobless Tulsans" was the motto of the new concern, but 
lOugh the plan seemed to be working at first, a shattering fact soon 
,s apparent. There simply were more jobless Tulsans than there were 
,lsa jobs. Spending slumped after Christmas, and, in the early days of 
.nuary, the unemployment problem reached its most acute proportions yet. 
Ever greater numbers of people were forced to turn to the county for 
.d. By January, 1931, some 2,000 people were regularly visiting the 
,unty Humane Society to obtain grocery orders or a check to pay rent, 
li h d . . b'll lO .s , g t or me 1.c 1.ne 1. s • The lines were so long on some days that 
. e relief seekers flooded the corridors and spilled over onto the court 
,use steps. It was soon obvious that county funds could not outlast the 
9 Tulsa Tribune, November 26, 1930» p. 2. 
lOTulsa World, January 7, 1931, p. 3. 
10 
.nter charity needs. Under an agreement which existed between Community 
.nd directors and the county, those agencies of the Fund which furnished 
,od and shelter to families had concerned themselves with persons who 
d been in Tulsa for less than six months, while those qualified as lega 
· 11 
sidents.were handled by the county. Under the stress of emergency, 
wever, the Community Fund agencies did not stand on the letter of this 
ipulation. They gave aid to all they could. 
County officials believed that their funds would last until January 
The Family Welfare Society, foremost of the Fund agencies, agreed to 
ke over the county's load on that date. It was oiling its machinery to 
so when, on January 9, the money was gone. The next morning the chari 
ne was sent to the red brick house at 2'06 South Cheyenne Avenue, where 
ny of the city's relief agencies had their headquarters. There the 
ne wound so far back from the entrance that people called the head-
arters of the Family Welfare Society asking whether a mob was attemptin. 
loot its offices.12 
Overwhelmed by this onslaught of the unemployed, the directors of 
a Family Welfare Society had to find some way to distinguish the needy 
om the "deadbeats." An organization was needed, it was believed, to 
i,estigate "real" need and to prevent the spread of voluntary indigency. 
ss Margaret Woodson of Kansas City, therefore, was brought to Tulsa to 
chairman of a special relief organization. 13 She was a professional 
:ial worker trained in the case work principle. Before relief was 
lnted, the home of each applicant was visited and the actual condition 
11 10, 1931 » 2. Tulsa Tribune, January P• 
12tulsa World, January 10, 1931, p. 2. 
13 March 15, 1931, 3. Tulsa Tribune, p. 
11 
the family observed. The workers sought out those whose ills stemmed 
om involuntary unemployment, and tqen attempted to find the way they 
uld be relieved permanently and economically. Men applying for relief, 
aiming to be unemployed, and maintaining that they had made an honest 
fort to·correct this conditio0i,were asked to work for the Society in 
turn for relief. The Society, with fifteen volunteers aiding Miss 
odson, assumed, investigated and aided 419 cases in the first four days 
14 ter it took over the county load. 
In January of 1930 the case load of the Family Welfare Society had 
en 450 cases. By January of 1931 its case load had increased to ap-
oximately 1,500 cases. The budget of the Society from November 1, 1930 
November 1, 1931 had been set at $38,000. By March, 1931, the agency 
d already expended $36,000. From November 1, 1929 to November 1, 1930 
a Family Welfare Society had aided 1,700 cases. From November 1, 1930 
July 1, 1931, it aided 3,415. This was twice as many in eight months 
15 it had aided in a year before. 
Families Cared For 1930 1931 
January •••••••••••• 673 1,506 
February ••••••••••• 621 1,900 
Ma. rch . ......•..•... 637 1,772 
April •••••••••••••• 553 1,532 
Ma.y O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 457 1,275 
June ••••••••••••••• 417 1,200 
On the subject of the increased activities of the Family Welfare 
:iety, the Secretary of the organization, Mrs. Grace Cone, commented: 
ie moral of the story seems to be that we have more applicants who have 
~en our time, but to each we have been forced to give less relief than 
14 Tulsa World, January 15, 1931 9 p. 3. 
15 
(Tulsa) Family Welfare Society, Report of the Year's Work, 1931, 
4. 
12 
would have in normal times. 1116 The Society had special reasons for 
1ting to do a good job. If increased contributions to carry them throu~ 
1 emergency were to be secured, they would have to prove their capacity 
handle relief problems adequately. They were endeavouring to prove, 
line with the lofty ideas of social work, the efficacy of investigat!or 
discriminating between the needy and imposters. They wanted to 
lOnstrate through the flexibility and economy of their work that the 
1ation of emergency agencies, which was being discussed·, would be un-
:essary. Perhaps· the most extreme opponents of private charity in 
.sa were the labor groups, and it was largely due to criticism from 
·kingmen that the Family Welfare Society felt it needed so badly to 
,ve itself. Extreme labor elements felt that charitable agencies were 
:t ''an aristocratic concession to poverty. 1117 
Meanwhile, the Tulsa County Humane Society awaited additional funds 
:h which to work. Private enterprise cooperated in the interim. The 
:tern States Grocery Company and Safeway Stores loaded a truck with 
.00 pounds of beans, 3,600 pounds of flour, 12,500 pounds of corn meal, 
I pounds of rice, 15 large cases of peanut butter 9 17 cases of sandwich 
·ead, and a large collection of miscellaneous groceries and delivered 
:m to the Humane Society. 18 The Banfield Packing Company gave a large 
,ply of salt pork and pigs feet. 19 The bakeries of Tulsa were doing 
1ir part in supplying 1,000 loaves of bread per day. 20 These foods 
16Tulsa Tribune, January 15, 1931, p. 1. 
17 
Tulsa Unionist-Journal, February, 1931, p. 5. 
1~ulsa World, January 17, 1931, p. ·2. 
191bid. 
20Tulsa Tribune, March 15, 1931, p. 2. 
13 
re distributed in unprepared form rather than as sandwiches. W. L. 
rth, chairman of the county commissioners, had firmly declared his 
position to needy families being forced into "li"lring out of a sack. u21 
County officials made an effort to transfer funds from other depart-
~ts of the government to the aid of the Humane Society. The idea was 
~pped, however, when North was told by the state Supreme Court in an 
formal advisory opinion that it would be unlawful to transfer funds 
propriated for other causes. 22 With it appearing that the county would 
stymied in its relief efforts until the adoption of a new budget in 
Ly, a month-long series of conferences of city officials and other 
~erested citizens ensued in an effort to find some way of easing the 
Efering of the unemployed. The atmosphere of these discussions was 
1se. Already there had been at least two minor demonstrations by the 
amployed. Both of these attempts to attract attention had failed due 
a lack of response by the proposed participants. Some Tulsa officials 
lred that not a few among the unemployed would resort to force and 
>lence rather than to submit to the humiliation of relief from public 
private charity. 
Tulsa authorities were thus convinced that more extensive and 
Eferent methods of relief were needed in order to preserve the public 
Lee. This feeling was perhaps best expressed by a local officeholder 
m he dee la red: 
The situation is acute, but I am confident that we will get 
relief somehow, somewhere. We must have it. We don't want 
anything to happen in Tulsa like they had over there in 
Oklahoma City Friday when an army of unemployed persons stormed 
the city hall making demands for relief.23 
21 Tulsa World, January 17, 1931, p. 2. 
22Ibid. 
14 
lsa officials became even more alarmed a short while later when another 
:ident, more drastic than the one referred to, took place at the 
.ahoma capital. Three hundred members of the Oklahoma City Unemployed 
1ncil marched on a grocery store there demanding food. It had taken 
) office·rs to put down the trouble, and the incident -attracted nation-
le attention. What was particularly disturbing to Oklahoma City of-
:ials, and to Tulsa leaders as wellp was the fact that though the march 
l been made by an obviously radical 6lement, some 3,000 persons had 
;hered to watch, and many had cheered the group on.24 
From the conference of civic leaders there finally emerged an im-
liate relief measure. The mayor's committee had advanced a plan-where-
some $10,000 would be made available to put 550 unemployed Tulsans to· 
·k on public works projects. 25 The plan evolved from the theory that 
was better for men to work for their keep than to receive charity, and 
,ma desire to prevent the burden on relief agencies from growing any 
.vier. It was also felt that this type of program would be more bene-
ial to the community. The city would receive some return on the m~ney 
ested. The program, however, immediately drew the heavy criticism of 
organized private philanthrophy groups. These elements questioned 
_assumption of the committee that such made-work was all that was neede 
do away with pauperism and unemployment. These charity organizations 
o feared that funds procured through what they called "high pressure 
licity" would not offset the decrease that could be anticipated in 
24 Oklahoma City Times, January 20, 1931, p. 1. See also: David A. 
nnon, The Great Depression (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
1, Inc., i960), pp. 119-120. 
25.rulsa Tribune, January 28, 1931 9 p. 2. 
15 
rect contributions to the existing agencies.26 
Those Tulsans who had been fortunate enough to maintain their jobs 
re called upon to participate in the financing of this project. Em-
>yees were asked to authorize their employers to deduct a minimum of 
fty cents a week from their salaries during the next three months. Em-
>yers were then to match their employees' contributions, and the money 
1ld be turned in weekly to the city finance department. Since, however 
all citizens could be reached in such an employer-employee canvass, 
committee mailed some 5 9 000 letters to other citizens asking for 
>scriptions that would pay a man for three days work on public works 
· db h i · 27 >Jects arrange y t e c ty engineer. Trusting in the people of 
Lsa to respond, a group of bankers advanced an interest-free $10,000 
the committee so that work could begin immediately.28 
According to the provisions of this plan 9 those employed would work 
~ee days a week, receiving $3 per day for their time. 29 In addition to 
~ practical economic considerations, this rate of pay was agreed upon. 
:ause it was believed that normal wage rates would tend to attract. 
:kers away from regular industry. Many industries had cut their wages 
:ing the depression in order to enable the continuation of work for all 
tds. It was also felt that fewer of the "undeserving" would be drawn 
the program if the rate of payment was kept low. Although the committE 
l not define the term, it can probably be assumed that they were re-
·ring to migratory workers. Not only low pay 9 but the method of payment 
26Tulsa World 9 January 30 9 1931 9 p. 7. 
27Tulsa World» January 28, 1931 9 p. 3. 
28rulsa Tribune, February 1, 1931, p. 2. 
29Tulsa World» January 31 9 1931 9 p. 4. 
16 
to be used to safeguard against such abuses. Workers were to be paid 
scrip» a special form of credit slip 9 to be issued by the city finance 
artment. Apparently this plan was adopted at least partly out of a 
r that the money paid the workers would be misspent. It is to the 
iit of the committee, however» that they devised a plan whereby the 
,er would receive greater value for his pay when paid in scrip than 
iid when he was paid in cash. 
The scrip was to be redeemable only at a central commissary to be 
1ed by the committee on unemployment.30 In order that the funds paid 
unemployed would have increased purchasing power 3 food and clothes 
! to be sold at wholesale prices in the commissary. To avoid infringe-
:s of this privilege, no sales for cash were to be made. Workers were 
)e allowed to convert their scrip into checks at this distributing 
:er, but these checks could be cashed only at the city finance depart-
: 9 by landlords and by gas and electric offices. None of the executivei 
:harge of the commissary were to receive pay. Clerks at the comm.is-
, were to be selected from the ranks of the unemployed and paid in. 
Lp. 
This combination made-work and commissary plan did not meet with un-
1ous approval. Labor groups criticized it both because the wages were 
regular and because the participants were not to be paid in cash. 31 
of the small merchants protested that the city had no right to engage 
L trade at their expense. 32 And some of the unemployed later protested 
30Tulsa Tribune» February 1, 1931» p. 2. 
3lTulsa Unionist-Journal» March~ 1931 9 p. 2. 
32rulsa World, February 1, 1931» p. 4. 
lack 9f courtsey on the part of clerks selected from their own 
ts. 33 But none of these protests were more than weak murmurs at 
;t. 
At daybreak on the morning of Tuesday, January 27, 1931, a long 
1ue of men formed at the entrance to the office of the city's 
:ral employment bureau on Cincinnati Avenue. 34 It had been an-
iced that manpower utilized in the new made-work program would have 
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1t to be investigated by the unemployment committee or by one of the 
1cies of the Community Fund. Those obtaining work were supposed to 
~esent the neediest families in Tulsa. These men now waited an op-
:unity to get inside and place their applications for jobs which 
city administration had promised would be ready. This was the his-
'.c date for the launching of Tulsa's first work relief program. 
Almost every type of man, it was reported, was found among the first 
1p of workers. Administrators of the p~ogram made every effort to put 
L available man to work. One man with a wooden leg was given a job 
iping out a warehouse. 35 Work relief for men consisted chiefly of. 
y outdoor work. Two hundred men were put to work leveling hillocks, 
miag up river banks, and moving rockpiles in Newblock Park. Another 
hundred men were dispatched in crews of a dozen to repair ruts beside 
pavement, sweep the streets, clean up the backyards of West Tulsa, 
33 Ibid. 
34Tulsa Tribune, January 28, 1931, p. 3. 
35 
Ibid., January 27, 1931, p. 2. 
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ln dumps, build roads and clean out lakes. 36 Exactly 1,480 jobs were 
~n Tulsa residents by the plan during the first week. The men working 
4,676 dependents, making of total of 6»156 persons benefiting. 37 
With emergency relief measures now taken to correct the unemployment 
1ation, Mayor Watkins announced that any labor disturbance growing out 
:he problem would be dealt with summarily by police: 
Information has come to city officials that certain individuals 
whose prime purpose in life is to destroy government 9 -incite 
riot, and create havoc among the people are now at work in 
Tulsa. In view of the fact that arrangements have been made and 
are now in operation for caring for the needy citizens ••• such 
persons will not be tolerated nor allowed to ply their trade 
in this vicinity. The police have instructions to arrest any 
person or persons who attempt by word of mouth 9 act or deed to 
incite the populace and such persons will be dealt with sum-
marily.38 
The mayor's committee had estimated that for the approximately 
10 unemployed Tulsans» a made-work payroll of $10 9 880 per week would 
equired for twelve weeks. This meant, figuring $9 a week for each 
that 10,000 Tulsa employees had to authorize their employers to de-
at least fifty cents a week from their wages with the employers 
hing these contributions in the same amount. 39 Response of firms and 
viduals to appeals for cooperation in the employer-employee financing 
s were at first considered good. Among the early 100 percent sub-
bers were six oil companies» thirteen merchants» and all the city 0 s 
s. The Tulsa Retail Merchant Association rallied to the support of 
plan. Most of the firms which quickly delivered funds reported that 
36~. 
37Tulsa World» January 28» 1931» p. 2~ 
38 Tulsa World» January 26,. 1931» p. 2. 
38Tulsa Tribune» February 1 9 1931» p. 2. 
19 
average contribution of their employees was more than the fifty cents 
eek suggested as a minimum. One company gave a unique twist to the 
n. Payroll contributions of $120 per week were taken out in scrip by 
company and used to hire back persons formerly employed by the 
pany but released during the depression.40 
The hiring of large numbers of men for public works stimulated the 
loyment of individuals to work about homes and business houses on odd 
s. The reason was that sales of scrip to private individuals and firms 
begun. Individuals were urged to purchase the scrip and pay off 
~ers with it, or turn it back to the city so that it could be used to 
e additional workers for public projects. An indication that the $9 
week earned by the men was sufficient was seen in the fact that more 
1 $9,000 in scrip was outstanding on February 19. Thus it seemed that 
money earned by the men had not only fed their families but also pro-
ad a little surplus. It had» incidentally, been decided that scrip 
Ld be stamped "negotiable" at the city commissary and then used for 
ie with merchants anywhere in the city.41 
Foreign immigrants to this country have at times had cause to com-
ln about the reception they received. Such immigrants, however, have 
ar known a more persistent scorn than the Tulsa officials had for 
rants from other cities and other states who arrived in the city during 
depression. Committee members had noticed an apparent influx of 
lters soon after they announced the new made-work program and empha-
ad that only Tulsa residents would be cared for. But, as knowledge 
:he new plan spread, transients came in ever greater numbers hoping 
40~. 
41 (Tulsa) RP.port of the M.ayor Os Committee en Unemployment~ February 
10~1 n 
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:rash the gates. It seemed to one committee member as if: ''the en-
: Mexican population of the Adamson Coal Mining Company, east of Tulsa 
now shut down migrated. 42 The problem created here, however, was 
.ly solved. The committee required naturalization papers before giving 
Mexicans jobs. Mayor Watkins in the meantime ordered a police drive 
lear all the transients out of town. Falsification of the records 
titted by workers were sometimes discovered and compensation denied. 
The insistence of the mayor's committee on its right to investigate 
oughly every man.placed on a job through the employer-employee fund 
to a clash with state authorities. A letter from E. N. Ellis, state 
oyment officer in Tulsa, to state labor commissioner W. A. Murphy 
ged the committee with refusing to accept men whom Ellis had recom-
ed without further investigation. The letter also stated that the 
.ittee was not allowing a fair share of men to the office of Ellis to 
mployed.43 The committee refused to yield. It unanimously adopted 
solution which bluntly declared that all men hired to do scrip work 
d have to be cleared through the city central employment bureau or 
of the agencies available in the Community Fund. To ensure an even 
vigorous enforcement of the rule, a special group was appointed to 
d up investigation procedures. Pending more complete financial reports 
the perfection of the investigation system, the mayor reduced crews on 
ic works for a limited period. 44 
Although the committee's research did not reveal that unemployment 
on the decrease, H. C. Tyrell, chairman of the employer-employee fund, 
42Ibid. 
43 Tulsa Tribune, February 8, 1931, p. 2. 
44 Ibid. 
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!d his belief that the original estimate of 5,000 unemployed heads 
lmilies was too high. On his recommendation, therefore, the committee 
ied its goal of an income of $45,000 weekly for the emp,loyment of such 
lents to $20,000 a week, which for a time they believed would meet the 
1 of the Tulsa citizenry. At the same time Tyrell declared: 
The response of firms and individuals to our appeal is highly 
gratifying. I don't know of more than two instances in which 
aa organization has failed to cooperate and in both cases it 
was a branch office with headquarters outside the state. I 
am confident that our $20,000 weekly income will be subscribed 
within tea days.45 
By February 15th, however, it was evident that the number of men 
employed would have to be curtailed if more funds were not received. 
receipts at this stage under the plan amount to about $5,000 a week, 
1as $13,000 a week was necessary to keep the program in minimum oper-
l.46 Believing that a large number of firms had started subscription 
., and therefore, that additional funds would shortly materialize, the 
.ttee allowed its expenditures to exceed weekly income by about $18,000. 
Additional funds did not, however, immediately develop. In view of 
fact, the committee decided that a special campaign was necessary _to 
trimming the number of jobs being s~pplied. Nearly 2,000 individuals 
eea given three days of work at $3 a day during the three weeks the 
had been in operation, but the unemployment problem was far from 
d. A direct appeal was thus made to the citizenry to subscribe funds 
nemploymeat relief at once. The petition issued by the mayor's com-
e read: 
45Tulsa World, February 10, 1931, p. 3. 
46Tulsa Tribune, February 15j 1931, p. 2. 
47 Ibid. 
No movement in the history of Tulsa has done more to stabilize 
business and prevent panic than the present system of providing 
work for the deserving unemployed residents of the city. 
The employees of a large number of concerns have pledged 
amounts of fifty cents a week over a period of twelve weeks to 
finance the _issuance of scrip for this purpose. Many employers 
are matching the contributions of employees. The response has 
been generous and gratifying, but sufficient funds have not 
been pledged to take care of all the deserving applicants for 
work. 
In fact, the committee faces a deficit and must immediately 
curtail, to some extent, the number of men to be employed daily 
unless, and until, additional contributions are received. This 
is a responsibility of every citizen whether he be an employee 
or employer, a business or professional man.48 
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llthough the public response was never as good as the committee had 
nally hoped it would be, sufficient contributions were received to 
the program going. By March 1 scrip had been issued in the amount 
5,641, with five thousand employable persons.receiving approximately 
ach from this source. 49 Three thousand and twelve men were paid in 
for work done in March of 1931, which with dependents meant that an 
:1.ted 10,000 persons benefited.-50 In addition many men and women we.re 
temporary outside jobs. The scrip program was scheduled to expire 
r 1 9 but because an estimated 3,000 were still unemployed, many of 
,ith dependents, employment relief was extended for as long as the 
available would last. 51 In April the committee was spending $8,500 
1ek paying men working on public projects. 52 
ly the late spring of 1931 9 however» it was evident that unemployment 
f~ulsa Tribune, February 20, 1931, p. 3. 
f9 (Tulsa) Report of the Ma.yor 8 s Com:D.itt•=:e :.1 Un<fr.mployment~ March, 
P• 1. 
iO (Tulsa) Report of t:he Mayor's Comm.:i.ttee on UnempJl.oymentf April, 
p. 1. 
ilibid., May, 1931, p. 1. 
12.!!?.!!!,. 
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id consequent demands for relief were constantly increasing. Local 
tnds would soon be exhausted. With summer coming, the city abruptly 
included its special emergency efforts, leaving permanent public and 
·ivate relief agencies to carry on as best they could. Tulsa 0 s ten-
:ncy to limit its emergency relief to the winter inspired some criticisn 
· representatives of private agencies. These groups were not satisfied 
.th the spasmodic, seasonal character of charity work carried on by 
,ecial committees. 
On May 15, citizens of Tulsa holding the balance of the scrip issued 
the relief effort were asked to turn it in. The city commissary was 
be closed. Approximately $2,500 worth of scrip was still in the hands 
individuals who had either worked for it ·or purchased it to pay for 
e services of persons working under the unemployment organization. 53 
all $93,623 in scrip was sold during the campaign, resulting, so the 
mmittee said, in 32,000 jobs for the unemployed.54 Roy B. Hinkle, 
ecial agent for the Federal Department of Labor for Missouri, Kansas, 
lahoma, Arkansas, and Tennessee, gave Tulsa credit for handling the 
tuation more effectively than any other city in the country.55 
The partial success of the city 8 s made-work program during the winte 
1931 indirectly created friction between Tulsa officials and state 
thorities. Indiscriminate soup lines had never been popular with the 
lsans in control of relief. Such aid had been of greatest benefit for 
a transient population, in one day and out the next. Yet 9 just at the 
53 (Tulsa) Report of the MayorGs Committee on Unemployment 9 May, 
31, p. 2. 
54Ibid. 
55 Tulsa World» May 17, 1931, p. 3. 
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lme that the Tulsa depression problem had been curtailed, Governor 
llliam H. Murray ordered the establishment of state soup kitchens in 
1e city. 
Opposition quickly developed to the Murray order. This criticism 
LS strongest among the directors of Tulsa 0 s private philanthropic 
~encies, who had gained a great deal of influence when they rescued the 
,unty during the winter. These leaders maintained that the poor should 
1 aided not in promiscuous masses at public distributing points, but by 
.sits to their homes. They believed that indiscriminate relief would 
Ldermine the self-respect of the recipient, since individual capacity 
Ld responsibility were not taken into consideration. They, in short, 
•posed any kind of aid which did not take into appraisal its effect upor 
Le receivers. 56 City officials were, on the other hand, not so much 
,ncerned with the idealistic side of the issue. In fact, they had 
rlier, before the adoption of the new program, requested a state soup 
tchen for West Tulsa. But they did fear that relief distribution with-
t proper investigation would draw undesirable persons to the city to 
are with the unemployed the funds available. Mayor Watkins, therefore, 
ntacted Murray requesting that the state not interfere in local relief 
ministration by the establishment of the free food camp he proposed. 
e governor replied that the reports of his state relief workers indi-
ted that "in one of the outlying districts food is necessary to be 
57 
spensed free." The governor went on to declare that he would not re-
11 the soup kitchens until the city furnished provision for feeding 
56Tulsa Tribune, March 15, 1931, p. 3. 
57 Tulsa World, February 1, 1931, p. 5. 
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ese persons. 58 
The loose handling of the state relief organization brought the 
ath of Tulsa down on Murray more than once. The governor had left the 
pression with those whom he commissioned to spread the state relief 
~dover Oklahoma that they had authority to feed all they found hungry. 
rray's Tulsa representative Colonel L. W. Rook authorized J.P. Gal~ 
~her, manager of the Light House Mission, to charge purchases to the 
ate relief fund. Gallagher fed hundreds with the aid of this credit, 
Ly to find his bill .disallowed. The governor claimed that Gallagher 
,er had official sanction, and that nothing but personal subscriptions 
1ld liquidate the debt. Tulsa wholesalers were forced to take the 
is.59 
When the intensity of the relief crisis was temporarily alleviated 
the spring of 1931, Richard Lloyd Jones, editor of the Tulsa Tribune, 
>k a belated slap at the governor. His editorial apparently reflected 
~ong local sentiment against the meddling of Murray: 
Tulsa has been able to take care of its own. That was the de-
cision by the representatives of relief and civic agencies ••• 
when it was announced that Governor Murray planned to send 
soup kitchens into Tulsa. 
The unemployment situation in the state was serious. With 
characteristic lack of discrimination Governor Murray jumped 
into the breach. It meant little to him that some communities 
could care for their own while others were robbed of all self-
support. 
Tulsa did well when it declined state aid for its needy. 
Confidence in its local agencies prompted it to decline with 
thanks. And, again, the sufficiency of one centralized body 
to administer local relief is established.60 
58Ibid. 
59 Tulsa World, May 1, 1931, p. 2. 
60 Tulsa Tribune, May 1, 1931, p. 10. 
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At approximately the same time that the made-work program was put 
o operation in Tulsa, a group of physicians and health workers repre-
.ting the city, the county, the Public Health Association and the 
nty Medical Society had drawn up plans for a free medical service for 
unemployed. Medical expenses for the impoverished were reduced by 
enlargement of the City Health Bureau. City hospital student nurses 
e detailed to the Bureau, and various physicians agreed to donate 
ir time. A group of druggists agreed to fill prescriptions issued by 
clinic at wholesale prices. Hospitalization, including minor surgi-
work, was provided in some cases. 
Only persons recommended by the city's relief agencies were admitted 
the clinic. Special equipment for the clinic, as well as the actual 
t of the drugs used, were paid from the employer-employee fund of the 
Jr's committee on unemployment. In the first two months of its opera-
~, 2,309 persons were treated in the clinic and thirty-two homes were 
ited. 61 The doctors participating in the clinic also agreed to continu1 
:are for their own patients who had become dependents. 
Some Tulsa families were deprived completely of shelter. Many of 
n took residence in the crudest kind of shacks at the outskirts of 
city or merely lived in the open. Believing that it was foolish to 
people be evicted from one house only to have to find another for them 
county asked many landlords to help by reducing the rent of needy 
Llies, and in some cases it was reportedly cut in half. The problem 
Einding new housing for relief families became more difficult as 
Llies were forced to move more frequently. Many landlords seem to 
1 preferred to leave their properties vacant rather than accept relief 
61 Tulsa Tribune, March 15, 1931, p. 7. 
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ilies as tenants. The classified advertising section of the city's 
major daily newspapers indicate a constant growth in the number of 
ilable rental units while at the same time Tulsa's relief organizations 
ducted a persistent search for such housing. The problem of adequate 
sing was never really satisfactorily solved. The situation became so 
tical, in fact, that Governor Murray later asked the department of the 
62 
r for tents to provide shelter for squatters. 
One of the most disturbing outgrowths of the great depression was the 
~lem of a migratory·population. Men, great numbers of small boys, some 
aless women and girls, and sometimes entire families left their homes 
,ander about the country. The reluctance of Tulsa officials to extend 
1lar benefits to these persons has already·been discussed. This at-
1de was quite in contrast to that which prevailed in Oklahoma City. 
:he latter city a temporary village for non-resident families, with 
! rudimentary conveniences and with a public school for children, was 
lblished. 
As a consequence of the hostile Tulsa attitude toward migrants, its 
1sient problem soon became acute. Some revelations of drastic poverty 
1g these groups finally prompted the city to provide food and shelter 
the transients until they could get out of town. The adoption of this 
policy was prompted by the discovery of nearly twenty persons near the 
tr in Newblock Park where they had been living in crude shanties and 
tents. 63 A sociologist making a national study of the transient 
62 (Tulsa) Report of the Subcommittee on Transients, Mayor's Committee 
rnemployment, February 15, 1931, p. l. 
63 Ibid., p. 2. 
1blem wrote·: 
One woman, camped near Tulsa at the edge of a swamp, told me as 
she scratched away at the boils on her face, how healthy it is 
camping out of doors •. Three hundred feet away, eight out of 
twelve in two. families were sick with malaria. 64 
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:y officials arranged for these people and others to be transferred to 
lrch basements and to the fairground buildings during the winter. 
Private agencies such as the Salvation Army and the local rescue 
sions provided food and shelter for men. In Tulsa these agencies ob-
.ned some aid from the Community Fund in their operations. The Mission 
Redeeming Love, the Salvation ArurJ, the Hiland Home, and the Light 
lSe Mission, all, at one time or another, handled the transient problem 
· the Fund. During its tenure as the Fund's official agent, the Salva-
,n Army maintained transient men for a maximum of three days during 
1ir stay in the city. Such an arrangement, it was felt, gave the men 
;ficient time to find jobs in Tulsa if any were available, and if not 
move on to some other place. While at the home they were served two 
.ls per day. 
Children who had an insufficient or unbalanced diet at home were 
.bled to stay in school through an expansion of school lunch funds. 
·ent-Teacher Associations participated actively in relief programs in 
1 individual schools. Although the Independent Party, an organization 
the unemployed, was unsuccessful in its efforts to secure free lunches 
city schools, the installation of the ten cent lunch was arranged to 
;in with the opening of the 1931-1932 term. The lunch included a sand-
:h filled with meat or a meat substitute, two hot vegetables and milk. 6~ 
64 
Robert Wilson, "Transient Families," The Family, XVI (December, 
10), pp. 243-251. 
65 
(Tulsa) Report of the Central Clothing Dispensary, Mayor's Com-
:tee on Unemployment, April, 1931, p. 1. 
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lan to aid children who could not go to school because of a lack of 
table clothing was begun by the Parent-Teacher Association Council. 
A central clothing dispensary was established on Bundle Sunday, 
ember 5, 1930, when Tulsans laid thousands of bundles of clothes on 
ir front po~ches. By June of 1931 at least one thousand adults and 
66 
ldren had received 30,910 garments from this dispensary. And there 
e many other relief services of a varied sort. The city water depart-
t extended credit to needy persons under an established policy. The 
ahoma Natural Gas Company cooperated with the Mayor's Committee in ex-
ding credit and giving free service. Between November, 1930 and May, 
1, more than $5000 worth of free gas was furnished to more than 500 
dy families, with more than 6,000 persons benefiting. 67 A recreation 
~ram for the unemployed which stressed citizenship was carried on by 
YM::A at various locations in Tulsa. 
Unfortunately for the cause of an effective permanent relief program, 
Mayor's Committee on Unemployment failed to consolidate the gains it 
made during the winter of 1931. It relaxed its efforts as soon as 
initial crisis was passed. It now turned to stop-gap measures for the 
ner of 1931 after its made-work program had come to an end. The com-
:ee had learned that there were many unemployed persons under its 
!rvision who intended providing their families against hunger during 
summer by cultivating a garden. Aware of the potentialities of such 
Lon, the committee authorized a city-wide canvass of vacant lots to 
lin plots for the use of Tulsa's registered unemployed. The committee 
66(Tulsa) Report of the Central Clothing· Dispensary, Mayor's Committe1 
Jnemployment, April, 1931, p. 1. 
67 (Tulsa) Report of the Subcommitte~ on Free Public Utiiities, Mayor'1 
mittee on Unemployment, May, 1931, p. 1. 
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also hopeful that thousands of owners of vacant lots could be per-
ded to rent them on a share basis and furnish the necessary garden 
lements and seeds. In some cases free use of land was offered, and 
the unemployed were unable to take advantage of it due to their 
ancial condition. The committee therefore worked out a plan whereby 
ls were provided and seeds obtained through the free-seeds fund set 
by the state legislature. 68 
The garden project put hundreds of families back on the .basis of at 
st partial self-support within the few weeks required for the maturing 
garden crops. In some cases these gardens offered a means of supple-
ting low wages with early morning labor. Crops included potatoes, 
ns, cabbage, corn, beets, squashes, and pumpkins for the most part. 
nips were produced where the soil was unsuitable for anything else. 
plus produce was sold by the gardeners to private consumers. The pre-
ent for this program was the city's endeavor during World War I when 
re was a speecial need for the growing of all kinds of fruits and vege-
les. During 1917 and 1918 hundreds of vacant lots had been cultivated 
rulsa. Real estate board officials worked closely with the sub-com-
tee appo~nted by Mayor Watkins in working out plans for listing 
ilable lands. 69 All in all, however, this program proved too small 
too scattered to make much of a dent in relief needs. The failure 
the city to provide a more complete program of relief during the summer 
ld mean another panic effort the following fall. 
For various reasons unemployment had not been considered a serious 
68 (Tulsa) Report of the Subcommittee on the Cultivation of Vacant 
s, Mayor's Committee on Unemployment, June, 1931, p. 1. 
69Ibid., p. 2. 
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lem by officials until late in 1930. Once its severity was recog-
d, efforts to correct it were, at least initially, clumsy and mis-
cted. City officials persisted in viewing the troublesome situation 
temporary condition. Tulsa authorities in the beginning tried 
ly to correlate an over-estimated number of jobs with an under-
mated number of workers. No thorough measures were taken until the 
ustion of the county's relief funds forced a more realistic view of 
situation. Partly because of the social theory of these officials 
partly because of the fear of disorder among the unemployed, a made-
program and other activities were entered into by the city under 
direction of a new, aggressive Mayor's Committee on Unemployment. 
ort for the program was not what had been expected, but there was 
icient response to enable considerable alleviation of the ills of un-
oyment. 
There appeared during the winter the first signs of several differ-
s of opinion which were in the future destined to curtail the ef-
iveness of relief efforts. Sharply opposing points of view grew 
the matter of the purpose of relief and the method of distributing 
City officials tended to take a practical, economic view, while pro-
ional social workers in the charity agencies viewed relief as a re-
litation process. A combination of these views, as well as Governor 
ay's loose handling of the state relief program, led to a quarrel 
aen state and local officials. They had already quarreled once over 
stigation procedures, a problem which could be directly traced, at 
tin part, to the deep resentment of Tulsans for transients. 
The failure of the county to provide sufficient funds for charity 
shad led to a position of new respect for the Family Welfare Society. 
was to result in the future in a more independent line of action by 
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a Society. There also resulted from this episode a big interest by 
~ public in just how the county appropriated its funds. The winter 
closed with •ere stop-gap measures being taken for the summer by the 
:y, a course of action which would result in a similar state of unpre-
~edness the following winter. 
CHAPTER III 
RELiEF: THE STRUGGLE FOR FINANCES 
Prior to the great winter emergency, the Family Welfare Society h~d 
d only for transients, non-residents and a small percentage of the 
1 residents of Tulsa. Then, in January of 1931, the Society had been 
ed to take over most of the cases formerly handled by the County 
ne Society with county funds. The task had been a difficult one. The 
ety had neither adequate manpower nor sufficient funds to continue the 
ect for very long. It depended for the most part on volunteers to carr 
lts work, and on contributions to provide finances for it. Now that 
~epression had eased, therefore, the Society both expected and desired 
~urn to its previous arrangement. 
The county commissioners favored the new arrangement. The laws of the 
a made them responsible for a large portion of public charity, and this 
they did not deny. The commissioners maintained their complete willin 
to provide the funds necessary, but they wanted desperately to transfe 
:ask of administration. The handling of the charity funds by the count: 
:raditionally been rather loose. Demands were not heavy in ordinary 
;, and for this reason the commissioners had never worked out an ef-
Lve system of administration. The county had usually appropriated for 
Lty whatever was left over from the general fund after the other de-
~ents of government had been provided for. These funds were then dis-
Lted by the semi-public County Humane Society. The county was thus 
~ved when it was able to turn the administration of charity funds over 
ji 
:he Family Welfare Society in the winter of 1931, and now attempted to 
steps to make that arrangement permanent. 
Before the Family Welfare Society's reluctant new role could be made 
.cial and definite~ however,~ legal avenue had to be found for the 
1sfer of county funds to an agency of the Community Fund. The new fisci 
· was to begin on July 1. The Commissioners hoped to find authorizatior 
1 their proposed action before that date. With one brief announcement, 
ver, the directors of the Family Welfare Society suddenly p~t an end tc 
e plans. The Society served notice that after July 1, when the new 
ty funds were to be available, they would turn back to the county the 
ion of its cases which they had taken over. The Society thus made it 
n that it had no interest in the County's proposal. Nor did ·any of the 
r family welfare agencies of the Community Fund announce an interest. 
The County Commissioners had no choice but to begin preparations for 
care of the 2,500 needy families the Family Welfare Society was sending 
The first step taken was to tighten controls over relief expenditure 
those cases of direct immediate need were to be considered during the 
er months. Where any other type of aid was felt to be available, cases 
to be weeded out. This, it was hoped, would prevent serious strain on 
ty charity funds before winter arrived with its heavy load of cases. 
grocery orders were to be written at first, the payment of rents, gas, 
ts and other utilities being halted during the summer to make charity 
s meet more important needs. 2 
Most of the charity groups in Tulsa approved of the county's summer 
lTulsa Tribune, June 15, 1931, p. 3. 
2Ibid., June 28, 1931, p. 5. 
>my movement. The way in which the expenditures were reduced, however, 
~d some strong protests. County widows were the first group to suffer 
the new rigid standards of economy. Since February of 1931 they had 
receiving only $2~70 per month due to the exhaustion of county charity 
•• The widows were ordinarily paid $10 per month. Much unhappiness wa: 
td by this reduction. The county's deficiencies had a way of becoming 
liately painful for the private relief agencies of Tulsa, for when 
riduals were unable to obtain enough to satisfy their needs ~rom the 
:y, they frequently attempted to obtain additional help from one of the 
Lte organizations. Many of the widows had now been thrown back on non-
Le agencies in this manner. 
This shifting of cases generated discussion as to whether the county 
,een paying the widows a sufficient amount to begin with. And right 
Le midst of this talk came the announcement by the commissioners that 
i only $8,000 was available for the care of the widows, and since that 
Lt could not possibly be apportioned among the 130 who were on the roll: 
1ch a way as to provide them with their normal pension, no aid at all 
3 :o be given them. Of course, this is not exactly what the commissione1 
, but it was the impression they left. In reality the county was adopt: 
:ity's opinion that relief is unnecessary in the summer, and therefore 
I 
,ostponing any further payments until September. What possible justifi· 
,n there was for this belief it is hard to see, but it does seem to hav4 
the predominant viewpoint in the summer of 1931. Whereas the city had 
,ed with only mild criticism when it abandoned its made-work program, 
:ounty did not prove to be so fortunate. And it is interesting to note 
a_mong the strongest critics of the county action were some of the city 
3Tulsa World, July 1, 1931, p. 4. 
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Lcials who had satisfied themselves with stop-gap summer measures. 
The county's agents in the Humane Society now turned to the serious 
~ of handling the influx of cases from the Family Welfare Society. 
Laps the relief recipients had grown accustomed to the professional 
Ltment of social workers. At any rate they made their return to the 
Lne Society noisily. Many of the applicants for aid there quickly re-
Led to the Coannunity Fund agency, declaring that they had been refused 
and had been told to "come back in a week and we will see what we can 
4 
:or you." Some asserted that they could not wait a week to get milk 
their babies and went to the Public Health Association for aid. One 
Lg woman claimed that she had been denied aid because "they told me the~ 
.dn't do anything for us young people, that we.would have to fend for 
5 
1elves." Allegedly she then explained that the aid was not for her bu1 
her parents, and was told in reply that she would have to look out for 
L herself. 6 The Community Fund agencies with funds depleted could only 
l the applicants back to the court house. 
The county agent explained that only those people for whom t~e agency 
no case record were turned away, then politely, and only for a couple c 
7 
1 while a file was prepared on them. He further replied to his critic1 
••• it is the least deserving who cry the loudest when things don't 
go just to suit them. Many of those who have gone back with the 
report that we had refused to help them came in here with chips on 
their shoulders. They expected us to give them money and food 
right on the minute. When we didn't they left in a huff.a 
4Tulsa Tribune, July 3, 1931, p. 2. 
51b~d. 
61bid. 
7 Tulsa World, July 3, 1931, p. 3. 
81bid. 
Family Welfare Society, he said, had refused to allow the use of its ci 
rds, thereby making it necessary for the county to send out its own in· 
igators. The executive secretary of the Family Welfare Society took 
nse. She said the case records of the Society were at the complete dis 
1 of the county workers, adding that there had not been a single reques 
9 
them. 
It is barely possible that all these charges and counter-charges posse 
validity. There is little doubt that the county was reluctant to take 
its cases from the Family Welfare Society. This may well have affecte 
spirit with which it conducted the investigation of the original re-
aes. It is equally likely that some of the relief seekers were a 
Le tense, a bit quick to criticize. Being herded about from agency to 
:y to accomplish what at best must have been an uncomfortable process 
nany on relief at this time was probably disconcerting. And certainly 
:ould not deny that there are those among relief seekers at any date wh, 
repellent personalities. The fact that no more planning had been done 
:he return of the relief recipients was first and foremost a failure of 
:ounty, but the Family Welfare Society could have done much more than i1 
:o facilitate this process. The net result of it all was that admini-
:ive unity broke down on the Tulsa relief scene. 
Conditions had no more than settled down to an uneasy normalcy when 
al once again disrupted relief matters. The chairman, members of the 
tive committee, and the treasurer of the Tulsa County Humane Society 
ned. The resigning members claimed that during their tenure on the 
ttee they had found it necessary to take action to curb certain practic 
respect to the funds of the Society. In particular they referred to tb 
9 Tulsa World, July 3, 1931, p. 3. 
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tices of checks being drawn on the bank account of. the organization pa) 
to some officer or employee with no explanation as to the expenditure 
uch funds except to designate it as petty cash.lo 
The committee had ·sought to correct this situation. It had passed a 
lution requiring that all bills against the Society be presented to thE 
ittee for approval before they were paid. Checks, it had been ruled, 
d no longer be drawn to petty cash. Certain officers and employees, tt. 
ittee claimed, had resented this restriction and had continued to try 
ecure checks designated.as petty cash. In addition, the committee had 
ned that the president of the Society was engaged in some devious 
vities as an attorney. 11 Feeling that he was therefore not qualified t 
ct the affairs of the society and to handle its funds, they had demande 
he offer his resignation. The president, they held, had retaliated by 
ing a special meeting of the society at which he submitted and secured 
passage of a new constitution. This-constitution had divested the exec 
committee of its authority to handle the affairs of the society. The 
12 lttee, therefore, resigned. 
When this story was revealed to the press, the president of the Societ 
~ed that it was merely a matter of the personal animosity of the member 
1e executive committee toward him. He further maintained that the 
~man of the executive committee had been unsuccessful in his attempts 
13 
1n the Society and had thus launched a personal attack on him. 





:ever the true story was, the seed of doubt had been planted. Hereafter, 
commissioners announced, they would maintain direct supervision over 
distribution of county charity funds. The commission saw the need, it 
l, to discard slack methods and thereby eliminate loose access to the 
ls. They planned to employ trained workers to institute the case work 
:em.14 
These statements had hardly been made, however, before the commissioner 
Ltted that they were unable to handle the cases that had been turned back 
:hem by the Family Welfare Society. Maintaining that it was unable to 
sufficient investigators, the county urged that the Community Fund take 
: its work once more. Reference was made to the fact that the Family 
:are Society had case records on 2,500 families· which it had taken care 
luring the first six months of the year. Because these records would 
materially in avoiding duplication in charity work, it was proposed that 
Society take over the county load. 15 
The President of the Community Fund offered a qualified proposal to 
1me the county's case load. It would do so provided the county furnished 
Ldequate budget, and provided that the Family Welfare Society could re-
Lblish its budget. 16 But the Family Welfare Society rejected the move. 
!in its directors saw the opportunity to obtain a professional social 
; character for Tulsa charity permanently. The directors, therefore, de-
·ed that the organization could not assume any responsibility for pre-
.ng a temporary form of charity relief. It was, however, willing to 
14Tulsa World, August 15, 1931, p. 2. 
15Tulsa Tribune, August 21, 1931, p. 3. 
16 . 3 Ibid., August 28, 1931, p •• 
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tiate with Community Fund officials and the county commissioners re-
ing a permanent plan to take over the work. They felt that the county's 
e had been handled too slipshod in the past, and that a definite under-
.ding with county officials was desirable before they went into the work 
n.17 
In line with these statements and proposals the Community Fund finally 
ed to assume the county's charity relief on a budget to be supplied by .. 
county. The commissioners agreed to give the Fund a monthly budget to 
nd until October 1 or until some permanent relief org~nization could be 
.ed out. It was felt that the Family Welfare Society could probably take 
work on in the fall on a county budget even though it would not, perhaps 
d not, do so temporarily. The Fund officials,.however, made it clear 
their own family relief funds were nearly exhausted and that the county 
d have to furnish a budget immediately.18 
A new organization, the County Welfare Department, was created by the 
:unity Fund to handle the county's charity cases. Under their arrangemen· 
the Fund the county commissioners appointed Harold M. Vaughn, Pontiac, 
19 
igan welfare worker, as the agent to direct relief work. The county 
ished a budget of $4,000 per month for this new department's work, at 
same time urging that it be dispensed with the strictest economy. 20 The 
ling of the cases of persons residing outside the city was at first left 
he commissioners, but this was finally also turned over to the Welfare 
rtment with a $1,000 per month increase in the budget resulting. 
17Tulsa Tribune, August 29, 1931, p. 2. 
18Tulsa World, September 2, 1931, p. 4. 
19Ibid., September 11, 1931, p. 6. 
20Ibid. 
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At the same time the commissioners discharged the remaining workers i 
te County Humane Society and ordered the court house offices of the 
:ganization closed at once. In order to make sure that the money for the 
ilfare Department's budget would be available, the commissioners slashed 
Llaries among workers in other departments. The county also furnished th 
ilfare Department with four automobiles. Gasoline for the cars, a big 
:em in the investigation work, was purchased through the highway depart-
int in order to obtain the benefit of a low price. 21 
One of the first acts of the Committee of Five, organized in the fall 
1931 to handle the over-all administration of relief, was to call upon 
,unty commissioners with the request that the county budget include an 
,propriation of not less than $150,000 for charity and relief work. That 
~unt, they declared, should be exclusive of expenditures for the county 
,rm, county hospital, widows' pensions fund and other state welfare ex-
1nses. The committee cited the laws of the state of Oklahoma as authorit: 
,r making the request. This law provided that: 
Every county shall relieve and support all poor and indigent 
persons lawfully settled therein, whenever they shall actually 
need assistance and shall allow such temporary relief to persons 
not settled therein as shall be actually necessary pending the 
ascertainment of their settlement or removal thereto.22 
.e committee stressed that the law said the county shall provide such rel 
,aving no alternative. 
Only $56,000 had been set aside for relief by the county, and more th . 
.lf of that was already gone. The commissioners claimed that they were 
,reed to stay within the four mill limit and therefore could not make 
21Tulsa World, September 15, 1931, p. 2. 
22oklahoma Department of State, Revised Laws .2f Oklahoma (St. Paul: Tl 
.oneer Company, 1912), p. 1159. 
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litional appropriations. 23 With only $26,000 remaining in the county re-
~f fund, and with that amount being rapidly exhausted as welfare cases 
:reased by over fifty a day, the directors of the Family Welfare Society 
~eed to take over part of the county load immediately. Thus, for the 
:ond consecutive year the Society found it necessary to go to the rescue 
the county when the commissioners failed to provide enough money to care 
the legal residents who were indigents. The county's failure to do so 
aroused considerable indignation. The manner in which most of the re-
,nsible county officers. had failed to cooperate with the city charitable 
~ncies in planning for the winter had been most disappointing. 24 
The Committee of Five also asked the commissioners to apply to the 
rernor for road work and to use as much labor.drawn from the unemployment 
~istration lists in this work as possible. The county commissioners had 
~viously been asked by a committee representing the governor's unemploy-
it relief program to make available .funds which would be matched dollar 
~ dollar by the state to provide work, presumably on highways, for unem-
,yed men. About $1,000,000 was available in state funds to match county 
ids in this work.25 
The county commissioners claimed that they could not make such an 
,ropriation without endangering charity funds which were expected to be 
lly needed. In the face of their failure to do so the agents of the 
rernor became sharply critical. One called the fact that the county was 
mding twenty-five per-cent of its tax revenues for charity purposes "a 
23Tulsa Tribune, September 24, 1931, p. 4. 
24Tulsa World, September 28, 1931, p. ·2. · 
25 
Ibid., October 14, 1931, p. 7. 
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Lme." The state urged the county to base its charity on a "work-or-starv 
26 .icy. 
w. L. North, chairman of the county commissioners, was particularly 
:ong in his opposition to the state's plan, recalling that: 
••• last year $700,000 was raised by the state for relief work 
of which Tulsa paid at least ten per-cent and received back 
just $3,500, a part of which was in free seed, so worthless 
it would not grow.27 
Ln B. Means, chairman of the County Excise Board, dispproved of any levy 
'.ch would further tend to burden the taxpayers for charity purposes: 
To make jobs through government as is proposed is all wrong. You 
are simply educating the people to look to the government for 
support. The American people have always supported their poor 
by public subscription and can continue to do so.28 
Meanwhile full responsibility for any breakdown in the emergency relie 
:k during the upcoming winter was placed upon the county commissioners by 
l Central Emergency Committee of Five. If the commissioners failed to 
~e adequate provision in the budget to finance tne necessary relief work, 
t committee threatened to recommend that the existing and wholly inade-
Lte funds then available for charity be dispensed as rapidly as needed, 
I then when the funds were exhausted to let the entire charity load re-
:t to the county. 29 
Ernest H. Cornelius, chairman of the Committee of Five, advanced two 
:hods by which pressure could be brought to bear upon the county to force 
to live up to its charity responsibility. Full details of the charity 
26tulsa Tribune, October 18, 193t, p. 5. 
27~. 
28Ibid. 
29Ibid., December 3, 1931, p. 2. 
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uation could be aired through newspaper publicity, and a mass meeting 
taxpayers could be held at which public opinion could be engendered to 
.ng the county commissioners into line. 30 At the invitation of the 
missioners, Cornelius, with the assistance of auditors, began an exami-
.ion of county departmental records and the county budget. He sought to 
m the appropriations and reduce the budget so that additional funds couli 
made available for emergency poor relief. Cornelius emerged from the 
.dy convinced that additional funds could be made available for charity. 
At this point in the controversy a test case was filled in the distric 
.rt. The object was to obtain a legal opinion as to the extent to which 
: county was responsible for the care of indigents. The petition was 
:ered by a Mrs. Tom Baker. Said A. F. Sweeney, who prepared the petition 
Mrs. Baker: 
This woman, her husband,and three children are living in a garage 
with a dirt floor,· no ventilation except for the open door, a 
wood stove. I think it a disgrace to the city that such a case 
exists .31 
'Mrs. Baker stated in her petition that she had applied for relief but 
been denied it by the county. The provision of the law under which the 
:ition was filed read: 
If any person shall suppose that he is entitled to benefit of the 
laws for the relief of the poor, and the overseers of the poor 
in the county in which he resides shall refuse to give such person 
the benefit thereof, upon application of such person, the judge 
of the district court may, if he shall think proper, direct said 
overseers ••• to receive such persons on the poor list •••• 32 
Here were the roots of a possible crisis for the entire county relief 
30Tulsa Tribune, December 3, 1931, p. 2. 
31 Ibid. 
32oklahoma Department of State, Revised~ of Oklahoma, 1910, pp. 
;3-1164 •. 
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ram. If Mrs. Baker were granted relief on the order of Judges. J. 
dinning, all other rejected relief seekers would be given inspiration 
ollow suit. Regardless of the merit of Mrs. Baker's case, there were 
.ain justly restricted aspirants amidst the potential throng. Aware of 
Clendinning continued the case on the grounds that: 
A judgment of this kind is like a judgment of any kind when 
there is no money to support it--no good. That's why I want 
to check into the county's poor funds and see if the money is 
available. Then we will see if this family is entitled to aid, 
and if none is available, we'll see why not.33 · 
was available, the county commissioners saw to that, and no decision was 
reached in the case. 
The clubwomen of Tulsa, 10,000 or more strong, now massed their forces 
a campaign to induce the county commissioners to comply with the law by 
:opriating sufficient money for relief. The Tulsa Federation of Women's 
is made a thorough study of conditions in Tulsa abd emerged from it con-
:ed that a crisis existed in the administration of charity by the county. 
ting the county commissioners that their system was at the point of a 
>lete breakdown, the Federation drafted a resolution containing the 
.owing points: 
The amount which you have set aside for general charity of which 
only $26,000 remains for emergency relief during the coming 
months is only one-sixth the amount necessary to meet the 
emergency •••• 
••• the Revised Statutes of Oklahoma specifically state-that 
it is your duty to make appropriations of sufficient funds to 
meet relief needs. 
,,,we recommend that an appropriation of not less than 
$150,000 be set-up and the balance divided as you deem best among 
the other departments of government.34 
Federation recognized in its resolution that the county was handicapped 
33Tulsa Tribune, December 16, 1931, p. 2. 
34Ibid., October 3, 1932, p. 6. 
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1e four-mill limit, but maintained that the $150,000 charity appropria-
could still be made. 
The commissioners made no move to increase their charity budget. The 
iomen, therefore, demanded that they abide by the law or get out.. of 
:e. This ultimatum was presented to the county commissioners by a 
Lttee representing the Tulsa Emergency Council, a new organization of 
:lub women of Tulsa. If the commissioners did not obey the law, the 
!S announced their intention of asking the attorney general to .start 
!r proceedings. The resolutions addressed to J. Berry King, attorney 
~al, stated in part: 
You are hereby notified that the Tulsa county commissioners have 
been guilty of wilful negligence of duty. 
They have been guilty of opposionlsi£.7 in office to wit: They have 
and are oppressing the poor in Tulsa county and propose to further 
oppress poor and indigent persons who are not in public charitable 
institutions in the county and are now being supported by the 
county. 
They are guilty of wilful misconduct, wilful maladministration in 
that they have refused to make this necessary appropriation to 
care for the poor. We regretfully request that your office in-
vestigate the facts concerning the misconduct of the county 
commissioners and that you forthwith institute proceedings in the 
Supreme Court of the state of Oklahoma to oust them from office.35 
Presentation of the petition to the attorney general was to depend upon 
1ction the county commissioners took upon the council's request that 
be permitted to study the county budget. The commissioners gave in to 
iemands of the ladies, and the Emergency Council appointed a special 
Lttee for the purpose of the budget inspection. The committee reported 
in almost every instance maximum amounts allowable by law had been 
lpriated by the county for its various departments. The Emergency Councj 
iemanded to know why these maximum appropriations had been made for 
35 
Tulsa Tribune, October 8, 1932, p. 2. 
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~r departments while relief was slighted.36 A resolution was adopted 
Lng the commissioners four days in which to increase the appropriations 
charity to $150,000. If they did not do so, the women announced that 
Lr resolution asking for ouster proceedings would go forward to Attorney 
~ral King. The Emergency Council further announced that it had searched 
county records only four days and found where $63,000 could be added to 
charity funds by effecting governmental economies, and promised that if 
commissioners will "give us ten more days, we will find more than the 
),000 that has been requested. 1137 The committee then made eight specific 
)mmendations as to how the reductions could be made. 
For three days the commissioners did not comment. Then, on the fourth 
, they promised to place all funds saved by salary reductions or other 
1omies effected into the county welfare fund.38 But they neglected to 
tion a date when they would take action. The club women were not satis-
i. They replied that if the commissioners failed to take action by mid-
1t, coercive measures would be applied. 39 The county's answer was a 
sed budget which called for little change fro~ the original. At the 
rt they had planned to make available $211,004 for all charity purposes, 
luding the maintenance of the County Home and the County Farm, salaries 
the operators of these institutions, compensation for widows and orphans 
other items. The budget they now submitted to the Excise Board called 
$221,963.99. 40 What the county's critics had demanded was $150,000 for 
36.rulsa World, November 4, 1931, p. 2. 
37 Ibid. 
38 
Tulsa Tribune, November 8, 1931, p. 3. 
39Ibid., January 14, 1932, p. 3. 
40Ibid., January 15, 1932, p. 2. 
, welfare alone, and they had in mind benefits for those in need as a 
1lt of the depression, not the normal indigents. 
The Emergency Council now decided to go direct to the Excise Board 
48 
1 its plea that changes be made in the county budget. They allied them-
res with other organizations for the purpose of carrying out the fight. 
1ps included with the club women in the Amalmagated Charity Council were 
Central Emergency Committee of Five, the American Legion, the Veterans 
~oreign Wars, the Chamber of Commerce and the Community Fund. The new 
1cil presented a report indicating that there were 12,276 registered un-
Loyed persons in Tulsa county, 11,908 without any income at all.41 They 
1tained that family relief work in Tulsa would fail if more money was not 
a available by the county. They pointed to the fact that the Family 
fare Society was carrying more than fifty per-cent more cases than it 
in the previous year. The Council spokesmen also suggested that, at the 
,ailing rate of daily increase, the Family Welfare Society's total would 
1t to 1900 cases before the end of the month. The County Welfare Depart-
c, they stated, was caring for 2,200 families, more than the total of all 
42 1cies for the year before. 
The commissioners attempted to stir up resentment against the admini-
ltion of the Community Fund. Their hope apparently was to divert public 
antion from their own negligence in failing to provide aoequate funds fot 
rity. They may also have been motivated by threats of the Emergency 
lef Council's investigators to make revelations of political waste in the 
rt house. The commission's charges of extravagance in the administratiot 
the Community Fund were, however, quickly refuted. Fred lnsull, Fund 
41Tulsa World, January 19, 1932, p. 3. 
421bid. 
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sident, produced figures which revealed that salaries paid by the organi-
ion compared favor~bly with those paid in other cities for the same work.~ 
The Emergency Relief Council then accused the commission of functio~ing 
tly for the benefit of job hun~ers. In support of this contention, an 
torial in the Tulsa Tribune compared the organization of Tulsa county 
ernment with that of Tammany Hall, contending that political workers were 
vided with jobs on the public payrolls before any other expenditures from 
lie funds were made: 
For years Tammany has ••• L~intaine2,7 that whatever the short-
comings of its leaders, they were good to the poor. If it 
paid--and they saw to it that it did pay--they !!!!!. good to 
poor. Tam.many can't forget it is a political machine, even 
though men and women starve and children go poorly clad in 
the midst of want and suffering. The relief provided by the 
taxpayer was first withheld and then sold for pcl>litical 
support •••• Tammany methods are just as contemptible in Tulsa 
as in'New York City.44 
The Excise Board moved slowly in its deliberations. Veiled thre~ts 
a directed at it by the county commissioners. It was rumored that if .any 
ttic changes were made in the budget a court teat of the Excise Board's 
1ority might be resorted to. On the day of decision, the court room of 
ie John B. Means was packed to capacity. For two hours tense and silent 
and women listened to the reading of statistical findings.45 The dis-
1ion of the budget by the Board was brought to a close with its announce-
; that the County Highway Police Department was to be abolished. This 
precisely one of the departments for which the commissioners were em-
:ically opposed to altering allotments. The commissioners, however, did 
challenge the authority of the Excise Board. It is ironical that only 
43Tulsa Tribune, January 13, 1932, p. 14. 
44Ibid., January 16, 1932, p. 16. 
451bid., January 18, 1932, p. 8. 
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:ew months later the state Supreme Court ruled that equalizing boards had 
authority to alter budgets that came within legal limits. The Tulsa 
:nty commissioners, by not demanding the right to make their own budget, 
effect acquiesced in the cuts made by the Excise Board.46 
In finally approving the budget, the Excise Board added $48,200 to the 
47 
ginal charity budget. The final 1931-1932 county budget carried an 
,ropriation of $270,133.99 for charity, subdivided as follows: 48 
Pureose 
ary, Superintendent of County Farm and 
ounty Home 
ntenance of County Farm 
ntenance of County Home 
ntenance of the poor: 
rugs, hospital and burial 
ounty Welfare 
ity Welfare 
lothing and food for school children 
















Despite this small victory for the club women and the committee of five, 
relief situation did not improve. The county commissioners limited ex-
ditures in the County Welfare Department for February, 1932 to $10,000. 
January $35,000 had been required for family relief work, half of which 
been provided by the county. The county relief load at this time in-
ded 4,100 cases of which 2,400 were under the care of the County Welfare 
irtment and 1,700 under the Family Welfare Society. 49 
4~ulsa World, May 16, 1932, p. 2. 
47Ibid., January 28, 1932, p. 3. 
48John E. Brindley, Survey Report~ the Present Administration of the 
!!, County Government (Tulsa: The Public Affairs Association, 1932), p. 
Dr. Brindley, of the Oklahoma Tax Economy Association,, drafted this re-
t for a group of Tulsans interested in tax reduction. 
49Tulsa Tribune, April 19, 1932, p. 2. 
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On February 26, 1932, the county commissioners announced that their 
rity appropriations for relief within the city were exhausted. The 
munity Fund directors determined.to carry on the work with their own re-
rces. The relief load heing carried by the County Welfare Department and 
Family Welfare Society was showing little decrease. In mid-April the 
nty cases still numbered 2,529, · while theJF:amily Welfare Society ·· ·,. 
providing relief for 1,900. Since July l the Community Fund has spent 
,107.08 on family relief alone. Of this amount $71,107.08 had bee~ ex-
ded through the County Welfare Department.SO In the same period the county 
spent $92,00o. 51 
The end of county contributions to the financing of the work of the 
11ty Welfare Department came abruptly with the rejec.tion by the county 
nissioners of claims for charity totaling $5,997.24. The commissioners 
i this amount was in excess of the $92,033.99 that they had set aside to 
iisbursed through the city's relief program. 52 Some confusion had arisen 
r the assertion of Conmunity Fund officials that they understood than an 
Ltional $6,000 was to be allowed .. by the commissioners. The commissiop.ers 
sent a letter to the County Welfare Department in March indicating that 
r were increasing the original amount available by another $6,000 and that 
~ants could be issued to that amount.53 
The Community Fund was forced into a $40,000 deficit because it had 
1 necessary to assume all of the county load. This forced a curtailment 
50 Tulsa Tribune, April 19, 1932, p. 2. 
Slibid., April 27, 1932, p. 3. 
52Ibid. 
53 Tulsa World, May 1, 1932, p. 2. 
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funds apportioned among the various affiliated agencies for charity. 
Fund had expended all its surplus and was operating on collections as 
, came in weekly. With a case load of 4,000 families, upwards of 20,000 
sons were on the rolls of the Fund agencies.54 The Community Fund di-
tors now advised the county that unless an agreement could be reached on 
1dget to be furnished by the county for relief work, the entire welfare 
i would be returned to the county on July 1, 1932. 55 
With the Fund agencies operating on a "starvation" schedule it was de-
~d that the "bum" must go. The agencies felt that they had been carrying 
Eessional charity seekers for several years. Now that they had deserving 
~ployed people who, because of the county's inefficiencies, were hungry 
needed help, they were not going to be allowed to suffer because of 
1e who had always relied upon charity. Only enough aid, it was decided, 
.d be given physically able men to prevent acute suffering. Dependency 
not to be encouraged. A "work test" was drawn up to apply to all able-
'.ed adults before they could receive aid from the agencies. Those who 
i not wi'lling to work for what they received would not get anything. Of 
first 250 men who took the city's new test about 50 failed to appear 
the work that had been assigned to them. Unless they had acceptable 
ons for failing to show up, th~se men were cut off the case lists of 
agencies. Men who qualified were given one day's work a week and were 
by the agency concerned.56 
Definite steps were now taken to place relief work in the city on a so-
ed ''war-time" basis for the next year. Consolidation of all emergency 
54Tulsa World, May 1, 1932, p. 2. 
55Tulsa Tribune, June 26, 1932, p. 2. 
56Ibid. 
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Lief work done by the Community Fund agencies under one organization was 
:horized. The movement was partly prompted by the action of oilman Wait 
Lllips in allowing the Community Fund to use the Tidal Building for one 
Lr free of rent. All Fund agencies could move their offices into the one 
'.lding, and $10,000 in rent saved. 57 
The plan of the executive committee of the Community Fund to force a 
Lsolidation of all relief agencies, however, did not win the immediate 
iroval of all the agencies concerned. The Family Welfare Society and the 
:holic Charities continued to operate as usual and made it clear that they 
not decided to go along with the new venture. The opponents of the 
solidation plan maintained that it would, in effect~ set up the dole 
tem, that it would be more costly and less efficient than the old form 
administration, and that it would retard the raising of the annual fund 
alienating the separate agency supporters. They said, in addition, that 
would mean greater costs because of the addition of numerous salaried 
itions for all forms of charity work then being carried put by volunteers. 
The Family Welfare Society had an additional, special reason for ob-
ting to consolidation. It was believed that such a plan would cause 
sa to lose its membership in the Family Welfare Society of America. One 
the rules of the national society was that trained social workers must 
in charge of the distribution of charity in order that waste could be pre-
ted, to provide for family rehabilitation along the way, and to prevent 
creeping of political control into charitable affairs. The consolidation 
1 did not include a trained social worker in charge.58 
In view of these facts the Family Welfare Society decided to withdraw 
57Tulsa World, June 29, 1932, p. 1. 
58 
Ibid., July 1, 1932, p. 3. 
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>m the Community Fund rather than lose its membership in the national 
:iety. In their statement of withdrawal, the Society's directors pointed 
that the plan had been hastily formulated and that it was not apparent 
1 any large savings could be made. They further protested that they were 
told anything about it until they were forced to the decision of joining 
withdrawing. It would be a step backward, they said, to put Tulsa on 
i dole system of charity relief again. The directors of the Society ad-
:ted that there could be some savings in executive salaries and from 
tsolidation of clerical work and filing. But they felt that such savings 
were claimed for the plan could be derived only from the abolition or 
luction of case workers and the granting of relief without investigation 
follow up. Such a course of action, they maintained, could only lead to 
: dole and pauperization by developing chronic cases out of reasonably 
1-intentioned persons, who might otherwise have returned to normal life 
a result of careful study and guidance. The dole, they said, removed 
incentive toward self-help.59 
The executive board of the Community Fund bitterly criticized the 
iety. They declared that consolidation was the demand of many of the 
ge givers to the Fund, because they desired a reduction in the expenses 
operation. An emergency existed, they tpought, in the relief work of 
sa which required the action being ~aken in the interest of economy. Most 
all they objected to a "group of professional social workers dictating to 
citizens of Tulsa on a question of business administration. 1160 The 
ily Welfare Society thus found itself accused of ungratefully placing 
elf above the interests of the city. 
59rulsa Tribune, July 7, 1932, p. 1. 
60rulsa World, July 8, 1932, p. 2. 
The directors of the Family Welfare Society agreed to rescind their 
1ignations only if they were provided, in writing, three assurances by 
1 President of the Community Fund. First of all, each of the family re-
tf agencies in the proposed coordinated structure had to be given the 
;ht to retain its complete individual identity if it so chose. It must 
re the right to retain all its properties including records and office 
1ipment. Second, an advisory committee consisting of members of each of 
55 
i boards of directors of the various agencies involved had to be formed to 
: with the executive committee of the Community Fund in the consideration 
all matters of policy, procedure and personnel. It conceded final au-
irity, however, in all cases but one to the Community Fund's executive 
onittee. It demanded that a trained social worker be designated as di-
:tor of relief under the proposed organization from a list of names to be 
1mitted by the advisory CODlll,ittee. Finally, all agencies must be given 
: right to withdraw from the organization at any time that the final de-
·mination of policy by the executive committee was not satisfactory to it.E 
In a letter of reply, the Community Fund directors stated that they had 
attempted in any way to determine what the Family Welfare Society would 
concerning a retention of its identity and general activity. They said 
t any question of property rights, if one should arise, was a question 
be decided -by a _.court of law, and not by either of the parties concerned 
the controversy. They agre-d to the establishment of the type of committe 
t the Family Welfare Society proposed. They did not agree, however, to 
selection of a relief director in the manner asked by Family Welfare 
kesmen. Instead, they pointed out that no other agency except the Family 
fare Society had made such a demand, and added that if that agency was 
61 Tulsa Tribune, June 8, 1932,. _p. 1. 
,twilling to proceed on the basis of the good faith of Tulsa citizens, 
could add no further comment. 1162 The Community Fund directors also 
56 
Lted that they certainly did not presume that they had the power to hold 
the new agency any organization that decided it wanted to withdraw. 63 
It seems probable that the Family Welfare Society had from the be-
Lning seen the necessity to conform. Under the principle of collective 
.d raising upon which the organization of the Community Fund had been 
.lt, those organizations not participating, and who had thus to dep~nd on 
untary contributions, were no.t likely to be very successful. Whatever 
cause, the Society now announced that it was willing to cooperate, and 
was only a short time later that the plans for consolidation were carried 
All family relief, including the distribution of.food and clothing, 
thereafter handled by the United Family Relief and Service Association, 
onsolidated agency taking over the work formerly handled by the Family 
fare Society, Catholic Charities, Jewish Charities, and County Welfare 
64 
artment. Five district stations were established in order to de-
tralize relief distribution. Each district had a supervisor and workers 
65 m the existing Fund staff. 
Meanwhile the city's charity situation had threatened to turn tragic. 
re were at least 20,000 persons in the city asking for relief, and the 
ources of the Community Fund were virtually exhausted. Johnson D. Hill, 
president of the Community Fund, called upon the county commissioners 
act immediately to help meet the charity load of the Fund, which was 
62Tulsa Tribune, July 10, 1932, p. 1. 
631bid. 
64 Ibid., October 2, 1932, p. 2. 
65Tulsa World, October 1, 1932, p. 3. 
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.ghted down with 1,500 cases which rightfully fell under the commission's 
ponsibility. In a meeting with three commissioners and the members of 
Excise Board, Hill asked that $20,000 be made available for July. When 
approval was voiced to this, he asked for $10,000 for July and an 
.ntical amount for August. 66 The commissioners, while not i1$11.ediately 
eeing to that figure, did promise to prepare tentative budg,ats for the 
ise Board and to include in them an appropriation for charity. They de-
ed in doing so, however. This caused one member of the Excise Boar_d to 
1111ent: 
I waited around here for three days this week in the belief that 
the commissioners intended to ask for an appropriation. I was 
really ashamed when we finally approved expenditures for the fair 
which opens this month, and then took no action on the charity 
question.67 
Again the county commissioners had defaulted in their relief obligation, 
again citizens of Tulsa organized themselves for more effective protest. 
new agency was the Public Affairs Association, originally the idea of a 
up attempting to promote lower taxes. As its initial action the Associ-
on employed Dr. John E. Brindley of the Oklahoma Tax Economy Association 
survey the economic aspects of Tulsa county administration. The objective 
making the survey was to point out any reductions in expenditures or 
ings which might be effected, without crippling the functions and servicee 
the Tulsa county government. If such savings could be made, they would 
e possible the retention of an appropriation to assist and feed the poor. 
68 might also make possible a substantial lowering of .taxes. 
The salaries of elective officers and their deputies were considered. 
66Tulsa Tribune, September 4, 1932, p. 2. 
67 Ibid. 
68Ibid;• p, 6. 
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was found that several elective officials and most deputies in the county 
,k a ten per-cent reduction in their salaries for 1932-1933 as compared 
:h the 1931-1932 schedule. However, no appreciable reduction in the 
iber of deputies or other employees was made. Nor was any attempt made 
adjust salaries in line with the qualifications for deputies or the 
:ies necessary to be performed. Where salaries were not fixed by law 
!Y were apparently fixed by political expediency. 69 
Some questionable procedures were found also in a check of the records 
,ering the feeding of prisoners during 1931-1932. The county had spent 
i,096.80 for this purpose. The total number of prisoner days was 51,408, 
~ing the average cost per day to the county 48.8 cents. The federal 
rernment paid the coun,ty f if ty-f ive cents per day for the feeding of these 
1ates. The considerable profit involved for the county was going to the 
1riff. Dr. Brindley contended that the daily charges were unreasonable to 
;in with, for food costs had taken drastic declines. It was estimated tha1 
iding expenses could be reduced by the commissioners to around twenty-five 
LtS per day, with a conservative saving of $10,000 to the county. 70 
The Brindley report recommended that livestock on the county farm be 
.d and the property rented. This rather drastic proposal followed the dis· 
·ery that the farm had suffered a net loss of $6,480.21 during 1931-1932. 
1 report pointed out that when the county farm had been established it had 
1n assumed that it would be maintained in part with some of the county hom• 
~tes and furnish gainful employment for them. Its produce was supposed tc 
turn contribute to the support of the county home. Neither of these 
69Brindley, Survey Report .2!!. the Present Administration of the Tulsa 
1nty Government, p. 1. 
70lbid. 
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jectives, of course, had been realized.71 
Evidence of inefficient practices was also found in connection with 
purchase of drugs by the county. During the fiscal year of 1931-1932 
,gs were bought and prescriptions were filled, by one company only, in 
: amount of $12,087.33. A check of prices charged for standard drugs and 
1plies indicated that the county was being charged approximately thirty 
-cen~ above standard retail charges and was then being allowed a discount 
fifteen per-cent. Dr. Brindley's report suggested that a large saving 
72 
ld be secured by calling for bids on the purchase of drugs. 
The report also asserted that certain persons on the county payroll 
e being over-paid. The county physician was receiving a salary of $500 
month. This was the highest appointive salary in the county, and one of 
highest in the state. It was therefore .considered an unnecessary ex-
vagance. Janitors, it was also found, were receiving a salary which was 
ce those of custodians in downtown buildings, and they did only half 
work generally performed by such workers. Dr. Brindley recommended that 
janitors be put on a half-time basis, reducing their pay by fifty per-
t without putting any of them entirely out of work. 73 
The investigation also revealed lax methods in the handling of details 
:erning expenditures for the maintenance of roads and bridges. Payrolls 
! made out showing the money due each employee, but not signed by the 
,er. After the claim was passed, warrants were issued to the engineer, 
!rintendent or supervisor who paid the men and secured their signatures 
>site the amount supposed to be due them on the payroll. The signed 
71Brindley, p. 1. 
721bid., p. 2. 
73 
Ibid., p. 3. 
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opy of the payroll was then transmitted through regular channels to 
ne county clerk. But many of these signed copies could not be located. 
nere was room for doubt that the men actually received the total amount 
ue them; in fact~ it was possible to question whether they received any· 
fit. And there was, on the other hand, no certainty that the individual 
erformed the work covered by the claim. 76 
Payroll frauds were just a possibility 9 but Brindley proceeded to 
rove that waste and political favoritism did exist in other areas of 
oad construction administration. Men were employed as patrolmen at 
ertain stipulated wages and then allowed to hire someone else at a smaller 
age to do the work. For heavy work men were paid $2.50 per day for the 
se of their team 9 and another $2.50 to drive them. .In fact, however, the 
eam owner usually hired his drivers as cheaply as he could, frequently 
aying $1 per day. In order to eliminate outside competition, the county 
jvertised contracts for only two or three culverts or structures at a 
ime. But if a favored contractor was a successful bidder, the contract 
as often extended to cover several times the original work. In such 
ases the prices paid were greatly in excess of what bid prices would 
ave been had the entire work been advertised for letting. The same 
77 ,actice prevailed in regard to paving contracts. 
These practices were obviously costly for the Tulsa taxpayer, but 
1e greatest extravagance of all possibly related to expenditures for the 
>unty fair. Although the fair operated only ten days during 1931, it 
>st the county more than $88,000. A high salaried force for the event 
lS maintained throughout the year although they had no reason to function 
76i3rindley, p. 4. 
77 Ibid • , p • 5. 
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re than a few months annually. Of the total amount spent for the fair, 
rl W. Ellmore was paid $13,199.75 for grading the grounds. His claims 
re not supported by any payroll showing the forces he employed, the days 
rked, or the work accomplished. Nor was there any reference in the of-
::.ial documents examined by Brindley to any contract or any stipulated 
te of pay upon which Ellmore's claims were based. An inspection of the 
lr grounds led Brindley to believe that the work could have been done 
r $3,000. This same Carl Ellmore, incidentally, appeared on the county 
rroll for three other jobs, for which he received a total of more than 
s,ooo. 78 
Dr. Brindley's report to the Public Affairs Association, therefore, 
Jported the charges of political favoritism and extravagance which had 
an heard repeatedly since the Tulsa women had undertaken the winter be-
re to ftnd out why the county commission could not make an adequate 
Jropriation for charity. He gave the civic groups of Tulsa enough 
~ures to enable them to go to the court house and demand that the charity 
,blem bP handled out of the existing budg.et. County Commissioner W. L. 
:th, however, branded the report "biased." He contended that it was 
lSed on conditions of two years ago." North continued: 
••• if I was an auditor and couldn't get out a better state-
ment of facts than that report of Dr. Brindley, I wouldn't 
get out anything. It is a mass of gross exaggerations. The 
people who sent him here don't want to get at the truth. 
They are just a bunch of organized tax dodgers. I've said 
my little say, and that's all. We'll try to run our business, 
and Dr. Brindley can run his.79 
:th's "little say" could well have been taken as an official statement 
the county position, for the extent of county cooperation with the 
78Brindley, p. 5. 
79Tulsa Tribune, September 7, 1932, p. 5. 
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ty's relief program was not destined to increase. The county finally 
d ask the Excise Board to approve a $15,000 grant for relief, but the 
thod announced for the distribution of funds left out the Community Fund. 
ch distribution was to be through the office of the county juvenile of-
cer, who worked under the county court in checking and providing for 
digent cases there. 80 It thus became necessary for the city to institute 
program to fill the breach temporarily. 
If the Great Depression offered any lessons for Tulsa concerning.the 
ministrative organization for-relief, one of the most profound was a 
cognition of the fact that the existing machinery did not suffice for 
e institution of emergency measures. County officials had never con-
dered the handling of charity to be one of their maJor functions. Tra-
tionally they had given it only slight consideration. When they found 
emselves with legal responsibility to cure a great social ill at a time 
en that ill was most pronounced, they reacted in a way which was not in 
e best interests of the effective handling of that problem. Constantly 
ey refused to appropriate sufficient funds for relief. The fumbling 
r in which they used the public revenues aroused the antagonism of relief 
cipients. And, just as important, the inadequacies of the county 
arpened the hostility between public and private charity, and d~maged 
pes for the effective centralization of relief. 
80 
Tulsa World, September 8, 1932, p. 4. 
CHAPTER IV 
RELIEF: THE COMMITTEE OF FIVE 
A movement got underway in the fall of 1931 for the consolidation 
>f agencies which had been set up to relieve the poor and unemployed. 
~his attempt to centralize resulted from several factors. The repeated 
:onflicts between private and public agencies, the seeming inability of 
:he county to provide enough funds to carry the load, the steady in-
.rease of the number of those on relief, and the realization that there 
'.ad been much duplication of effort were all sources of the desire to 
onsolidate. 
By this time Oklahoma City had developed a centralized relief organi-
ation which appeared to be functioning very effectively. The Tulsa of-
icials turned for advice to C. C. Day, one of the organizers of the former 
ity's program. Day suggested that Tulsa make each one of its agencies 
lear its work through one bureau, eliminating any agencies that proved 
neffective. He added: "If American businessmen do not think and act 
JW, we certainly will go under the dole and then the businessmen who did 
Jt act will squawk to high heaven. 111 
In response to Day's advice, a fact-finding committee was set up by 
1e coordinating committee of the Chamber of Commerce to make a survey of 
1arity and unemployment conditions in Tulsa. The committee's task was 
> survey conditions throughout Tulsa, take into account the work of the 
1Tulsa Tribune, September 14, 1931, p. 4. 
roposed winter programs of the various relief agencies and determine 
nat steps should be taken to relieve su_ffering and unemployment. A 
inancial campaign which was to follow would be predicated upon their 
indings. 2 Immediately after its authorization the fact-finding committee 
ent out a questionnaire to all agencies doing any charity work. The re-
lies were checked and tabulated. The records of the Better Business 
ureau, the City Solicitations Committee, and the Community Fund were 
necked. Many individuals were interviewed, and plans which had been 
dopted in other communities were studied.3 
The fact-finding committee emerged from its study convinced that the 
uccess or failure of the administration of relief in Tulsa depended on 
1e measure of cooperation between the Governor 0 s Committee, the county, 
1e city administration and the established relief and charitable organi-
1tions. In order to insure such cooperation the fact-finders proposed 
1e establishment of a Central Emergency Committee of Five. The aim of 
1is committee would be to see that there was no duplication in 
lther work relief or direct relief. The committee was not to actually 
1rry on any of the work of the employment or charitable agencies but to 
!rve only in an advisory and directive capacity. The committee of five, 
!ld the fact-finders, should have as its ultimate end the substitution of 
mployment for charity in so far as possible for all able-bodied bona-fide 
4 
1lsa residents. 
The fact-finding committee recognized that such an organization as the 
2Tulsa Spirit, September 21, 1931, p. 8. 
~eport of the Fact-Fin.ding Committee 9 Tulsa Ch.amber of Commerce, 
:tober, 1931 9 p. 2. 
4 
.!!?..!.g,. J p • 1. 
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entral emergency committee of five it proposed was unnecessary in normal 
imes because the several agencies for relief and social welfare had a 
egular group of contributors. Under the emergency circumstances pre-
ailing, however, they felt that some extraordinary body was needed to 
oordinate the efforts of these agencies.5 The recommendations of the 
act-finding committee were adopted by the board of directors of the 
~amber of Commerce and subsequently won the approval of the other agencies 
ovolved. The fact-finders proposed that the committee be made up of one 
apresentative each from the Community fund, the Chamber of Commerce, the 
ity administration, and the county commissioners, with the fifth member 
o be selected by the other four.6 
The five Tulsans thus entrusted with the power ~f control over the 
:tivities of the city 9s charitable agencies in their campaigns to reduce 
1employment were Ernest Cornelius, president of the Oklahoma Steel Casting: 
>mpany, and chairman of the committee, H. O. McClure, president of the 
1lsa Industrial Finance Corporation, Major John Leavell, president of the 
!avell Coal Company, Harry Schwartz, president of the Tulsa Labor Council, 
1d municipal judge G. Ed Warren. Cornelius was appointed by the Community 
1nd as its representative, McClure represented the Chamber of Commerce, 
aavell was the delegate of the city administration, Schwartz was named 
r the county commissioners, and Warren was chosen by the other four. 7 
The Committee of Five decreed that as a general rule charity was to 
confined to aged or infirm men and women and to families without adult 
5Report of the Fact-Finding Committee» Tulsa Chamber of Commerce, 
:tober, 1931, p. l. 
6 
Ibid., p. 3. 
7 Tulsa Spirit, October 16, 1931, p. 6. 
ale members. Before giving any ~harity» the agency concerned should ob-
ain proper information as to the applicant's needs. The committee in-
isted upon absolute impartiality in the giving of both charity and, 
nployment. The sole test was to be the relief need of a legal resident 
f Tulsa. 8 
The Community Fund was ordered by the Committee of Five to prevent 
1y unnecessary duplication in the work of its participating agencies. 
1e committee announced its intention to appraise all other agencies_ doing 
alief work, and require inefficient agencies to discontinue operations in 
rder that there might be no waste of funds. The committee gave the Social 
arvice Bureau the task of passing on all cases of approved agencies doing 
tlief work. All agencies were required to present their cases to the 
1reau for clearance. Failure to do this was grounds for disapprovel of 
te agency. In order to insure a fair distribution of combined relief 
trough charity and employment, the central.committee required c.oordination 
!tween the unemployment registration lists and the lists of the Social 
irvice Bureau. 9 
One of the first acts of the Central Emergency Committee of Five, 
1e prompted by public protests, was to attempt to bring "panhandling" to 
. end in Tulsa. The committee established a community rooming house to 
.re for all transients and emergency cases. The committee also authori-
d the establishment of the city's first overnight home for Negro men •. 10 
ring the winter of 1931-32 the rooming house fed approximately 200 men 
8(Tulsa) General Order Number One, Central Emergency Committee of 
ve, ~~tober ~~, 1~31, p. 1. 
9Ibid. 
lOTulsa Tribune, December 8, 1931 9 p. 2. 
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ly, and provided 125 beds nightly, but panhandling did not cease. 
In its recommendation that a committee of five be established in 
sa the fact-finding committee of the Chamber of Commerce had declared: 
suggest to the committee of five that it give earnest consideration 
the suggested means of providin_g revenue as well as to any other sug-
tions that may be advanced, and arrange to make effective the means 
·eed upon with the least possible delay. 1111 During the summer of 1931 
.h thought had been given by Tulsans to special plans for effecting re-
:f during the winter to follow. Although the city administration re-
itedly expressed its desire that the made-work program be renewed, there 
·e many who did not agree that it should. Some Tulsans were of the 
.nion that the relief burden from a financial point of view could be 
:sened by a switch to direct relief. 
M. C. Hale, a Tulsa hardware dealer, was one of several citizens to 
,pose agrarian-flavored alternative plans. Hale advocated a program 
ireby, he said, more than 10,000 could be fed at a cost not to exceed 
1,000. Maintaining that the county would, in any event, appropriate 
:e than $40,000 for relief, he suggested that this amount be used to 
, foods wholesale and 2,500 families of four persons each fed substantial 
12 
:ions for a five month period. His plan included as a daily ration 
: a family of four: two pounds of Irish potatoes, one pound of sweet 
:atoes, one loaf of whole wheat bread, one pound of corn meal, one pound 
.t pork, one-third pound of beans or peas, one quart of skim milk, one-
1rth pint of sorghum, and one-fourth pound of lard. All of the supplies 
llaeport o~ the Fact-Fi11:ding C~ittee, Tulsa Chamber of Commerce, 
:ober, 1931, P• 3. 
12 
"The Hale Plan, 11 Relief Plans Under Consi_t!eration, Central ~mergency 
mnittee of Five, p. 1. 
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Lld be bought from fa;mers of the Tulsa area except the wheat, which 
1ld be obtained through the Federal Farm Board at no cost to the com-
Lity under the plan whereby the Board would release the wheat on a credit 
.p to be later cancelled by Congress. Wheat and corn could .be ground 
:ally, Hale contended, thereby saving the cost of regularly milled flour 
l meal. Hale even offered to donate the mill and corn shellers for the 
·k.13 
A plan proposed a short time later would have taken advantage of some 
:ential provisions of the Hale plan, but would have continued the city's 
.sting work relief program. This plan suggested that several carloads 
wheat, which could be purchased in the western part of the state at an 
:remely low price, be obtained with charity funds. This wheat could be 
.pped to small mills around Tulsa where it could be ground into graham 
•ur at small cost and turned over to the central commissary. Corn could 
provid•d for the commissary in the same fashion. Heavy hogs, which 
·e not bringing top price on the market, could be bought, and slaughtered. 
:weet potato curing plant could also be established.14 
Arthur F. Antle, pioneer Tulsa cattleman, proposed that the city 
·elop a cooperative farm where unemployed men might work to provide 
•d for their families. It was suggested that Tulsa acquire a tract of 
Ld, possibly eighty acres in size, for this purpose. The plan included 
i construction of a canning factory, which would, Antle maintained, make 
possible not only to preserve the products of the farm but to secure 
Lations of food and vegetables which might be canned and distributed. 15 
1311The Hale Plan, 11 Relief Plaas Under Constru~_tion, Central Emergency 
un.ittee of Five, p; 2. · 
14"The Grain Plan, 11 Ibid. , p. 1. 
1511Tbe_Antle Plan," ~., P· 1. 
()9 
A fourth plan proposed was to create a committee comp~sed of repre-
.tatives of all agencies for relief to buy food supplies direct from 
,ducers in the area around Tulsa •. The object was to eliminate the 
1fits of the middleman in supplying the needy of Tulsa. The plan would 
·e taken advantage of the surplus of vegetable and fruit products,, 
1reby making savings possible, and at the same time aiding Oklahoma's 
16 ·mers. While none of these plans was ever adopted completely or even 
large part, common elements of all became essential ingredients in the 
mer in which the committee of five and the city handled relief work the 
.lowing winter. 
Mayor George L. Watkins, searching for a way in which to continue the 
:y' s made-work program of the previous year, came up with a novel plan 
finance. In 1929 the city and county had collected $900~000 in taxes 
.egally since some of their levies were subsequently held invalid. The 
Ley was impounded in the city treasurer's office for return to the tax-
rers. Watkins proposed that every taxpayer give all or a part of the 
:und, which he had not expected to get back in the first place, to a 
17 ,gram of public works. He pointed to the severity of the situation: 
The job of taking care of the relief and unemployment problem 
in Tulsa will be two or three times as great as last winter. 
Many of the contributors to the Mayor's scrip plan last year 
are themselves out of work this fall. I believe that $250,000 
will be needed for a work program and that we can get it from 
this refund.18 
t mayor suggested that a reservoir which would be needed in a year or 
> anyway be immediately constructed in Mohawk park with hand labor, and 
16"The Central Purchasing Plan," Relie.f J>lall.s :qllder Cons.i.der,~io~, 
1tral Emergency Committee of Five, p. 1. 
17"The Mayor's Plan," Ibid., P• 1. 
l8Tu1sa Tribune, September 18, 1931, p. 2. 
19 
t park and playground improvements be made in the same way. 
70 
The plan had been suggested to the mayor by R. Letcher McKee, presi-
t of the Tulsa Taxpayers Association. McKee called attention to the 
t that a small group of taxpayers had initiated the protest action and 
fought it through the district and supreme courts at heavy expense to 
nselves. Obviously, McKee pointed out, these taxpayers should not be 
ad to make the same gifts from their net refunds as should the taxpayers 
profited without expenses. 20 Others also referred to their special 
itions. A representative of .the Public Service Company said that the 
arship '!1nd management of rental property constituted the sole business 
income of many people in Tulsa and that these individuals and firms 
ld not give the same proportion of their refunds to.the common fund as 
ld the individual whose property ownership and tax refund was incidental 
21 1is income from another source. Some were outright opposed to the 
1. One very aroused in~ividual said that he would do the winter's work 
taxation, "unescapable taxation on oil companies for example who have 
ar built a thing here but have made millions out of Oklahoma's soil, 
as non-resident landlords. 1122 
Not only did the means draw criticism, the end did also. It was 
1ted out that by creating a made-work program only part of the com-
ity's responsibility was met. "What about the women who are heads of 
ilies?" asked one man. "And the orphaned children?" He made it clear 
tit was his belief that the city must provide a large fund that winter 
1911The Mayor's Plan," p. 2. 




r charity to be administered to hundreds who were unable to partici-
te in any made-work program. 23 Another individual understood that 
~ernor Murray had the relief and charity problems all worked out, and 
snot sure that the city needed to plan a substantial work program. 
e city, he felt, though should have a campaign for charity funds, "just 
be sure that no one starved. 1124 There were some Tulsans who anticipated 
at wholesale starvation was just what could be expected if things were 
ft for the state's governor to settle. 
M. C. Williams, southwest regional director for President Hoover's 
employment committee, advised the city to forego its system of made-work 
favor of a system of direct taxation. Made-work was not satisfactory 
cause the worker: 
••• knows it is just a guise for charity and those who really 
want to work for whatever they receive resent such a make-
shift. Made~work is expensive, and in the long run it is 
cheaper to pay off than to resort to such practices.25 
e trend is toward direct taxation to finance work relief: 
About 75 per cent of the help given last year for relief 
was through tax supported funds. More and more cities are 
realizing that this is the logical way to handle their 
problems. It is too late for Tulsa to adopt this method 
this year, but you should begin planning for next year. 
Study the records of the cities that have this form of 
taxation and you will find that it is more satisfactory 
than the voluntary donation plan.26 
Mayor Watkins, however, explained that the city was going ahead with 
s plans to provide work relief on the theory that there was a distinct 
fference between it and charity. By providing work for the unemployed, 
23Tulsa Tribune, October 1, 1931, p. 4. 
24Ibid. 
25Tulsa World, October 5, 1931, p. 2. 
26Ibid. 
I .t. 
e mayor contended, the number of calls for charity are lessened. 27 A. 
Sweeney, Independent party leader, representing Governor Murray's unem-
oyment committee at the meeting, took exception to some of the suggestions 
de by Williams. He remarked that the president's committee was just a 
ifth wheel," and maintained that the federal authorities were just 
28 assing the buck" with· their suggestions. 
A. L. Farmer, chairman of the Chamber of Commerce's fact-finding com-
.ttee, proposed the raising of water rates· to provide funds for charity • 
. ' 
: the water rates were raised fifty per cent, he foresaw an additional 
:50,000 in,.come which could be u·sed for charity work.29 It was the belief 
: the city administration, however, that such an increase for charity 
Lrposes would be illegal since state law required that appropriations for 
1y purpose be based upon an amount no higher than the.previous year's 
30 
1come. It was also pointed out that such an increase would over-burden 
1e large industries and the small home owner. The large industries were 
.ready paying the largest water bills anyway, it was said, and with 
1siness conditions like they were, they could not afford to have their 
cpenses increased. The "little man" generally would be a poor source be-
Luse the water department was already carrying hundreds of them who could 
>t afford the existing rates. 31 
Soon after its creation the Committee of Five declared itself to be 
i favor of a system of made-work for the city. The committee urged, 
27 
Tulsa World, October 5, 1931, p. 2. 
28Ibid. 
29"The Water Bill Plan," Relief Plans Under .consideration 9 Central 
nergency Committee of Five, p. 1. 
30 
Tulsa Tribune, September 25, 1931, p. 3. 
31Ibid. 
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wever, that such a project be financed so as not to interfere with the 
ising of the Community Fund, which had to be done by public donations. 
e committee rejected the mayor's tax donation scheme because it could 
t be "ascertained in advance that a substantial sum of money, say 
32 .00,000 to $300,000 could be accumulated from tax refunds ••• " The com-
.ttee directed the sub-committee on made-work which it created to seek 
ways to meet two principal requirements: 
First, the made-work program must return physical good to 
the community. Second, the work must be done almost ex-
clusively by hand labor instead of by m.achine.33 
le sub-committee's first task was to work out such a plan for the city. 
Local authorities, on the suggestion of the subcommittee on made-
,rk, asked the County Excise Board for a readjustme~t of the city water 
1partment's budget for permanent improvements. In this way $100,000 
,uld be provided for an additional reservoir at Mohawk Park. The reser-
,ir was to be constructed with hand labor as a made-work project. City 
:ficials agreed to provide trained superintendents for this project so 
lat no big salaries would have to be paid from made-work funds. 34 Mayor 
ltkins was authorized by the city commission to receive oral bids from 
lrdware merchants on 100 wheel barrows, 200 long handled shovels, 12 axes 
ld 36 picks for carrying out the project by hand labor.35 There was 
:tual need of the reservoir aside from that brought by unemployment. It 
32 (Tulsa) Report of the Ceatra.1 Emergency C_onnnitt:ee of Five, October 
), 1931, p. 1. 
33 (Tulsa) "Appointment of the Subcommittee on Made-Work," Minutes of 
1e C::omm_i_t_t.a_e. o.f. Jive., October 15, 1931, p. 1. 
34(Tulsa) Repor_t. of _the Subcommitt.ee oa ~de-Work, Central Emergency 
>mmittee of Five, p. 1. 
35Ibid. 
Io.+ 
.s expected to provide a volume of water storage sufficient to tide the 
ty over a maximum period of high consumption in time of drought 
City officials proposed that the task of employing men on the project 
left to the special made-work subcommittee of the Committee of Five • 
. e subcommittee announced its intention of using the lists of the mayor's 
,mm.ittee on unemployment and the governor's unemployment committee·as a 
.sis for its direction and coordination of the work relief. But the sub-
tJ111Dittee asked the mayor's committee to continue to handle the registratioD 
36 
.d assignment of jobs. 
Mayor Watkins, representing the city, and Mrs. Redmond S. Cole, repre-
,nting the Governor, had cooperated in the registration of the unemployed • 
. eir intention had been to collect the names of all unemployed persons in 
.e city as well as other information about each of them. This information 
.s placed in a central file, to which every approved relief agency was 
ven access. The cards were classified as to the type of work in which 
.e applicant had experience, the type of case he represented, and whether 
37 n or woman. After the central file was assembled, those cards coming 
.der the classification of city employment, carrying the names of those 
rsons seeking jobs under the city's made-work program, were turned over 
the mayor's committee for the task of job assignment. 
Registration had moved slowly. The larger group of the unemployed 
.s made up of office or white collar workers and office girls, and they 
w nothing in particular for them in the proposed made-work program of 
e city. They, therefore, were slow to confess their situation. Some 
.d political reasons for failing to register. With Governor Murray's 
36(Tulsa) Report of the Subcommittee~ Made-Work, Central Emergency 
,mmittee of Five, p. 1. 
37Tulsa Spirit, September 21, 1931, p. 10. 
mmittee in Tulsa beginning work on relief plans at the same time that 
yor Watkins was meeting with civic leaders to discuss plans for solving 
nter problems, Johnson D. Hill, president of the Community Fund, sounded 
warning against scattered effort. He made a sharp appeal for coordinated 
•... 
d consolidated planning before the situation got out of hand. Hill was 
ghly critical of the governor's committee: 
The governor seems to have set up an organization in Tulsa 
ostensibly to compete with whatever machinery is set up by 
the citizenry. Unless the object of the governor is to have 
representatives who will cooperate 100% with our regular 
machinery, I think most any person familiar with the situation 
would call his action ridiculous. Furthermore, the net result 
would be to destroy the coordination that we have thought to 
be so imperative at this time.38 
Obviously Hill had in mind not only past differences with the Governor, 
t also other current endeavors, not the work being done by Mrs. Cole in 
njunction with Mayor Watkins. The statement, however, seemed to strengthe 
e conviction of some that anything connected with Murray had overtones of 
,litical "spoils." This led s. J. Hales, chairman of the governor's unem-
oyment committee in Tulsa, to remark: 
This movement is dlstinctly non-partisan, even though it 
has been sponsored by the governor. Gossip has it that 
this is a political set-up and for that reason many have 
refrained from registering. This is an error. Republicans, 
Democrats, Socialists or whatever their political align-
ments, will receiv~ du~ courtesy in registering and equal 
consideration to Lfor!/ jobs.39 
The special made-work committee had concluded that more than $1,000,00( 
L pay rolls would be necessary to provide a twenty-week program of work 
tlief for the city's 8,000 registered unemployed. Since it was not 
38Tulsa World, September 27, 1931, p. 2. 
39rulsa Tribune, September 30, 1931, p. 4. 
;sible to obtain this amount from city and county governments, the rest 
the relief would have to be provided by means of jobs given to those 
amployed by private citizens who had something that needed to be done. 
Lsa homeowners were therefore asked to provide made-work projects about 
eir homes. It was hoped that thousands of persons would thus be aided 
40 en though their services would be needed for only one day. 
The club women of Tulsa were asked to provide at least one day of em-
oyment per week for one of the 1,500 unemployed women of the city. The 
ergency employment sub-committee of the Committee of Five issued the 
llowing appeal to Tulsa club women: 
There are 1,500 women looking for work--women trying to keep 
their children in school, women working to save their homes 
and families, women with no one to turn to, no men to share 
their burden, women without food and children with'out food, 
women cold, hungry, and discouraged! 
Pledge one day of work a week, every two weeks, or once 
a week to some wo0¥ln. Join the club women's honor rol1!41 
A plan to create jobs for the unemployed in support of the made-work 
peal was adopted by the city street department. Department employees 
nated nine per cent of their salaries to a relief fund. Mechanical 
reet sweepers and other men-displacing equipment were taken off and the 
n put to work. Work was given to fifty men, all heads of families. 
lf of these men worked the first three days of the week, and half worked 
e last three days. Men employed under this plan worked just as hard as 
e regular employees and received just as much pay.42 
The Central Emergency Committee of Five gave its approval to the 
4°tteport of the Subcommittee on Made-Work» Central Emergency Committee 
Five, p. 2. 
41 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
42Tulsa Tribune, December 17, 1931, p. 5. 
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IIIIllissary which the city had operated in the previous winter. The com-
ttee declared, however, that it was well aware of the fact that such a 
mmissary interfered with free enterprise capitalism, and emphasized 
at its operation should end simultaneously with the end of the emer-
ncy.43 Meanwhile, competition with privately owned stores would be 
iminated by accepting only scrip, as in the past, for merchandise; In 
dition, provided that price and quality were equal, local products were 
be used in order that producers in the Tulsa territory might have an 
tlet for some of their surplus. 44 The commissary was to be made avail-
,le not only to the city's program, but for the programs of the state, 
unty and all other relief agencies as well. The purpose of the commis-
.ry was to provide a central purchasing agency for food and clothing, 
.d thereby eliminate piecemeal buying. The advantages, it was hoped, 
,uld be increased buying power with lower costs and therefore larger 
45 ,arity dollars. 
The commissary was to be under the supervision of the Committee of 
.ve. It would operate as a clearing house for the scrip that came in, 
:ing the money to buy supplies. The minimum stock compatible with a 
,lanced diet was to be carried. A revolving fund was established for 
Le operation of the commissary, and a strict accounting was kept of all 
:penditures. Any contracts made on behalf of the commissary's oper~tion 
,uld require the approval of the committee. All purchases were to be 
ir cash. 46 
4311The Leavell Commissary Plan," Special Report of the Central Emergen· 
r Committee of Five, p. 1. 
441bid. 
451bid. 
461bid., p. 2. 
10 
A ration plan for the distribution of food through the commissary 
i originated by committee member Major John Leavell. It was based upon 
! ration system used by his regiment during World War I. Whereas pre-
>usly relief recipients had been given the choice of purchasing what 
!Y wished from the commissary's stock, they now purchased the special 
~ion developed by Leavell. While a few objected to this control over 
air food, most were glad to find that it was cheaper and that they 
arefore had additional funds with which to purchase clothing. Since 
a value of the ration, especia~ly the children's ration, depended largely 
Jn the manner in which food was prepared, a cooking school was estab-
shed in the front.of the commissary. Public health nurses prepared 
47 
ecial rations for malnourished indigent individuals. 
48 The average cost of a weekly food ration was forty-two cents. 
jor Leavell submitted a synopsis of the rations being distributed by 
e commissary to the Massachusetts Institute_of Technology for a check 
their food values. An analysis of the Tulsa ration revealed that it 
ntained 2800 calories. The Institute had previously determined that 
00 calories was ample for the normal man.49 Leavell maintained that 
e food value of the ration exceeded that of the "two star" ration ap-
oved by the Department of Agriculture by several thousand calories 
ekly. 50 He tried out each new item on his family. Records were cited 
Leavell to show that persons dependent upon the ration had "a better 
4711The Leavell Commissary Plan," Special Report of the Central 
.ergency Committee of Five, p. 2. 
481bid., p. 5. 
49Harlow's Weekly, November 12, 1931, p. 8. 
5~ew ~ Times, April 25, 1932, p. 3. 
I ':I 
alth status than those of the city at large of 150,000 population. 1151 
At one point accusations were directed at the commissary that it had 
sued spoiled food. An investigation revealed, however, that there were 
ly two articles in the ration which could go bad--cabbage and meat. 
rst quality cabbage was purchased, and it was never allowed to remain 
the commissary for more than forty-eight hours. Beeves were delivered 
eat a time by the packing house and immediately placed in a large well-
ed refrigerator and kept there at all times. No meat was ever allowed 
remain in the commissary for more than twenty-four hours. 52 
The magnitude of the business transacted under this commissary plan 
best illustrated by the following chart which summarizes the food and 
othing distri.buted during one typical week: 53 
Flour o o •••••••••••••• 
Oats .•.•••. ~ .•.••••.. 
Beans ..•••.••.••••••. 
Urd . ............... . 
Potatoes .•...•....... 
Sausage . ............ . 
Powdered Milk ••••••.• 
Salt pork •••••••••••• 
Soap ................ . 
















Peanut Butter ••••• 
Cocoa ••••••••••••• 
Tomatoes . ••••••••• 
Grapefruit •••••••• 










All items in pounds except soap in bars, peanut butter 
in large jars, and cod liver o{l in gallons 
Shoes •••••••••••••.•. 3,000 
Stockings •••••••••••• 2 1 400 
CLOTHING 
Underwear ••••••••• 19 560 
Overalls •••••••••• 1 1 540 
51New York Times, April 25 9 1932, p. 3. 
52 
Tulsa Tribune, March 17, 1932, p. 3. 
53 
''Weekly Report of the Commissary Subcommittee, December 8, 1931, 11 
!ntral Emergency Committee of Five Report» p. 7. 
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The Tulsa commissary attracted international attention. Letters were 
ceived from such varied places as Washington, D. C., Elyria, Ohio, and 
rren, Missouri asking for complete details about the ration system. At 
ast one eastern industrial organization sent a representative .to study 
e plan. Requests for copies of a pamphlet explaining the plan, which 
s published after a time, came from twelve foreign countries, including 
o cities in the Union of South Africa.54 
The commissary plan was later adopted by the state of Pennsylvania 
55 a part of its official relief plan. Major Leavell was called to 
rrisburg in September 9 1932 9 by Governor Gifford Pinchot to explain the 
stem. A legislative committee 9 the governor's cabinet, the attorney 
neral I s office, welfare heads of the state, Pr.ofessor H. C. Sherman, 
tritionist from Columbia University, public health workers, and corpo-
tion htaads approved the-plan befure it was adopted for state wide use. 56 
The activities of the Central Emergency Committee of Five during late 
31 and 1932 marked the high point of relief administration in Tulsa. 
e committee's commissary plan attained internationaLregognition. Welfare 
encies were brought into closer unity. Relief organizations attained 
w respect •. There was one vital problem, however, with which the committee 
uld not cope, and this was the all-important problem of finances. On 
other front, the endeavor to force the public body charged by law with 
sponsibility for relief to live up to its duty had been largely 
54 
Harlow's Weekly, January 19, 1932, p. 9. 
55For an extremely interesting account of the controversy which the 
avell plan later aroused in Pennsylvania, see: Arthur Dunham, "Pena,ylvani 
.d Unemployment Relief," Social Service Review, VIII {June, 1934), pp. 246-
8. 
56Tulsa Tribune, September 15, 1932, p. 4. 
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~uccessful. Even the finest of programs could not operate without 
1ances. By the late spring of 1932, therefore, the city's commissary 
i been closed, its made-work program had ceased, and the committee of 
~e had formally terminated- its own existence. 
CHAPTER V 
THE ORIGINS OF FEDERAL AID 
Tulsa was facing in the fall of 1932 its most severe winter of unem-
.oyment yet. Its early efforts to combat the complications of the de-
~ession had been far from satisfactory. The county had persistently· 
tfused to provide as much relief for the indigent as its critics thought 
lS necessary. This reluctance of the county had rendered more pronounced 
1e normal philosophical frictions between public and private charity. 
1ese conflicts had nullified, or at least interfered ·heavily with, 
Eforts to centralize relief administration. Even when consolidation 
1d been achieved, as in the case of the Committee of Five, the activities 
f the bodies thus created were troubled by inability to obtain theo-
atical criteri~ acceptable to all. And, even on matters upon which 
1reement could be reached, the consolidated effort was soon brought to 
~ end by the exhaustion of finances. 
As early as February of 1932 the reservoir made-work program initi-
ted by the city and approved by the new committee of five had of necessity 
l een halted, for funds were totally depleted. With 11,675 registered unem 
loyed in Tulsa, an organized spring clean-up, paint and repair campaign 
ad been launched. It was designed to serve the double purpose of beautif;; 
!Tulsa's water department officials later declared that it was impossi 
le to make profitable use of the extra reservoir at Mohawk Park in which 
ver $40,000 had been invested. A private contractor, would not accept 
he work done for nearly the amount spent: Tulsa World, June 11, 1932, 
• 7. 
1e city, and supplying work for the unemployed. City officials were hopeft 
1at every person on the lists might benefit, at least through part-time 
)rk. Fifteen thousand women answered the call to canvass house-to-house 
1 order to induce every property owner in the city to carry out improve-
2 ants that would mean jobs for the unemployed. 
This program had been largely unsuccessful. Its meager results are 
ot surprising in view of the mass of destitution in the city. Efforts 
n this direction w.ere gradually relaxed until finally the whole problem 
as back with those administering direct relief. When ·in the late summer 
f 1932 the county had refused to heed the pleas and threats of the re-
ief agencies for more funds, a temporary program, as mentioned before, 
ad been inaugurated by the city. All city employees and a number of 
ounty employees had contributed a portion of their salaries to charity 
,n a fixed percentage basis. A mayor's committee had called upon business 
:irms of the city in an attempt to gain donations on a salary percentage 
,asis in order to help finance the distribution of food to the needy, The 
.dea was to get officials and private enterprise to give a portion of 
:heir salaries as local governmental employees were doing.3 The committee 
Lad fared very poorly. 
A city-wide distribution of food was started at six district commis-
saries under the direction of Captain Raymond ~ranger and v-0lunteer city 
4 firemen. Only those persons registered, checked against Community Fund 
>r Red Cross records, and investigated by city firemen, were given food. 
2Tulsa Tribune, February 26, 1932, p. 2. 
3Tulsa World, September 1, 1932, p. 3. 
4Tulsa Tribune, August 23, 1932, p. 1. 
1ch sacked ration was designed as a week's supply of food for a family. 5 
~e Tulsa Immediate Relief Association cooperated with the firemen by 
ollecting two truckloads of vegetables and produce from generous farmers. 
ive weeks after the commissaries were opened eighty-six thousand pounds 
f food produc~s had been purchased and distributed at a cost of $2,928.88. 
he average cost per family was 45 cents, and the average cost per ·person 
as nine cents. 6 Five hundred families were served with food on August 22, 
he first day the commissaries were opened. 7 This number had increased by 
n average of approximately 400_ families per week. On September 8, fami-
.ies numbering 2,023 were served. 8 In all an estimated 32;475 persons ob-
:ained food through these commissaries while they were operated by the 
:i ty firemen. 9 
In the meantime, since early May, city officials had been striving 
:o get another made-work program into operation. In 1930 a $3,000,000 
1ond issue had been floated for municipal im~rovements. More than 
,1,300,000 of these bonds had never been sold. City authorities proposed 
1ow that $500,000 or more of these bonds be cancelled, and a new bond 
· 10 
Lssue ranging in size from $250,000 to $500,000 recommended. City 
1.uthorities were hopeful that sale could be mad6 to the Reconstruction 
rinance Corporation, which, it had been announced, was to have a fund of 
5Tulsa Tribune, August 23, 1932, p. 1. 
6 Ibid., September 9, 1932, p. 2. 
7 12!.!!•, August 23, 1932, p. 1. 
8tulsa World, September 9, 1932, p. 3. 
91!?.!!· 
lC>itarlow's Weekly, May 15, 1932, p. 8. 
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ire than $300,000,000 for federal loans to municipalities and states on 
ilf-liquidating construction projects. If an agreement could not be 
1ached with RFC administrators, the plan was to sell the bonds locally 
t small denominations. 11 
Robert W. Kelso, regional representative of the Reconstruction Finance 
>rporation, instructed delegates of the city, county, and Community Fund 
> prepare immediately a report of the charity needs, particularly among 
1e unemployed, for the rest of the year. The report was also to include 
monthly expenditure record for the years 1931 and 1932 through the 
1rious agencies. If any funds were obtained, they were to go toward 
nemployment relief in the main, although some, it was thought, might be 
sed to take care of the more serious cases where outright relief was 
eeded. 12 
The plan had plenty of local opposition. Some expressed the view that 
nsurmountable obstacles might be encountered in the sale of bonds by 
.ither method. One doubted that made-work was worthwhile, stating that 
~n unfit for labor would be engaged and that the slow ones would set the 
13 
,ace for the whole crew. One did not believe that the city should sell 
Lny more bonds for any purpose. He deplored the action of Cong-ress in 
,assiag what he called a "grab bag relief bill. nl4 
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation failed to make a positive repl) 
:o the Tulsa request that it purchase its bonds. The Tulsa city attorney 
!Xpressed disappoiatment over the apparent failure to make progress in 
llTulsa Tribune, May 15, 1932, p. 1. 
12.rulsa World, September 19, 1932, p. 2. 
l3Tulsa Tribune, May 16, 1932, p. 3. 
14Ibid. 
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gotiating with the RFC, declaring that "the more correspondence we had 
th them the farther away they got from the object in mind. 1115 In the 
ce of its failure to obtain the cooperation of the Reconstruction Finance 
rporation, the city commission asked the legal department to prepare an 
vertising notice to bidders on $150,000 in park bonds as a step toward 
blic sale of the bonds. It was hoped to sell the bonds.to individual 
tizens, banks and businesses on a patriotic basis, with the bonds being 
sued in the amounts of $50, $100, $500, and $1000. 16 Tulsans who could 
:ford the investment would be a~ked to buy one or more of the security 
.its, which they could later sell at par plus accrued interest provided 
17 .e market for municipal securities ever improved. 
In the preparation of the advertising notice, how~ver, it was dis-
1vered that the ordinance authorizing the 1930 election at which the 
•nds had been voted, had fixed their denominations at $1,000, while the 
.ty ia its plans had proposed to sell them in amounts as low as $50 to 
ldividual citizens. 18 Thereby frustrated in both of its bond sale pro-
,sals, the city commissioners turned to the state. The commissioners re-
1ested an apportionment of $500,000 to the Tulsa county from relief funds 
lde available to Oklahoma through the RFC. The resolution directed to 
,vernor William H. Murray called attention to the need of finances for a 
19 
Lde-work program and for general relie·f. 
15 Tulsa World, October 4, 1932, p. 2. 
16 Tulsa Tribune, October 10, 1932, p. 2. 
17Ibid. 
l8Tu~sa World, October 14, 1932, p. 3. 
19 Tulsa Tribune, October 18, 1932, p. 1. 
U I 
In late October, 1932, Tulsa received $146,000 for relief purposes 
om the Reconstruction Finance Corporation via Governor Murray. All of 
is fund was designated to go for the payment of labor on made-work pro-
cts. These projects included a recreation lake in the northeast part 
Mohawk Park, water line extensions and the clearing of timber for a 
w golf course in the park. 20 A central employment registration head-
.arters was set up and 1,000 heads of families put to work, most of them 
, the lake project. Shifts of 500 men were used, giving each shift three 
.ys of work weekly. The purpose of alternating the shifts was to enable 
1ch man on the job to receive a minimum of $7.20 for three eight hour 
1ys each week. The standard wage was $2.40 per day, while fifteen cents 
t hour was paid for teams and five cents an hour for wagons and similar 
tuipment. 21 A national guard rolling kitchen was procured on order of 
,vernor Murray from Oklahoma City, pots and pans were gathered, and the 
1n were fed on the spot.22 Unemployment registration for the county 
lached 13,000, including 706 widows.23 
At the same time, women were given work in town. More than one 
1ndred women whose families were in need were employed in sewing rooms 
9novating clothing for the needy. The Community Fund provided these 
>men with a daily lunch, and they were paid on an hourly basis from Re-
>nstruction Finance Corporation funds. Two hundred and ninety-six girls, 
!gistered with the Community Fund, were given work in connection with 
1arities and public service. Most of them had stenogi:;.~phic or clerical 
20Tulsa Tribune, October 26, 1932, p. l. 
21tulsa World. O~tober 30, 1932, p. 2. , 
22Tulsa T~ibune, November 23, 1932, p. 13. 
23 Ibid., November 8, 1932, p. 11. 
:aining and were given part-time work in charity and relief offices • 
. othing classes in the Tulsa senior and junior high schools completed 
1 284 garments for needy students from cloth furnished by the Red Cross. 
Lstribution ~as made through the Parent Teacher Association and the At-
tndance and Guidance Department of the schools. Supervisors reported 
1at students who received garments showed a change of attitude and often 
ire eager to attend school once they were adequately clothed. Robert 
1lso, Reconstruction Finance Corporation represe~tative on a tour of the 
>uthwest, praised the Tulsa sewing rooms and other ladies' programs as the 
>St effectively planned that he had seen. 24 
As far as the common man was concerned, federal aid made its triumphan 
~try into Tulsa on Tuesday, November 29. This was th~ day when first 
~eeks were issued for employment on the made-work projects. The pay was 
omen employed in the first three-day shift from November 14 through 
ovember 16. The total payroll amounted to $4,700.00, with the individual 
becks usually being $9.60. 25 This was the first pay that many of these 
en had received in months. Since most of them had been on the Community 
und charity rolls, their general attitude now showed that they were glad 
o be, to a degree, self-supporting again. 26 Men took their turns passing 
hrough a basement hall to a desk where E. B. Howard, Tulsa county made-
ork administrator, sat with the checks already made out. A conversation 
ited by the local press which took place between two men in the line 
as considered typical. Both were middle-aged, both clad in over-alls: 
24 
Harlow's Weekly, December 11, 1932, p. 8. 
25 Tulsa Tribune, November 27, 1932, p. 1. 
26 Ibid., November 29, 1932, p. 3. 
'I don 1 t have much coming, but I'll tell you, it looks 
big to me»' said one. 1 I 8ve got three children. It's been 
so long since we've had any money~ I won't know how to 
count it. 
'Me too,' rejoined the other. 27 'I've got six kids.' 
Others among the Tulsa ·populace were just as happy over the payment 
these men 9 particularly those to whom the unemployed men owed money 
,r goods and services. These men were, as a matter of fact, so happy 
1at they ~ould not resist going dOWl'!. to the Community Fund building to 
ttend congratulations. Of course, once felicitations had been proffered 
1ey had to have something to talk about, and what better subject of con-
arsation was there than past due bills. The attempts of creditors to 
btain payments of old accounts from men and women barely able to meet 
imnediate needs with their made-work checks became so insistent, in fact, 
hat relief administrator Howard declared the Community Fund building 
ff-limits to bill collectors on pay day. Howard declared: 
The made-work program was created to provide enough 
funds for the unemployed to keep body and soul together. 
Under the present rule laid down by Governor Murray, each 
person may t'ti"ceive only four days pay a month, which gives 
them $9.60, and-that is barely enough to cover the cost 
of food. I have informed merchants that no check assign-
ments would be honored by my office and that goes for all 
other creditors.28 
Winter crept in as the made-work program continued. Since the site 
,f major activity was eight miles from town~ and since most of the men 
tmployed had no means of transportation» the cold weather presented even 
;raver problems than normal. In an attempt to cope with this problem, 
loward appealed to Tulsa businessmen to loan trucks for the hauling of men 
:o work. The appeal went largely unanswered. In fact, only one "ill-used' 
27Tulsa Tribune» November 29, 1932, p. 3. 
28 Ibid., December 9, 1932 9 p. 4. 
Ld flat-bed vehicle was delivered. This situation provoked an incident 
1ich indicates the basic attitudes of the unemployed. ·It snowed heavily 
1 Tulsa on December 14. It had become established procedure for the 
lde-work officials to publish in the local papers a list of names of 
irsons on the unemployed registration lists they wanted to report to 
,rk the next day. Promised jobs cutting wood for charity fuel if they 
>uld bring tools for work, 400 men, properly equipped, trudged to the 
,mmunity Fund building on the morning of December 15. There they found 
tly the battered flat-bed available for transportation. Two hundred and 
~venty were carried to work by the available truck. All others faced the 
.ternative of losing a day, or walking the distance through the snow. 
tanimously they volunteered to walk: 
Over the shoulders of this straggling army were swung its 
instruments of war--axes and saws--as it mushed through 
the business district and out North Main Street to Mohawk 
Boulevard, thence to the scene of the Bird Creek timber 
clearing project. 
They sang, joked, wise-cracked, and war-hooped as ,, 
they trudged along, a hodge-podge of humanity, some poprly 
dressed, but back of everything determined. Half were 
Negroes. They formed a line to string out for the long 
stretch along Mohawk Boulevard. 29 
Thus the unemployed in Tulsa, far from being revolutionary or subject 
1 radical agitat:io~, were instead unfortunate people thoroughly dedicated 
1 the root principles of capitalism. They demanded little from the govern· 
nt, and what they received, while they accepted it gratefully, they re-
ived it with no little bit of shame. Perhaps, as some historians be-
eve, the impending New Deal eventually saved the United States from 
volution. Tulsans, however, were in no such immediate danger. 
By the end of 1932, indeed, the national government had began to 
29Tulsa Tribune, December 15, 1932, p. 13. 
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ffect Tulsa's relief policies. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 
1e first of many federal agencies, had achieved substantial improvement 
f local relief organization by insisting that a proper administrative 
1it be set up to distribute federal funds. It also had hastened the 
~ovision of increased state aid through its reiteration that federal 
~ants were available only to supplement fully utilized local and state 
!Sources. 
CHAPTER VI 
ORGANIZATION AMONG THE UNEMPLOYED 
One phase of prominence in the Tulsa depression narrative concerns 
~e evolution of organized groups among the unemployed. Animated by 
~eir dissatisfaction with some aspect of the local relief set-up, 
aighborhood groups would drift.into informal association. The degree 
f cohesiveness and degree of expansion that each of these organizations 
ttained normally depended upon the dynamics of its leadership. Some-
imes they developed a city wide membership, but in most cases the element 
f interest restricted membership to the original participants. Although 
~e combined memberships of these organizations never totaled more than 
very small proportion of the city's unemployed population, they were 
Ktremely vocal, and in many instances their statements were accepted as 
ne general sentiment of all those out of work. As a result, local 
uthorities were instructed as to which of their practices were offensive 
o those dependent upon relief, and at the same time relief recipients 
ere enabled to understand better just what the aims and limitations of 
elief administrators were. It is probably true, therefore, that these 
roups contributed significantly to the lessening of hostility between 
ulsa' s "haves" and "have nots'' during the Great Depression, and possibly 
nabled the city to avoid the riotous manifestations of discontent that 
eveloped elsewhere. 
Almost without exception these organizations took little time to 
·ormulate broad social reforms. They concentrated instead on immediate 
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ocal grievances. Ordinarily they presented their views through the 
edium of delegations to the city's relief bureaus. Occasionally one of 
nese organizations did stage a mass demonstration. Judging from the 
imes when such activity took place, however, they were not usually de-
igned to force basic changes in the policy of social agencies. 1 
Of all the organizations of the unemployed which developed in·Tulsa, 
erhaps the most noteworthy, and certainly the most colorful, was the 
ndependent Party. Organized in the autumn of 1930, it introduced itself 
.o Tulsans with precision drills, described as "hunger marches," on down-
.own streets. This group was destined to have greater permanency than any 
,ther' organization of the unemployed which appeared in Tulsa during the 
lepression. It was not until late in 1932, after the Socialists had 
;ained ascendancy within its ranks, that the party dissolved. Even then 
.ts leftist members reorganized as the Unemployment Citizens League. 
As far as members of the Independent Party were concerned, the de-
,ression had been the inevitable result of the avarice of the economic 
tlite. These men, the party believed, had been so possessed with accumu-
Lating vast wealth for themselves that they had neglected to return enough 
2 . 
,fit to the working class. As a result, consumers were unable to buy 
:heir products, and depressed financial conditions had descended upon the 
!ntire nation. 
1The one such incident that took on a violent character occurred in 
::>ctober of 1930 when a minor labor disturbance erupted in the downtown 
district. A small group of Independent Party members thought that the 
labor being employed in demolishing a half-block of buildings on the site 
of a new federal building were out-of-towners. Six men were taken into 
custody and charged with conspiracy to assault government employees. 
lulsa World, October 3, 1930, p. 26. 
2Tulsa Unionist-Journal, October, 1931, p. 5. 
Although a few radicals within the party, even in the earlier stages 
fits development, recommended government ownership of industry and a 
3 
ational unemployment insurance program, most members scorned the dole. 
~ring the 1931 party convention they stated with great conviction that: 
!fo decent American wants anyone t·o give him anything. All he wants is 
chance to work for it. 114 
In August of 1931, at the Unemployment Relief Conference in Memphis, 
ennessee, the Independent Party called its big project to national a~-
ention. In preference to charity, the Independents advocated the pro-
ation of employment, that is, the reduction of jobs to a half-time basis 
~ere feasible, and the recruitment of labor from the ranks of the unem-
loyed to fill the remaining time. Most proponents of. the proration of 
nployment advocated a three or five day week. Not so with the Inde-
endents who preferred a five hour day. The Independents pictured the 
5 peration of a polic.y of proration as a "benevolent circle." Even though 
o more money would be paid out in wages, they calculated, more money 
ould be spent by wage earners. Those unemployed would spend because 
~ey would be lifted out of the dependent class and would have the funds 
ecessary to meet their essential needs. And those who already had jobs 
ould spend because, even though their incomes would be decreased, they 
ould have security in their jobs. As fear was lifted more goods would 
e bought, more orders given, more goods manufactured, better prices made 
ossible, more jobs made available, higher wages would come, and more 
oods would be bought. 
3 Tulsa Tribune, September 8, 1931, p. 3. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
Governor William H. Murray of Oklahoma had summoned the relief 
>nference to meet at Memphis. The research work carried out by Murray's 
11ergency Committee for Employment had convinced him that the unemploy-
tnt problem was not one of Oklahoma alone. It was a problem, Murray be-
Leved, that no state could solve within itself without cooperation of 
1e other states. 6 Acting on this theory the Governor called a conference 
Ethe Mississippi basin states for the purpose of organizing a nation-
Lde program to provide work for the unemployed. Requests were mailed to 
mgressmen, United States Senators, Governors and mayors of cities in 
lsin states urging that they be represented by delegates at the Memphis 
,nference. 7 
In preparing to attend the conference, Elmer Thomas, Oklahoma Sena-
,r, wrote to Independent Party officials in Tulsa requesting information 
1>out the proposals they had made for a local solution. The letter of 
eply offered these suggestions: 
To limit employment in each family to one person where feasible. 
To drop either man or wife where both are found working. 
To secure from city and county officials a half-time policy. 
To ask all ministers to devote time in the churches to securing 
an understanding of the unemployment needs. 8 
To provide a citizen's committee for prorating employment. 
opies of the letter were also sent to Governor Gifford Pinchot ~f 
ennsylvania, Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York, and President 
erbert Hoover. 9 
6 . 
State of Oklahoma, Annual Report of the Department of Labor. Bulletin 
umber 10-A for the Fiscal Period ending June 30th, 1932. (Oklahoma City, 
he State of Oklahoma, 1932), p. 56. 
7.!.!?14. 
&rulsa Tribune, August 27, 1931, p. 7. 
Urging the need for a rapid solution to the unemployment problem at 
out the same time, A. F. Sweeney, Independent Party leader, declared: 
If employment is not forthcoming the dole will be. 
Odd jobs are not the answer to the problem facing Tulsa 
and the country, but instead every man must have a job 
for which he is fitted. The only solution is the pro-
ration of employment.10 
The unemployment relief conference was called to order by United 
ates Senator K. D. McKellar of Tennessee in the auditorium of the 
.abody Hotel at Memphis on August 24, 1931.11 Colonel Clarence B. Douglas 
Tulsa was elected temporary chairman. 12 Senator Thomas, representing, 
least in part, the viewpoints of the Independent Party was named chair-
.n of the committee on resolutions. At this time Thomas was probably 
1e leading Congressional monet,ry reform strategist. He had received 
.s political baptism in the campaigns of 1896 and 1900 as an ardent 
13 •okesman for the monetary doctrines of William Jennings Bryan. In 
123, after accumulating considerable wealth in legal work and land 
~elopments in Oklahoma, Thomas had gone to Congress for two terms in 
Le House of Representatives. He had been elected to the Senate in 1926. 14 
lOTulsa Tribune, October 1, 1931, p. 5. 
llit looked for a time as though the Memphis Conference would be a 
ital failure. An open breach developed between Murray and the Memphis 
Lamber of Commerce because of the alleged indifference of that organiza-
.on toward the meeting. Harlow's Weekly, August 22, 1931, p. 13. 
12nouglas is one of the most interesting figures of the early history 
Tulsa. By profession a newspaperman, he had been appointed by Murray 
1 a colonel of militia. Lyle H. Boren, Who is Who in Oklahoma, 1935. 
:uthrie: The Cooperative Publishing Company, 1935), p. 138. 
13 Joseph E. Reeve, Monetary Reform Movements. (Washington, D. C.: 
1erican Council on Public Affairs, 1943), p. 148. 
14 · Official Congressional Directory,~ Congress, 1st Session, 1935. 
rashington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1935), p. 93. 
~e also: Rex Harlow, "Elmer Thomas, 11 Oklahoma Leaders: Biographical 
~etches of the Foremost Living Men 2.£. Oklahoma. (Oklahoma City: Harlow 
1blishing Company, 1938) pp. 294-304. 
l had filed, during his first session in Congress, a bill which would 
Lve ordered the issuance of enough Federal Reserve bank notes for com-
Lete payment of the bonus. 15 In December of 1929, after the beginning 
Ethe depression, Thomas had proposed an unsuccessful amendment to the 
,over tax reduction bill which would have provided 160 million dollars 
, 16 · 
1 public works appropriations. And ever since he had continually 
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,ught for larger public works and relief appropriations, and for the 
17 1ecking of deflation by the Federal Reserve Board. This, indeed, was 
> weak champion who _carried the standard for the Independent Party at 
1e Memphis relief conference. 
The resolutions adopted by the conference indicate the significant 
ctent of the influence of Thomas, and therefore the far-reaching effect 
f t~e Independent Party's local stand. The delegates had nothing but 
,ndemnation for the dole; but, like Sweeney, they feared its eventual 
acessity: 
We condemn the system of the "Dole" as being not only un-
American but anti-American; but costly as such a system is 
and deadly as its aspects are upon the morale of our people, 
we believe that unless some other plan for the relief of 
the unemployment is devised and placed in practical opera-
tion the System of the Dole is inevitable.IS 
15cf. H. R. 6813, 11070, 68th Congress; Congressional Record, LXV, 
280, 6322; LXV, 2280, 6322; LXX, 3204-05; LXXI, 1793; U. s. Congress, 
Juse of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Soldiers 0 Adjusted 
Jmpensation, Hearings, 68th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 36-40. 
16congressional Record, LXXII, 654-60, 665. 
17Ibid., LXXIII, 12399; LXXIV, 50, 194-197, 316, 4787-94; LXXV, 1194-9 
~10, 3915, 4024, 4025; S. Resolution 338, S. 5482, 71st Congress, 3rd 
ession; S. Resolution 182, 72nd Congress, 1st Session. 
18state of Oklahoma, Annual Report 2.1 ~ Department of Labor, 1932, p 
8. It should be pointed out that Okla~oma's delegation had its way on most 
f the resolutions by virtue of the non-attendance of others invited. Less 
~an iu.tf of the executives of the other states replied to the Murray invita 
ion. Of those who replied none agreed to attend the meeting and only a 
ew agreed to send a personal representative. Harlow's Weekly, August 22, 
'l'.31. n. 13. 
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As to the proration of employment Thomas drafted, with the approval 
his fellow delegates, the following resolutions: 
That all employers endeavor to add employees by shortening 
hours. 
That rotation of labor·and increase of number of shifts 
be utilized to spread employment.19 
In an address before the gathering Thomas urged a special ses~ion 
: Congress. He could not believe, he declared, that a petition from 
.e cenference containing its representations and demands would be 
.ther ignored nor denied. 
If the president can be convinced of the seriousness of 
this emergency, we have confidence he will take action 
and recommend measures which will bring relief to those 
for whom w, presume to speak. The sole problem is to 
decide to do something and then to lose no time in 
getting the people to work.20 
(rray, however, opposed Thomas on the question of an extra session of 
ingress. To advocate such action, Murray pointed out, might be con-
:rued as a political move designed to embar~ass President Hoover and 
Le Republican Party generally.21 
Enthused by the publicity given its plan of proration at Memphis, 
Le Independent Party decided on an intensive campaign to get their plan 
lopted by the city of Tulsa. Their first move, however, was to seek 
,nsolation for the one defeat of Thomas at the conference. The party 
lopted resolutions only two weeks after the Tennessee meeting urging 
:esident Hoover to call a special session of Congress for the purpose of 
leking a solution to the unemployment situation, and suggesting a national 
.an of proration. The resolutions held that immediate relief was the 
19Ibid., p. 61. 
20uarlow's Weekly, August 29, 1931, p. 5. 
21 Ibid. 
:ed of the hour and called on federal, state, city and county authorities 
, join in a cooperative effort. 22 
The party suggested that representatives of the unemployed, the city 
td county officials, the Chamber of Commerce and the Community Fund 
tould work out a cooperative plan for instituting proration. An umpire 
Lould then be named by these delegates to inquire as to what employment 
LS usable for proration, and to make a definite division of time where 
~acticable. 23 The Independents further appointed a committee, headed by 
, F. Sweeney, to call on every employer in the city to ask that employ-
ant be prorated. The committee was instructed to press particularly hard 
>r the proration of city, county.and school labor. 
Neither public nor private enterp~ise, however, responded very well 
> these suggestions. Private business feared that additional expenses, 
arhaps even loss, would result from the adoption of such a policy. The 
roposals that two five hour shifts of labor be worked instead of one 
ight hour shift would mean that they would be forced to pay for two 
dditional hours of work per day. The industrialists also envisioned 
reater costs in providing supervisory and clerical personnel for the ex-
ended hours of plant operation. Either they would have to keep regular 
upervisors and bookkeepers on for an extra two hours, which would ne-
essitate the payment of overtime, or they would have to train new foremen 
nd hire new clerks. Decreased profits for the industrial concerns, how-
ver, was not the only drawback. The job-sharing movement was also handi-
apped by the fact that some sixty-six per cent of Tulsa's manufacturing 
22Tulsa Tribune, September 8, 1931, p. 3. 
23Ibid. 
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,ncerns were already working on reduced schedules of less than forty 
,urs per week. 24 These obviously could not be expected to divide their 
,rk among many more employees and still allow a living income for all. 
The limits to public proration were also rigidly defined. In the 
LSe of state, county, and city construction work, the substitution of 
mual labor for machine labor, as proposed by the party, would have re-
Llted in increased expenses, which public budgets would not allow. Such 
policy, it was felt, might also result in considerable delay of the 
,mpletion of public projects which were in vital need. 25 Mayor George 
, Watkins, however, did order city officials to prorate jobs where possi-
Le, and called upon contractors of public projects to do likewise. 26 
,me precedent existed -for this partial response by Watkins to the demands 
Ethe Independents. In October, 1930, a delegation of the unemployed 
ad presented a resolution to the Mayor: 
••• we, the undersigned committee representing the unemployed 
of the city, urgently request that you take official action 
upon the formal paragraph and order it to be made a part of 
all specifications on excavation work upon city contracts.27 
1e paragraph which the unemployed wanted included in city contracts 
,Uowed: 
• That portion of all excavations classified as earth 
of loose rock to,a depth of six feet and a width of 12 
feet six inches or less, shall be excavated without the 
24united States Department of Commerce, Industrial Employment Survey 
~lletia~ XI, Number 9 (September, 1931), p. 31. 
25iven economy could not sway the city administration. They turned 
IWll a proposal by the Independent Party that the city ask for alternate 
ids on public projects, one bid to be used on machine labor and the other 
n hand labor. Tulsa World, October 29, 1930, p. 2. 
261bid., October 1, 1931, p. 2. 
2712.!!•, October 1930, p. 4. 
use of power machinery, and the back fillin~ of all 
excavations shall be done in a like manner. 8 
LVL 
Le unemployed asked that this be done in order that "self-respecting men" 
iuld have an opportunity to earn a livelihood for themselves and their 
Lmilies rather than being "objects of charity. 11 29 The city had accepted 
tis request at that time, but had maintained repeatedly that it had gone 
1 far as it could go. In actuality local officials labeled most public 
~ojects "vital" and refused to go even this far. 30 
The party was dissatisfied with the meager results of its first 
Eforts on behalf of proration, and determined to keep the matter of half-
Lme employment before the public and the various relief organizations 
1til, as A. F. Sweeney emphatically declared, "something is done about 
~ one way or the other. n31 When Sweeney spoke, the public usually 
Lstened. He had become something of a legend in Tulsa for his determined 
1deavors on behalf of the "lost cause." He was sixty years old by this 
ime and had gone through careers as newspaper man, merchant and real 
state broker. He was aligned with the pro-Murray faction in Democratic 
ounty politics, being a member of the delegation to the state convention 
elected by the bolters from the Tulsa county meeting.3 2 
There followed an accelerated effort to sell the public on the virtues 
28.rulsa World, October l» 1930, p. 4. 
29 Ibid. 
30niis apparent "double-cross" was one factor behind the trouble which 
esulted in the jailing of six members of the party in the autumn of 1930. 
ulsa World, October 29, 1930, p. 2. 
i 
31 . 
Tulsa Tribune, August 20 9 1931, p. 3. 
32~., January 27, 1932, p. 2. 
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: proration. For employees 9 they proclaimed, it would mean more leisure 
,r recreation, opportunity to cultivate gardens 9 time to pursue cultural 
Ld educational courses, increased incentive to prepare for managerial 
ibs (they felt the new system would require a larger staff in this classi-
.cation), less fatigue and longer periods of rest. All these, they pro-
.aimed, would result in a more healthy, ambitious» alert» and aggressive 
irking force. 33 A further advantage would be greater opportunity for 
,thers who had to support their children to earn a living and yet have 
1ple time at home to care for their families. The cost of living would 
t lower since all meals could be eaten at home. Workers could feel more 
1re of a steady job due to the absorption of more of the city's working 
iople as a result of the increase in the number of jobs. This absorption 
>uld make the working class earners and consumers once again, and thus 
>uld stabilize the local industrial situation. 34 
The Independents also pointed to advantages for the companies. There 
>uld be increased daily production of the plant as an operational unit, 
id, therefore, increased return from the capital invested in the plant 
ld machinery. Since all employees would eat at home, the wasted meal 
eriod would be eliminated and possibly also cafeteria expense. An oppor-
~nity would also be presented for reorganizing the working force to 
ectify inequalities and fit all "pegs" to appropriate holes. 35 
With all this publicity seemingly accomplishing nothing, the Inde-
endents suddenly saw the fabled door of opportunity opened wide. As a 
art of the efforts of local authorities to centralize the administration 
33Harlow 1 s Weekly, August 29, 1931 9 p. 6. 
34lbid. 
35.D.!.g_. 
relief in Tulsa, a fact-finding committee was appointed by the Chamber 
Commerce to investigate ways and means of effecting such centraliza-
on. The fact-finding committee encouraged the party when it mentioned 
guely in one of its reports that the proration of labor seemed desir-
le if a way to make such a plan practical could be found. 36 The party 
snot content, however, with vague recommendations but wanted a thorough 
d complete program drawn up by civic leaders in conjunction with the 
dustrialists of the city. The fact-finding committee recommended that 
central emergency committee of five be made supreme authority over the 
ndling of relief and unemployment matters in the city. Provision was 
.de by the fact-finders for the appointment of four of the members of 
,is emergency group, and these were to select the fifth member. The 
Ldependent Party saw immense possibilities in bringing pressure to bear 
L this small group while it debated the selection of its other associate. 
the party demanded representation on the committee of five, the chances 
iemed at least fair that they could achieve it. Should they fail in their 
.d for a committee post, however, they would occupy a strategic position 
, obtain the committee's sanction of proration as a consolation prize, 
Lich, in reality was a trophy of greater importance. 
In line with this policy, the Independents announced in open assembly 
1at no committee of five nor any other central organization would have 
1e party's support or approval unless they were given active representa-
lon on such committee.37 The resolution was made even more dramatic by 
1e fact that it came as a substitute motion after one member of the party 
36aeport of the .!.!£!-Finding Committee, Tulsa Chamber of Co11DDerce, 
:tober, 1931, p. 5. 
37Tulsa Tribune, October 8, 1931 9 p. 3. 
.ved that the Independents go on record as opposing completely the com-
.ttee originally proposed, and suggest that a new one be set up con-
.sting of three representatives of the Independent Party, one from the 
lty, and one from the county.38 
The first four members of the Committee of Five were selected in ac-
,rdance with the plan devised by the fact-finding committee. The ·men 
alected, it turned out, all belonged to the Chamber of CoDDDerce, and in 
1is fact Sweeney found ripe ground for additional criticism. Pointing 
1t that two of the members wer~ actually directors of the Chamber, 
,eeney held that this was a violation of the original plan, and implied 
1at there had been collusion designed to establish the ascendancy of 
1e industrialists over Tulsa's relief program.39 Th~ Committee of Five 
aeded the Independent Party, said Sweeney, more than the Independent 
40 · 
arty needed the Committee of Five. 
In dire need of obtaining public respect in order to gain approval 
or its projected emergency measures, two of the already chosen members 
f the Committee of Five made statements that they were in favor of pro-
ation. With the ranks thus split, into the gap charged the Independent 
arty. While the Committee of Five was in the process of choosing its 
ifth member, a motion was presented and carried in another public assembl) 
f the Independents that they put forward Sweeney as the party's candidate 
:or the committee. The motion that he be elected and that he present his 
redentials to the other four members of the committee passed unanimously. 
38Tulsa Tribune, October 8, 1931, p. 3. 
39Ibid., October 16, 1931, p. 5. 
40.!!?..!A· 
,eeney delayed strategically the presentation of his "credentials," and, 
iring this delay, the committee appointed its fifth member just as stra-
1gically. The man chosen, municipal Judge G. Ed Warren, was widely known 
,r his strong pro-labor bent and was very popular in relief circles. 41 
few days later the Committee of Five presented to the public a five-
>int program for the proration of employment. 
The victory of the party in its long struggle to obtain official en-
Jrsement of the proration of employment proved a hollow one, however. 
t1e Committee of Five never went further with the idea after making a 
eneral recommendation of proration, and even these suggestions were dis-
rmed to avoid offending the businessmen. 
The committee's recommendations were: 
First, that all plants and industries operating on twenty-
four hour shifts change their mode of operation to six hours 
per day for all common and unskiiled labor wherever possible. 
This request does not necessarily apply to superintendents, 
foremen and other key men where the change would result in 
loss or added expease to the employer.42 
ot only did this statement enable a very broad interpretation of just 
hen "added expense" would be accrued, but very few plants in Tulsa opera-
.ed on twenty-four hour shifts during the depression. 
Second that every homeowner in Tulsa give employment of not 
less than one-half day per month, and ~s much more as 
possible to mechanics in the repair of buildings, decoration, 
plumbing or any other class of work about the premises.43 
41Tulsa World, October 18, 1931, p. 1. The local federation of labor 
Lad adopted the following resolution with respect to the proration of em-
>loyment: '~ecause industries have not openly and honestly accepted their 
:esponsibilities for regular amount of incomes to all working together in 
,roduction they have been able to shift many of their problems upon public 
md private relief agencies." Tulsa Unionist-Journal, November, 1930, p. 1 
42Tulsa SRirit, October 23, 1931, p. 9. 
431bid. 
Le committee also recommended that, wherever possible, housewives give 
1 much as two days employment monthly to domestic help. Both suggestions 
aem to divert attention from the signal issue of a workable plan of pro-
ition involving the cooperation of public and private enterprise. 
Third, that on all construction work where mechanics are 
employed eight hours per day that two shift of five hours 
per day be worked, providing that the employer may use his 
own discretion regarding the superintendent 9 foremen and 
other key men.44 
ere, again, the effects of proration would be necessarily limited if the 
lllployer so chose since it was left to him to define "key" men. This was 
ne only place in which the Committee of Five accepted the Independent 
arty's recommendations, and here the applicability was limited to con-
truction work. 
Fourth, that on all state, county and city construction 
work all labor be hand labor, wherever possible, and that 
no machine: labor be allowed except in cases where hand 
labor would be prohibitive.45 
hat "wherever possible" was to mean was left to the discretion of public 
,fficials, and they chose to give it wide latitude. Hand labor was de-
:lared prohibitive in a great many cases. 
Fifth, that all employers in Tulsa and Tulsa county emplo{ 
only legel residents of the county during the depression. 6 
'.his policy had already been followed rather conscientiously by the busine1 
1en of the city, and several campaigns against transients had been carried 
>ut by Tulsa officials. This clause was, in a sense, more of a replace-
~ent for proration than a buttress for it. The most significant weakness 
>f the recommendations from the standpoint of the unemployed, however, was 




Le very fact that they were mere suggestions. There was still no agree-
~nt between industrialists and civic leaders for a policy of proration 
ld there never would be one. 
Only a few firms of the city took measures to introduce the pro-
Ltion of employment, and then only on a small scale. As to local govern-
antal adoptions of the plan, no further action occurred, except insofar 
1 made-work was prorated, until May of 1932. At that time, in the face 
f the exhaustion of relief funds, a petition bearing the names of 565 
~employed persons was presented to the city commission asking for the 
roration of common labor to make work for more persons.47 The city com-
lied by asking foremen of the garbage and street department to ''stagger" 
their payrolls in line with the request. On the national scene, however, 
embers of the Independent Party must have obtained some satisfaction from 
he fact that Walter Teagle left his desk as president of Standard Oil of 
ew Jersey to head a nation-wide job-sharing movement. 
A short-lived wave of eviction notices in the autumn of 1931 led to 
ction by the Independent Party on another front. 48 The Independents 
·ere more successful when they adopted resolutions which called on the 
tate and federal courts to refuse appointments of receivers in mortgage 
:oreclosure cases where homes were being lost by their owners.49 A short 
;ime after the party took this stand, District Judge Owen Owens declared 
:rom the bench that he would frown on the foreclosing of homesteads and 
:equests for receiverships in cases where the loss of homes would result. 
47Tulsa World, May 15, 1932, p. 2. 
480ne can follow the complete legal history of Tulsa through the 
:olumns of the Tulsa Daily Legal News. 
49Tulsa Tribune, September 10 9 1931, p. 8. 
lUO 
stated that he was taking the financial conditions of many homeowners 
.d would-be homeowners into consideration: 
Too many persons buying homes in Tulsa.were caught in the 
business depression and now face the loss of savings of 
years. It isn't their fault that they can't meet the pay-
ments on their homes. To ask the court to grant orders 
that would mean ejection is asking the court to completely 
ignore the humanitarian aspect. This court won't do it.50 
The Tulsa Clearing House Association and the banks of the city were 
Lso attacked. Accompanied by about fifty members of the party~- A. F. 
ieeney appeared before the county commissioners and demanded that action 
a taken immediately to correct what was termed "corrupt banking practices. 
" 
ieeney exhibited a county warrant for $1.00 in favor of one James Spears 
a payment for services. The commissioners were told that Spears had 
ried to cash the warrant at a local bank. The banker, Sweeney said, had 
old Spears that they were not cashing county warrants any more, but that 
f he would take seventy-five cents for it they would cash his. Obviously 
ndignant at the very thought of such conduct on the part of Tulsa's 
ankers, the fiery Sweeney commented: "If they had the money to cash it 
:or seventy-five cents, they had the money to cash it at full value. Any 
,anker that does that is a racketeer and should be prosecuted. 1151 
The Independents adopted and placed before the city commission a 
·esolution asking for special privileges for the unemployed with respect 
:o the use of city water. The resolution urged that the water .department 
1uspend its right of declaring water bills delinquent and adding ten per 
:ent penalties for unpaid accounts when the consumers were unemployed.52 
50Tulsa Tribune, September 10, 1931, p. 8, 
51 Ibid., September 7, 1932, p. 2. 
52 
Tulsa World, October 29, 1930, p. 2. 
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that time Mayor George L. Watki~s assured the Independents, however, 
at the water commissioner would give its members every consideration 
fore cutting off their water supply. And, in fact, such a policy was 
,llowed by the water department throughout the depression. 
For prospective mothers, the Independent Party advocated a plan 
Lereby local hospitals would provide for their admission and treatment 
ltil the child was born, with the added provision that minor children of 
le mother also be cared for during the period of confinement. All this, 
ley urged, should be done for a fee of fifty dollars. An investigation 
r the party had revealed that a charge was being made which was far in 
~cess of this figure for confinement cases and other charity cases sent 
J local institutions.53 In a letter to the editor of the Tulsa Tribune, 
~eeney declared: 
There is not only a necessity now to see that indigent and 
distressed citizens be given food, clothing and shelter but 
that they be provided with medical attention. And those 
who·are employed for medical purposes should grade their 
fees accordingly.54 
local hospital administrator replied to the Independent Party proposal 
y informing its members that Tulsa County and the Public Health Associatic 
'ere already providing hospital care for a nominal charge of $15.00 to thof 
rhom they found deserving of charity. 55 It was also pointed out that the 
Lospitals had promised to cooperate with local authorities in relieving 
listress. The Independents correctly replied to this assertion by reveali1 
:hat this charge did not defray the cost of their treatment, but merely 
>ostponed payment. The party believed that too grea.t a strain was put on 
53Tulsa Tribune, January 15, 1932, p. 16. 
54!!?..!&· 
55Tulsa Tribune, January 21, 1932, p. 14. 
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! term "deserving" under the existing hospital charity policy. From 
!eney's viewpoint the rate should have been based on "humanitarian 
lnciples rather than upon the basis of what the traffic will bear."56 
Whatever its successes or failures~ merits or shortcomings, in other 
aas the Independent Party was at its best when it came to dealing with 
astions of the moral efficacy of the operations of relief agencies. 
a party continually championed the cause of the relief recipient, 
oming as a ''watchdog" deterrent to inconsiderate behavior by relief 
ninistrators. 
In the spring of 1931 an incident involving the County Welfare De-
rtment resulted in a request by the Independents for state intervention. 
ter internal scandal destroyed public respect for .the County Humane 
ciety in 1931, the County Welfare Department had been created through 
e combined efforts of the county commissioners and the Conununity Fund 
distribute the relief funds of the county. Soon after it began opera-
ons, a number of charges were lodged by those on relief that it was not 
operly carrying out its function. The accusations ranged from appli-
nts being refused food and shelter to their being put bodily out of the 
partment offices. One woman charged that the rations given her at the 
mmissary were not 11 fit to eat. 11 57 A man claimed that he had been denied 
the theory that he had "lived here too long. 1158 
An investigation launched by the county commissioners revealed that 
e county welfare workers had indeed been turning some persons away 
56Tulsa Tribune, January 25, 1932, p. 8. 




hout aid, but only those who were believed to be able to make their 
way.59 For example, it was found that the man who felt that his 
gth of residence was the prime factor behind his inability to obtain 
p, had actually been on the county rolls for seven years even though 
had a wealthy sister. Nevertheless, the suspicions of the Independent 
ty had been aroused 9 and it immediately appointed an investigating 
mittee of its own. 
The party's investigators, directed in their efforts by A. F. Sweeney, 
led to turn up any evidence of unwarranted denials of relief, but they 
discover in the process of the inquiry that men were being compelled 
work for the city in payment of grocery orders issued through the 
nty Welfare Department. These men were forced to do the same work that 
.ular employees were doing, for the same number of hours, but were re-
60 
.ving in return grocery orders amounting to only $1 to $1.50 per week. 
,senting a petition bearing the names of 300 men he claimed had worked 
the various city departments in this way, Sweeney contended that if 
! men worked, they should have been paid commensurate salaries. 61 
1stioning of the foremen in the city departments had revealed that none 
these supervisors had been informed as to what wages these men were 
:eiving, and that they had worked the men as though they were drawing 
Lal wages without realizing that many of them were malnourished. 
59there were occasions, however, when such charges were found to be 
Le and when the party resorted to court orders to obtain provisions for 
1 victims of such discrimination. Two applicants, both claiming that 
iy had been denied aid by both the county and the Community Fund, were 
Leed on the charity rolls by District Judge Halley in the fall of 1932. 
:!!. Tribune, October 11, 1932, p. 4. 
601bid., October 26, 1931, p. 2. 
6llbid. 
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A hearing was held into the matter by Mayor Watkins and the city com-
sioners9 and the practice was brought to a sudden stop. The commis-
ners instructed Harold M. Vaughn» director of the County Welfare De-
tment, who supplied the grocery orders» to stop sending men "over to 
City• II 62 
The Independent Party supported many of these laborers who had worked 
city projects in demanding back pay from the city. The commissioners, 
ever, denied their bill on the grounds that they had never been employed 
the city, but had merely worked on municipal jobs. 63 Angered by the 
lure of local authorities to make what they considered to be proper 
nds for sue~ actions, Independent Party officials now demanded that 
: county commissioners take personal charge of the administration of 
.ief. The party asked that the county welfare work be completely sepa-
:ed from the Committee of Five, that the recently opened city commis-
:y be closed, and that grocery orders issued through the county welfare 
iartments be sent to grocery stores as had formerly been the case. 
i Independents asserted that distributing county funds through the Com-
:tee of Five was illegal since the members of that committee were serving 
~hout bond, and that the disposal of the charity fund should be under 
exclusive control of the commissioners. 
The commissioners, however, rejected the demands of the Independents, 
1tending that they had a legal right to appoint agents to carry out their 
Lrity work. In view of the failure of the commissioners to act, Sweeney 
1tacted Mrs. Mabel Bassett, state commissioner of charities and cor-
:tions, and obtained her promise to investigate Tulsa's city and county 
62Tulsa Tribune, October 26, 1931 9 p. 2. 
63Tulsa World, October 28, 1931, p. 5. 
.L .L., 
.rity distribution.64 He filed similar complaints with W. A. Murphy, 
.te labor commissioner, and with Governor William H. Murray. 65 The in-
iction by Mrs. Bassett never got past the city's excel~ent commissary. 
· only criticism was directed at the county ,commissioners. They, she said, 
1ld be derelict in their duty if they did not make some shift to pro-
le the money necessary to carry on the program. 66 
One interesting outgrowth of the Independent Party movement in Tulsa 
1 the attempted colonization, under party inspiration, of some 500 
!lilies of unemployed Tulsans. on an 8,000 acre tract of land near Hunts-
Lle, Arkansas. The idea that was .to germinate into the colony was born 
an Mrs. Ida Lawley of Sand Springs, Oklahoma, saw that the land could 
obtained cheaply •. Mrs. Lawley planned the establishment of an old 
Jple 1 s home there, but after she had discussed her idea with J.P. 
llagher of the Light House Mission in Tulsa, George Perrine, a leader 
the Independent Party, and others, the plan •or a colony for the une~-
oyed was adopted. Through this endeavor it was hoped that hundreds of 
lsans would be able to re-establish themselves as self-supporting 
tizens. 67 
The Independent Party worked closely with Dr. Herbert Clough of Tulsa, 
ad of the sponsoring group, in securing pioneers for this constructive 
erican back-to-the-farm project. Clough replaced Mrs. Lawley as presi-
nt of the Oklahoma-Arkansas Ozark Development Association after she 
,parently decided the venture was too risky after all. Memberships in 
64Tulsa World, October 28, 1931, p. 5. 
65Ibid. 
66Tulsa Tribune, December 4, 1931, p. 2. 
67~., October 8, 1931, p. 2. 
114 
Association were sold for $1 originally. How many joined at this rate 
1 probably never be known. However, with some private capital added 
re was enough for a $500 cash payment on the Ozark land. On October 
1931, a contract was signed by officers for the colony and W. H • 
. lroy, Fayetteville banker, and president of the Industrial Finance Cor-
·ation which owned the land. 68 The colonists agreed to pay $4,000 on 
:h October 20 9 beginning in 1932 9 for nine years. Then they were to 
· $5,002.26 on October 20, 1941, and within five years thereafter $617. 
Lt made the total purchase price with interest $41,619.26. In addition 
i colonists were to pay the taxes on the land which amount to about 
69 )0 annually. 
The entire colonization project was to operate along community lines, 
~ewhat after the pattern of Brook Farm, and as a self-supporting unit. 
~ this reason the financial program that had been undertaken did not 
am difficult at first. Thrown in with the rough, wooded land was what 
nained of an old sawmill and 300,000 feet of rough oak lumber. It would 
easy, the colonists felt, to set up a thriving wood business. Highway 
, which bounded the colony's plot on the West., was an important and sc,e:nic 
ite. It wound through woodlands and along hillcrests for thirty miles 
:h like a park drive. Travelers would support a hotel, garage, and 
irist court. The woods abounded with huckleberries which could be 
thered and canned. Wild nuts, persimmons, and other fruits were also 
ailable in large quantities. The acreage was fertile and considered 
eal for the growth of tomatoes, grapes, berries, and other fruits and 
getables. There was much talk about a tomato cannery. The possibility 
68.rulsa Tribune, December 2, 1931, p. 2. 
691bid., June 20, 1932, p. 12. 
other small industries, including a furniture factory, was also a 
ject of conversation. Pine Creek, a mountain stream traversing the 
ony's land, was to be dammed in order to create a fishery and produce 
'er for the colony's electric plant. 
The colonists had visions of a new town springing up. A townsite 
, to be laid off and permanent homes built. Houses could be constructed 
native stone and logs. It was agreed that all crops and other products 
the colony were to be sold by the community as such and proceeds after 
•enses divided equally. Each family was to receive a ten acre plot of 
1d, for which it was to pay eventually $6 per acre. The first payment, 
,ever, was not to come due until after the harvest of the first crop. 70 
There was not to be any radical kind of governmental system for this 
llvation from the machine age. 11 71 For, as George Perrine explained, 
t colonists were not "Reds, radicals, Communists, or a little Russia 
72 >up." They were instead: 
••• merely American men out of work who seek to solve our 
own relief problems. We are not beggars and believe a 
general back-to-the-land movement might do much good for 
a country that has gone too far in buying paper securities. 
We have a plan--a ten year plan--for our· rehabilitation.73 
r disagreement among the members was to be settled by a board of arbi-
ation to be selected by the common vote of all the adult people. Dr. 
ough, director of the colony, was to be the court of appeals of all 
sputes. He was a dentist by profession but had also studied law and 
70tulsa Tribune, December 2, 1931, p. 2. 
71 
New !.2!.!, Times, December 7, 1931, p. 15. 
72 
Tulsa Tribune, January 9, 1932, p. 16. 
73Ibid. 
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1ology. The colony, which was named Concord Springs, was to conform 
county, state and federal laws. 
The religious, educational and professional needs of the membership 
~e also taken into advance consideration. Dr. Clough, in addition to 
J supervisory and judicial functions would officiate at the "House of 
l" Church in which Catholic, Jewish and Christian Scientist members of 
! colony could worship together. If differences arose, any denomination 
lt preferred could hold its own services separately, and select its own 
aacher from among its members. The Concord Springs school system was to 
at all the requirements of the state department of education.74 Each 
nber of the colony was to be assigned to duties to which he or she was 
st suited and trained, as determined by a tryout or expression of pre-
rence. The original subscribers to the Association represented almost 
75 ery trade and profession. 
The advance detachment of thirty colonists departed for Arkansas on 
cold November day in 1931. Plans were for this group to erect a com-
ssary building and shacks for temporary living quarters for seventy-five 
oneers. Then, as rapidly as additional living quarters could be com-
eted, more members of the colony could be summoned, and eventually those 
ready there would be joined by their families. The colonists planned 
spend all winter clearing the land, and then in the spring to plant 
.ick cash crops, mostly tomatoes, on as much of it as possible. From 
.is crop they h9ped to meet their financial obligations.76 
74tfew York Times, December 7, 1931, p. 15. 
75Tulsa Tribune, December 2, 1931, p. 2. 
76 Ibid., October 8, 1931, p. 2. 
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On North-South Arkansas highway 23, between Huntsville and Eureka 
ings, the truckload of utopian-minded colonists caught first sight of 
ir empire stretching for miles to the East, and engulfing large chunks 
Madison and Carroll counties. Here they departed from the main road 
a flint trail which led down a mountain valley. The valley grew a 
.tle wider as they progressed down the winding trail, revealing the 
,ted but majestically rising funnel of the ancient saw mill toward the 
Lth. The oak lumber, obtained in the purchase package, was stacked 
Ltly near the sawmill, two springs were nearby and the clearing seemed 
1erwise generally desirable. For these reasons it was at this site 
Lt the Tulsans decided to set up their headquarters. At the foot of 
t of the towering mountain bluffs they discovered a huge, low, lime-
,ne · cave. In it the first coloaists made their winter home. 77 
The $1 memberships provided just enough revenue to make the down 
rment on the land. There was nothing for the first colonists to live 
This problem was remedied by raising the price for new members to 
) and then to $50. With these funds to provide for their subsistence, 
i by Perrine, a contractor in pre-depression days, they were able ·to remai 
i to construct a dozen oak and roofing paper shacks. The way was thus 
aared for the arrival of new families. Some of them came after listening 
the utopian predictions of the sincere but impractical Dr. Clough, who 
d remained in Tulsa to promote the colony. They scarcely realized the 
sts of the building. They were broke when they reached the colony, and 
d been promised that they would be supplied with money until they could 
77For a description of the area reliance has been placed upon the 
count of a visitor to the colony found in the Tulsa Tribune, June 20, 
32, p. 12, and on the geographical information given in: Workers of 
e Writers' Program of the Works Projects Administration, Arkansas: A 
!!!, !2, Sh!. S.tate (New York: Hastings House, 1941), pp. 263-264. 
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,duce their first crops. A few had skills suitable to the task, but 
t had to learn. 78 
The discovery had quickly been made that the sawmill, upon which the 
(US of the colonists had been so largely based, was totally inoperable.· 
'. the most part, they had no tools, no teams, no trucks--virtually 
:hing to work with. The pioneers had hoped to get a start by cutting 
l selling cordwood. Wood cutting and tie "hacking" the Tulsans learned 
ld poor dividends. With their lack of experience and shortage of tools, 
t most they could manage was. three ricks of wood a day. This they sold 
$1.50 a rick in Eureka Springs,some eighteen miles away. But the 
lSOn for the sale of cordwood was rapidly running out. With this as 
air only cash income the colonists found themselves with little or no 
)d most of the time. On any day that the weather or some other obstacle 
)Odin the way of the preparation of the wood to be sold, there was 
~ely to be no food at all available. Each morning a truck carried the 
od from the colony into town, and each evening it returned with the 
ovisions ordered by George Carlon, commissary manager, a plasterer in 
lsa before the depression hit. All this was a big disappointment to 
e colonists, who had expected to see the project well-housed and 
rmanently settled by spring. A number of them now returned to Tulsa 
scouraged with the prospects. 79 
About ninety men remained struggling to make Concord Springs a success • 
. ey existed upon a monotonous food ration. For breakfast they usually 
.ea flour and water gravy, pancakes and black coffee; for lunch it was 
78.rulsa Tribune, December 2, 1931, p. 2. 
79 Ibid., June 20, 1932, p. 12. 
lans and cornbread; and for dinner more beans and cornbread and perhaps 
80 little soup. Ingenious methods typical of the frontiersman were 
iopted. One colonist traded a rifle for a power saw, which was repaired 
id put into running condition at the colony. The engine of the old saw-
Lll rendered bearings and other parts for a hand-made forge. Oil drums 
are transformed into workable stoves, while shoe soles were made from 
1tomobile tires. Vegetables were once traded for a bull which was 
Laughtered by the colonists, and thus provided exactly one half of Concord 
?rings' meat supply during the first year. 81 
Meanwhile, in Tulsa, the energetic Dr. Clough was placed under arrest 
~d charged with obtaining money under false pretenses. A man had gone 
o Clough's office and inquired about joining the colony, expressing a 
esire to build a house and later have other members of his family join 
im. His subscription fee was accordingly accepted, and he left for the 
olony. Shortly thereafter, however, the man's father had appeared and 
emanded transportation to the colony. When it could not be immediately 
ade available to him, he demanded the money back, claiming that his son 
ad obtained it from him. Since the son was already at the colony, Clough 
efused to return the money, and charges were therefore filed against him. 
lthough Clough was acquitted, his discouragement was so great that he 
esigned from the presidency of the colony. His negotiations for cannery 
achinery and three trucks were thus halted. He had already completed a 
ontract for the sale of some railroad ties during the summer. Perrine, 
ho was still at the colony, became its acting head. 82 
80Tulsa Tribune, January 12, 1932, p. 11. 
8llbid., June 20, 1932, p. 20. 
82lbid., January 9, 1932, p. 16; January 12, 1932, p. 11; February 
4, 1932, p. 6. 
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At Concord Springs dissension arose, and a state of "civil war" 
1sued. The precipitating cause of the dispute was the manner in which 
,od was being distributed. The sole commodity in the commissary's stock 
lS beans, but one faction wanted these divided differently. Actually 
1e hostility had been simmering beneath the surface for some time. The 
Lsis for it was a misunderstanding about how the revenues derived from 
1e sale of memberships in the colony were to be used. Some of the 
~iginal subscribers had not realized that their membership fees were 
aing used to pay for the land, and most of the newer colonists were un-
,are of the fact that their larger subscriptions were being used to 
aep the colony going before they ever got to Arkansas. Both felt that 
1e money should be used to pay for food and implements. W. J. Markham 
;sumed the leadership of the rebel group, which charged the older Perrine-
ad Independent Party faction with assuming a "domineering attitude" and 
amanded more plentiful and higher quality food and better general living 
83 
3nditions. The rebels gathered and elected their own officers despite 
1e fact that the nine men who were incorporators of the colony were al-
aady officers, and empowered under the Arkansas charter to hold all 
t:ock in the colony and to elect their own successors. The revolutionary 
action then went to a neighboring justice of the peace and secured a re-
Levin on the charter of the colony, a legal action without precedent. 
t the same time they seized control of the commissary by force, and com-
andeered the colony's truck. 84 
The incorporators of Concord Springs turned to Colonel Charles D. 
ames, a Eureka Springs attorney, for aid. James had long been convinced 
83Tulsa Tribune, January 12, 1932, p. 11. 
841bid., June 20, 1932, p. 12. 
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Lat a back to the land movement would be an effective way to solve the 
Lnancial depression, and had thus become very interested in the colony 
Len he learned of its founding. He had earlier sent out 300 pounds of 
Llt meat to the colony in order that its member could season their 
tgetables. An able lawyer, James quickly went to court and secured a 
Lncellation of the ··replevin. During the fight the. food problem had be-
»me serious. W. H. Mcllroy, who had sold the land to the Tulsans, sent 
Lptain I. K. Hooper, a national guard officer, and several guardsmen to 
~otect·a truck load of Red Cross supplies to the camp. Mcllroy had been 
:tracted to the difficulties when the rebels proposed to divide the 
>lony. Meanwhile James had obtained an injunction from the district 
turt at Huntsville restraining the rebellious group from harming the 
~operty or persons of the other colonists. The court also ordered four 
unilies of the rebels to leave,the colony. The ruling held that the 
abels had forfeited their membership in the colony by their failure to 
,rk for it and to cooperate in its success. No member, however, was de-
rived of any just rights in the colony if he labored in harmony as was 
1e original understanding and object of the colony.85 
Subscribers back in Tulsa had, in the meantime, become concerned 
,er their investment. The arrest of Clough and stories of corruption 
1 the administration of the colony led many of them to demand that they 
Lther be allowed to go immediately to Concord Springs or given their 
,ney back. The colony's builders could do neither. The funds of the 
1bscribers had be·en exhausted by the trail blazers in an attempt to get 
1e enterprise started. The objective for the present had to be to take 
are ~t those already on hand in the Arkansas hills. As one member put 
85rulsa Tribune, June 20, 1932, p. 12. 
.. . . ''We can't let them all come now that the beanpot has enough in it 
> feed us."86 It was earnestly hoped, however, that all members could 
~•dually be admitted. The plan was to notify ten members at a time, 
1forming them that they had to go to the colony immediately or forfeit 
1eir rights.87 
The inter-colony strife had convinced the members who remained that 
1ey needed an executive head,and they appealed to James, who had won 
1eir court battles for them, to become their president. This James 
Lnally consented to do upon .the following conditions: 
First, I was to prepare a suitable set of by-laws for the 
colony to operate under and I was to have full powers with 
the advice and assistance of the board of directors in the 
management of the affairs of the colony. Second, that all 
members were to forget all differences and work in full har-
mony and collectively for the success of the colony.88 
l these qualifications the former Tulsans unanimously agreed. 
On Captain Hooper's recommendations, after his two weeks in camp, 
:Ilroy refunded virtually all of the $500 down payment that had been 
ade on the land. Mcllroy further insisted that any profits the colonists 
ade from an order they had received for railroad ties should go to pay 
~• taxes on the land or the interest on the note. For the other wood 
~ich the colonists had already trucked to town to sell, Mcllroy felt 
~at if the land should eventually be returned to him, that he would have 
eceived fair value due to the clearing that had been accomplished. With 
~is refund the colonists were able to secure two teams, nails, roofing 
~d other needed items. 
86Tulsa Tribune, June 20, 1932, p. 12. 
87Ibid., July 10, 1932, p. 14. 
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In Eureka Springs James was able to obtain nearly 10,000 pounds of 
~e flour being made for the Red Cross from government wheat. The plight 
f the colonists had also attracted the attention of others. Mrs. L. S. 
eed, managing editor of- the Fayetteville Democrat,conducted a campai~n 
or food contributions to Concord Springs through four counties. Another 
>unty, which had received drought relief only the year before, ·sent over 
truck loaded with eight tons of food stuffs. 
The colony's largest population at any one time had been 120 people. 
fter the hardships and disputes of the first year there still remained 
l, representing 28 families. At one time there had been 40 single men 
1 the group, but at the end of the year there was but one. Of the 21 
1ildren, only one was not of school age, and, of course, Dr. Clough's 
>dern educational system had never materialized. The children were, no 
>ubt, denied a balanced diet. The colony had no cows, but milk was pur-
1ased for the one small child. The remainder of the children had not had 
llk since they arrived. Regular visits by the county health nurse, how-
,er, revealed that the children were healthy, only one being underweight. 8 
During the fall and winter of the first year seventy acres had been 
leared, and in the spring vegetables of all kinds were planted. From 
>mewhere the members of the colony obtained a large number of glass jars. 
~ey were thus able to can large quantities of food for the next winter 
1d store it in their cave. 
As the United States prepared to meet the worst year of the depression 
at, the Tulsa colonials contended with the problem of meeting delinquent 
axes. The fact that there seemed to be no possible way of obtaining the 
500 needed to meet this obligation did not seem to worry the average 
89 Tulsa Tribune, June 20, 1932, p. 12. 
124 
olonist a great deal. They still had great faith in the ultimate success 
f the colony, and they were well aware that it had always been difficult 
o oust a squatter in Arkansas in less than a year. Thus far the meager 
ains of their own hard labor and a judicious amount of philanthrophy had 
ept Concord Springs alive. Through more hard work they felt they might 
e able to get the payments on the land extended and to produce enough 
rofits to pay the taxes. 
Even if they were unable to pay, they would still be one year's exis-
.ence to the good. Financial worries were nothing new for these refugees 
:rom charity. Though provisions were scarce and plain, the colonists re-
1eatedly insisted that they were more contented than they had been before 
1ndertaking the venture. In Tulsa they had been entirely dependent upon 
:harity. In the Ozark mountains of Arkansas they were at least partially 
1roviding for themselves and their families. Concord Springs was probably 
( hopelessly idealistic scheme from the start. Perhaps the super-enthusiai 
:hat the immigrants from Tulsa continually exhibited was a necessary pre-
:equisite, History indicates that the pioneer's quest has always been for 
Lll the things which he did not have, and places in a soup line were all 
~hat these people had left. 
There were in Tulsa, however, organizations of the unemployed which 
,ere not at all concerned with the administration of relief. The purpose 
>f the Tulsa Immediate Relief Association, organized in the spring of 1932 
,as to provide relief for its members in order that they could renounce 
:harity. The constituents of this group insisted that they would rather 
,ork for their food than to receive provisions from the public. They had 
C'&llied around M. W. ''Wildcat" Williams, a profes~ional engineer and forme 
C'efinery operator, when he became dissatisfied with an earlier organizatio 
rhe sole aim of Tulsa's previous groups of the unemployed, it seemed to 
,. ... ., 
'illiams, was to seek charity.90 
The Association directed its major efforts toward acquiring food for 
.ts members. Contracts were made with farmers who had crops of fruits 
Lnd vegetables that they were willing to have gathered on shares. Half 
if what was gathered each day went to the farmers under contract. The 
:emainder was distributed among the members of the Association. In ad-
lition Williams closed a deal with the state game and fish department by 
,hich the members of the Immediate Relief Association rescued perishing 
:ish from drying streams and. lakes. The state furnished equipment and 
:he Association the m.anpower.91 Odd jobs were also sought by the Associ-
:ion and members detailed to work at them. 
Every member of the organization worked or else he did not share in 
:he distribution. Williams summed up the no-work, no-member philosophy 
Ln this way: 
When they'are sent out on a job, they are put on their 
honor to do the work. We don't keep up with them all the 
time, but when we find one shirking work, out he goes. 
Naturally we have had some deadbeats, but as soon as they 
are discovered they are eliminated from our rolls.92 
~here was not a single member of the Association on the Tulsa charity roll1 
Neither politics nor radicalism was tolerated. On several occasions 
~ 
:-adicals appeared in the ranks of th~ Association, but their membersh.ips 
,ere quickly terminated. At one point Williams became convinced that ex-
:reme left wingers were trying to disrupt his organization, and made a 
:our of the city speaking in the parks to the unemployed about the matter. 
90 7. Tulsa Tribune, September 18, 1932, P• 
91~., September 27, 1932, p. 2. 
92 
Ibid., September 18, 1932, p. 7. 
In one such speech he declared: 
It is no good to shoot a red; .. he is not worth the powder. 
This nation is in a bad condition» but even so it is the 
best in the world, and we don't need long-haired Russians 
coming over here to tell us how to run it.93 
Although the Association had originally been intended to serve 
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1embers only, it slowly evolved into an informal relief organization. So 
1uccessful were its efforts that supplies still remained after the members 
,ere cared for. Noting that there were needy families in the suburban 
listricts where neither city nor county relief organizations operated, the 
~embers of the Association began to distribute their surplus among them. 
iefore long about 120 families whose wage earners were out of work, ill 
>r incapacitated were being taken care of. The Association further ex-
~ended its relief activities with a successful appeal for the use of va-
:ant lots for the raising of turnips. Promises of a thousand lots were 
94 
received, and a large amount of volunteer labor was made available. 
the city provided plows, tractors and other equipment. In the summer of 
l932, when both city and county charity funds were depleted, the efforts 
of the city employees to cope with the situation drew heavy support from 
the Association. 
With the Immediate Relief Association's initiation into relief work 
an accomplished fact, city, county and state relief agencies began to rely 
neavily upon the group as a means of communication with the unemployed. A 
committee was created by the Association to hear grievances and investigat 
the complaints and reports of needy persons. Another committee was ap-
pointed to handle legal phases of the relief work. The membership rolls 
93Tulsa Tribune, September 20, 1932, p. 6. 
94 
Ibid., September 7, 1932, p. 3. 
lU 
,f the Association included a competent lawyer and a reputable physician. 
Many more temporary and less active organizations of the unemployed 
Llso developed in Tulsa. During one extremely bad period a soupline was 
,rganized by the Ex-Service Men's Association, a group of 115 men. 95 The 
aembers investigated applicants for a place in the line and fed something 
Like sixty families once daily. A local plant donated fifty pounds of 
soup bones and fifty pounds of pigs' feet day for the preparation of the 
~ation. 96 
The members of the Unemployed Association worked for pay in commodlti~ 
lnd operated an exchange service for the goods they received. Scrip issue, 
>y the Shirtsleeves Exchange could be used by its members to pay other 
members for labor, or to make purchases of food or.other necessary article1 
eventually the Exchange opened a cafeteria at which scrip was accepted in 
~ayment for meals.97 
A group of girls and young women formed an unemployment service for 
themselves. The Girls Cooperative Employment Club soon had a membership 
>f 250 single, unemployed girls, all of them badly in need of employment. 
rhe organization was self-supporting with the unemployed girls donating 
their services in seeking, listing and assigning jobs as well as attending 
98 to all office work. Regular meetings were held with lecturers and ex-
?erts appearing to discuss such subjects as oil stenography, sales tech-
~ique, personal appearance, and how to keep physically fit. 99 
95Tulsa World, September 15, 1932, p. 4. 
96Tulsa Tribune, September 7, 1932, p. 10. 
97Harlow's Weekly~ November 16, 1932, p. 6. 
98Tulsa Tribune, January 29, 1932, p. 5. 
99 Ibid., February 21, 1932, p. 3. 
The development in Tulsa, during the great depression, of organized 
;roups among the unemployed was a phenomenon which seems to have flowed 
:rom the natural gregarious instinct of people with a common problem. 
:ome of these groups, notably the Independent Party, concerned themselves 
rith attempts to correct the shortcomings of relief administration in 
'.ulsa. Others, like the Tulsa Immediate Relief Association, were prima-
·ily interested in self-help, a system of organized barter or exchange of 
;oods among themselves. In this latter type of activity goods obtained 
.n exchange for work done ou.tside the group and donated materials, such 
,s surplus crops, were brought to a central point and divided to meet the 
1eeds of the whole group. Although the Independent Party concerned itself 
rith politics in a minor way, Tulsa was fortunate enough to avoid the more 
·iolent forms of behavior by the unemployed. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE IMPACT ON RELIGION 
The Great Depression brought about some significant religious changes 
Tulsa, and placed tremendous pressure on the church and the clergy. 
:e weight of this burden affected the attitude of the church leaders 
1ward the secular order in all its phases, the church as a social insti-
Ltion, and their conceptions of their own roles. Ministers were called 
,on to counsel with many people regarding their troubles during the de-
:ession. Since many of these ills were rooted in unemployment, the 
ldividual as an individual could do little about them. Recognition of 
1is fact forced ministers to think on the major issues of the time. 
Some Tulsa church leaders saw a disguised blessing in these troubles 
f the people. Previous depressions, they believed, had turned men away 
rom materialistic considerations and toward God. They linked earlier 
:onomic disorders with great religious revivals. It was their feeling 
oat in times of trial men turn to God because their self-reliant atti-
udes are either totally destroyed or at least weakened to the point 
here they are no longer self-sustaining. 
Among Tulsa's ministers the most articulate spokesman of this point 
f view was the Reverend R. J. Bateman of the First Baptist Church. In 
n address entitled "Christ and Commerce," delivered before a Chambar of 
ommerce luncheon, Bateman expounded his beliefs concerning this subject. 
'here is, he felt, a moral question at the very core of commerce. This 
ras true because people and business rise and fall simultaneously. 
Roger Babson has made a chart of American history. By this he 
shows the money panics of the United States. Compare with this 
the chart showing the religious revivals in the United States. 
He shows that periods of prosperity are followed by periods of 
religious indifference and increased immorality, drunkenness and 
crime. These are always followed by financial depression, 
money panics and hard times.l 
Le beginning of each period of commercial crisis and deprivation had 
.ways been followed by a quickened interest in religion. As Bateman 
Lw it, then, business depressions were caused by "dissipation, dis-
>nesty, disobedience to God's will and a general collapse of moral 
J.JV 
1aracter." They were cured by "moral awakening, spiritual revivalism, 
1d rehabilitation of righteousness. 11 2 
The Reverend Frank W. Wright of the United Presbyterian Church was 
ri almost complete agreement with Dr. Bateman. "Providence," he once 
eclared, "always wears a beautiful face under a dark mask. In de-
ression and drouth, crime and unemployment are the means of humbling 
sand bringing us closer to God. 113 The Reverend o. M. Stallings of the 
mmanuel Baptist Church also believed that the depression would be a 
ource of good. It would "goad dormant minds into great thinkers. 
eaklings will wax strong. 114 Another Tulsa minister, the Reverend E. H. 
,ckel of the Trinity Episcopal Church, also quoted the economist Babson 
.n commenting on the depression. He was quite sure, he said, that: 
before prosperity can return there must be a renewed interest 
in the spiritual life of both individuals and nations. Such 
times as these are a challenge to the manhood and womanhood 
of each and every one of us, and the kind of courage that we 
most need today is the kind that is based on faith in God.5 
1Tulsa Spirit, January 30, 1931, p. 14. 
2Ibid. 
3Tulsa Tribune, November 24, 1930, p. 7. 
4 Ibid., January 5, 1932,.p. 8. 
'i.m... ~ - - T.T--1 ~ Tu 1 u 1 1 1 Q 1.? n. 2. 
l.H. 
1 these statements and other similar ones seem to indicate that there 
.s a rather widespread conviction among Tulsa ministers that a re-
.gious awakening would result from personal experiences of the people 
iring the economic crisis. 
If church membership can be taken as an adequate guide, the re-
lgious awakening which these Tulsa ministers anticipated did in fact 
:cur. Accepting denominational figures, total membership of all of Tulsa' 
1urches increased by almost twenty thousand persons between 1926 and 
~36. 6 Some of these new me~bers made their way into new congregations, 
l'lenty of which were organized in Tulsa during the early years of the 
epression. The growth in the number of congregations was such, indeed, 
bat twelve of the groups were forced to hold their meetings temporarily 
n such varied places as movie theatres, auditoriums, schools, parks and 
7 
ounty fair buildings. 
Church membership continued to be more attractive to females than to 
ales. The number of men who were members increased from 13,349 in 1926 
:o 18,047 in 1936, a total gain of 4,698. During the same span of years 
6The term church is used here, and elsewhere when the need for 
,revity dictates broad general statements9 to include all worshipping re-
.igious organizations--Catholic, Protestant and Jewish. I have accepted 
:he dates 1926-1936 as those approximately right to show the effects of 
:he Great Depression. Total Tulsa membership increased from 35,106 to 
>4,659. United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
~ensus of Religious Bodies, 1926 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
)ffice, 1930),p. 356.; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
:he Census, Census of Religious Bodies, 1936 (Washington: U.S. Government 
E>rinting Office, 1941), p. 434. Hereafter cited as Religious Bodies, 
l926 and Religious Bodies, 1936). 
7Polk's Tulsa, Oklahoma City Directory, 1929 (Kansas City: R. L. Polk 
~ompany, 1929), pp. 904-906.; Polk's Tulsa, Oklahoma City Directory, 
~ (Kansas City: R. L. Polk Company, 1932)~ pp. 761-762. There were 
97 church edifices as compared to 109 congregations: Religious Bodies, 
1936, P• 434. 
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>men who belonged to worshipping organizations increased from 19»077 
> 26,802, thus expanding by 7,795. The number of males to every one 
1ndred females, therefore» showed a decline of from seventy to sixty-
aven in Tulsa. 8 
The greatest gain in affiliates was made by the Baptists, who 
elcomed almost six thousand into the fold. The Baptists thus attracted 
~er one-fourth of Tulsa 1 s total of new church members. Nearly two 
nousand fresh members were involved in the Roman Catholic expansion, 
hile Presbyterians and Methodists, in that order, had the next largest 
ncreases in membership. The following table indicates the exact sta-
istics of gain for most of the major denominations. 9 
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP 
1enomina tion 1926 1936 Gain 
,aptist •••••••••••••• 7,511 13,466 5,955 
~oman Ca tho 1 ic ••••••• 5,055 7,027 1,972 
tresbyterian ••••••••• 4,617 6,224 1,607 
lethodist •••••••••••• 7,076 8,195 1,119 
,ssembly of God •••••• 598 1,530 930 
>rotestant Episcopal. 1,487 2,089 602 
:hristian Scientist •• 439 918 479 
.,utheran • .•••••• o •••• 369 828 459 
rewish • •••••••••••••. 2,400 2,850 450 
iazarene ••••••••••••• 72 330 258 
rormon • ••••••.••••••• 293 476 183 
ieventh Day Adventist 172 283 111 
Jnitarian •••••••••••• 124 190 66 
;reek Orthodox ••••••• 150 170 20 
Even though the rolls kept by the Tulsa denominations thus indicate 
significant membership increases during the years of the great depression, 
8Religious Bodies, 1926, p. 356; Religious Bodies, 1936, p. 434. 
9Religious Bodies, 1926, p. 560; Religious Bodies, 1936, p. 696. 
,e must beware of certain potential flaws in these records. In the 
.rst place, the definition of a church member varies widely in meaning 
.·om one denomination to another. Some groups include almost the total 
1pulation as members, while others use the term in a much narrower 
~nse. Competent statisticians warn also of the tendency among Protes-
lnt Churches to "keep names on the rolls as members even when the 
1dividuals have died or have psychologically separated themselves from 
10 1e church." The accuracy of the conclusions drawn from the sta .. 
istics herein, however, should be safe from distortions resulting from 
b.ese partic.ular deficiencies. In the accumulation of the figures 
ited safeguards were adopted to avoid such errors. Each congregation 
as asked to report as members only those persons who had been accepted 
nto the church through that particular denomination's ceremonial in-
.tiation, if any, and who attended with some degree of regularity. 11 
There is always also the possibility, of course, that church 
iembership grew from natural increase rather than from added interest. 
'.his does not appear to have been the case in Tulsa. In the entire de-
:ade of the nineteen-thirties the population of Tulsa expanded by only 
399 persons.12 Such a very limited increase in population indicates also 
~hat migration into the city could not have been a major factor behind 
10 Samuel J. Kincheloe, Research Memorandum 2!!. Religion During the 
~ Depression (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937), p. 
15. 
11 Religious Bodies, 1926, p. l; Religious Bodies, 1936 2 p. 1. 
12united States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1930: Characteristics of the 
Population (Washingt~ United States Government Printing OffI;;'e:--l943), 
Part 5, p. 937. Available statistics do not permit an exact comparison 
of membership and population increases. 
.LJ'"t 
,e increased willingness of the Tulsa citizenry to attach themselves to 
religious body. 
If doubt still remains as to the major source of the enlarged re-
Lgious bodies of Tulsa, a look at the number of children who were members 
Ly help to dissolve it. The number of non-adults who belonged to a 
1urch did expand. In 1926 they numbered 3,916, while by 1936 they 
nounted to 5,395, a total gain of 1,479. This increase thus constitutes 
nly a very small percentage of the total newcomers to the worshipping 
rganizations of the city. 13 
In contrast to the statistics for total membership, Presbyterians, 
ot Baptists, led all other denominations in the number of new adherents 
ho were children. Their gain in this category of followers amounted to 
~re than a thousand, and was almost three times the size of the increase 
,f child members registered by the second place Roman Catholics. Baptists 
rere far back in fourth place with only 266 such newcomers. They might 
Lttribute this position to their policy of voluntary membership for 
14 
:hildren. The following chart reveals the exact statistics for many 
)f Tulsa's denominations as to non-adult members: 15 
CHILDREN MEMBERS 
Denomination 1926 1936 Gain 
Presbyterians •••••••• 4,248 5,610 1,362 
ioman Catholics •••••• 1,581 2,108 527 
~ethodists ••••••••••• 768 1,083 315 
Baptists ••••••••••••• 450 716 266 
Protestant Episcopal. 227 375 148 
~ssembly of God •••••• 13 119 106 
Lutheran ••••••••••••• 91 194 104 
Mormon ••••••••••••••• 14 29 15 
Greek Orthodox ••••••• 25 40 15 
13Religious Bodies, 1926, p. 356; Religious Bodies, 1936, p. 434. 
14wuuam B. Lipphard, ''What do Baptists Believe?" ~ Guide S2_ the 
Religions of America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), p. 4. 
15Religious Bodies, 1926, p. 560; Religious Bodies, 1936, p. 696. 
While an increase in religious interest seems to be indicated by 
1urch membership figures, the degree of participation by members in the 
:tivities of the church probably reveals more. The size and scope of 
1e educational work of the church may be the best yardstick for deter-
lning the support given to the church program by the membership. The 
ost common form of educational work carried on by the church is the so-
alled Sunday School. The Baptists, who led in the recruiting of new 
hurch members, also had the largest number regularly attending Sunday 
chool during the depression. An average of 7,852 Baptists were regular 
cholars in the Sunday Schools of their congregations in 1926, while the 
sual number in attendance by 1936 was about 9,059. The total increase 
n average attendance at Sunday educational programs for this denomination 
as therefore 1,477. The obvious conclusion is that many, though far 
rom all, of those people who joined the Baptist Church during the economic 
risis had enough interest to carry through by actively participating 
16 ·ather fully in the total program of their congregations. In contrast, 
:he Methodists, who had a sizeable increase in total membership, regis-
:ered a decline in average Sunday School attendance. This suggests that 
iany Methodists who started their membership during the years of depressio1 
lid not take part fully in the church activity. The table which follows 
~ives some of the pertinent data relative to the attendance at the Sunday 
,chools of Tulsa's churches during these years: 17 
16 Religious Bodies, 1926, p. 357; Religious Bodies, 1936, p. 435. 
17Ibid. 
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SUNDAY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 
momination 1926 1936 Gain or loss 
Lptists ••••••••••••••• 7,582 9,059 1,477 
~esbyterians •••••••••• 4,500 5,120 620 
,semb ly of God •••••••• 2,159 2,640 481 
1therans •••••••••••••• 223 385 162 
>rmon • •••••••••••••••• 135 254 119 
rotestant Episcopal ••• 275 370 95 
aventh Day Adventists. 130 195 65 
litarians ••••••••••••• 46 93 47 
reek Orthodox ••••••••• 24 42 18 
ewish • .•..•...•.....•. 220 235 15 
ethodists ••••••••••••• 4,423 3,632 -791 
nurch of God •••••••••• 258 178 -80 
It is impossible to prove that all or any part of the people who be·-
ame members of Tulsa's churches during the depression did so because of 
he business slump. People accept religious membership for many reasons, 
auses which only the individoal member could reveal. It is just as 
tifficult to prove that the depression had any relationship to the number 
,ttending Sunday School or participating in the various other parts of 
:he church program. This analysis of the available statistics does 
1trongly suggest, however, that many Tulsans joined the churches of the 
:ity as a direct result of the economic crisis, but that most stopped a 
,tep short of complete involvement in the activities of their congre-
;ations. 
The fact that many Tulsa churchmen anticipated spiritual profits 
from the depression did not obscure their concern with the practices 
~hich they felt had caused it. For them they had nothing but condem-
nation. And while they did not specifically divide the groups of Ameri-
can society as to their responsibility for these evils, their sermons 
imply that some groups were more deserving of the blame than others. 
Principally there were two such groups. One wasl made up of those in 
control of the means of production, the capitalists. The other was in 
U/ 
Jntrol of the means of controlling the capitalists, the politicians. The 
apression might curb the unrighteousness of the masses, but some special 
ffort was needed to check the sinfulness of those who would remain un-
ffected by the economic crisis, and who were in fact responsible for 
1:.18 
What appears to be an ambiguity of religious thought thus reveals 
l:self in their sermons. On the one hand, they pointed to the sinfulness 
f the people at large as a cause of the depression, while on the other 
lnd they defended this undefined mass against the greed of the economic 
Lite and the corruption of the politicos. They were led to the first 
;signment of guilt by doctrinal .tenets which proclaimed all men to be 
ltural sinners. The second conviction resulted from the hard facts 
f the times which suggested that the sins of some people could be more 
rastic in their repercussions on society than the sins of others. They 
Laimed that what people had always considered to be individualism was 
:tually no such thing. It was rather a stark individualistic materialism. 
1e Tulsa ministers were thus carried logically to a denial of economic 
lissez-faire. 
If what had passed for individualism had, in reality, been only the 
1ilosophy of selfishness, where was the true example to be found? It 
>uld be seen in the life of Jesus as a workingman. As Dr. Bateman said: 
l8The list of those who served the churches of Tulsa during the 
!pression is impressive. The present analysis, however, is not an 
:tempt to explore the totality of their religious thought. Its object 
,ove all is to present their views as to the causes of the depression 
1d the best solutions for it. When, moreover, a greater amount of 
>ace is given to some messages than to others, the reason is that 
>me expressed thought about the nature of the dep~ession more than 
:hers; some dealt more than others with the main subject of this 
:udy. 
We think of him as having a carpenter's shop ••• in Nazareth. 
Here the farmers came to have their ploughshares made. He 
was far-famed for his honesty •••• His business was not done 
in a slip shod way. He was a good collector for his work. 
I can imagine that it was ever his principle to render unto 
Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things 
which are God's He recognized the rules of the game. He en-
dorsed the idea of acquiring and possessing property. He 
never once yielded to the idea of socialism.19 
:f such a spirit could govern business now, Bateman maintained, the 
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,hole world would be changed. Businessmen would see that if the factory 
ixisted for the good of the people, the people would work for the good 
,f the factory. The laborers would feel that ''capital has a soul" and 
:hat they were going to be cared for. 20 
An indictment was thus brought against American civilization as it 
tad d'eveloped, not against the basic institutions and ideology which had 
1erved it. Accordingly poverty was a disgrace not because it was bad in 
Ltself, but because it could be eliminated. American politics, and 
:hurches for that matter, needed to be reformed not because they were 
,eak institutions, but because men had not properly used them. Bateman 
lnd many other Tulsa ministers contended, therefore, that the critical 
,roblem faced by the United States was not the immediate abnormality of 
lepression but the attitudes which the people had shaped during America's 
1istoric development. 
Perhaps nowhere is their philosophical position indicated better 
than in a sermon delivered by the Reverend Walter Douglass before the 
~ongregation of the Centenary Methodist Episcopal Church. Douglass based 
1is address on Frederick Lewis Allen's book, Only Yesterday, which is 




ssentially a resume of American activities from the end of World War I 
o the great stock market crash in 1929. Allen, Douglass correctly 
ointed out, did not propose to analyze depression, nor offer a remedy 
or it. He evaded philosophy, adhering closely to the historical sur-
e 21 Y• The object of his sermon, Douglass stated, was to examine con-
22 itions in the world and point the way 112!!!:, of normalcy." He con-
inued: 
Our problems are grounded in business, politics, crime, 
poverty, church, school and home. The world needs a present· 
day attitude. So long as men think in terms of 'Jeffersonian 
Democracy,' 'Old Time Religion,' 'Back to Normalcy,' 'The Good 
Old Days,' and 'the Old Fashioned Home,' civilization will 
stagnate. We need men who can think in terms of their own 
generation. 23 
Starting with these basic ideas, the Reverend Mr. Eckel pointed to 
.hree basic truths about labor which he believed that Jesus had taught • 
. f these truths were incorporated into the industrial life of the time, 
·ecovery would follow and a social order would be created that would en-
The first truth is that society owes every man a job. The 
second ••• is that society owes every man a living wage. The 
third ••• that society must make some provision to tide the 
worker over the periods of enforced unemployment.24 
lot every man, in fact not even most men, could have a job if the selfish-
Less of a few was to be allowed to wreck the stability of the American 
21The book closes enumerating overproduction, prices, silver, 
~nternational finance, foreign unrest, mental attitudes and general 
:eaction as the seven basic causes of the financial crisis: Frederick 
.ewis Allen, Only Yesterday (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931), pp. 
142-343. 
22Tulsa Tribune, December 6, 1932, p. 4. 
23Ibid. 
24Tulsa World, September 6, 1932, p. 4. 
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conomy. A living wage would be denied as long as big businessmen were 
llowed to set the standards. The business of caring for the unemployed 
ust become a duty of the government if the industrialists persisted in 
eglecting them. Eckel closed his sermon by advocating some form of un-
~ployment insurance. 25 
In the last months of 1932, therefore, a rather large group of Tulsa 
inisters had moved philosophically to the advocacy of reforms which the 
ew Deal would soon carry out. They were, in fact, proposing the _funda-
ental political compromise which the administration of Franklin D. 
oosevelt would make between unrestrained capitalism and socialism. 
hurch leaders probably recognized that the crisis might make the totali-
arian state eventually acceptable to the masses of America, and knew 
hat such a government often left no place for religious groups to functior 
his seems to be the point that the Reverend John Allen Hudson, minister 
f the Tenth Street Church of Christ, was trying to make : 
Statesmen must thrash out this problem or revolutionary 
sentiments will be fomented on a giant scale before this 
nation is aware. Meanwhile the sway of the Gospel of 
Christ is the one element that can neutralize and balance 
dangerous tendencies.26 
The Tulsa clergymen, however, moved only hesitantly into the realm 
f politics. In doing so they bumped into a: serious question posed by 
ecular authorities: What had the church to do with a man's wages? A 
ermon by the Reverend Claude E. Hill provoked a letter to the editor of 
ne of the local newspapers which well indicates this sentiment in an 
xtreme form. The writer of the letter declared: 
25 Tulsa World, September 6, 1932, p. 4. 
26.rutsa Tribune, January 12, 1932, p. 4. 
Hypocritical professed Christians are mostly respons.!_ble for 
our plight. And that of the world also. Christ ••. /did not 
claim/ for himself the last thought as so many of his pro-
fessed believers do for themselves.27 
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e ministers were thus forced to justify making the management of the 
fairs of state and of economics one of their responsibilities. 
They found the grounds for this excursion into the political world 
humanitarianism. Almost unanimously they concluded that there was no 
:cuse for wealthy America to have the poverty which then existed. The 
verend Mr. Hudson openly debated the matter with himself: 
But what concern has a minister of the Gospel of Christ with 
political and governmental problems? He might have as good 
a conception of such problems, even better in some instances 
than the average man, but he has another role cast for him. 
There is {howeveE/ no apology for blundering that needlessly 
brings human suffering and surely there is something radi-
cally wrong when there can be want in a land of plenty.28 
Le church must, therefore, go to the aid of those who were deprived. In 
Le words of the Reverend Mr. Eckel: 
The silent church, the one that is unresponsive, unsympathetic, 
selfish in the present strees •• ~it matters not how many 
services are held within its sanctuary, nor how many jewels 
shine in the cross upon its altar, nor how many prayers are 
prayed, that church lacks credentials.29 
The extent and intensity of unemployment and poverty caused many 
turches to abandon all efforts to provide charity or relief for their 
Lstressed members. Contributions to Tulsa's denominations had declined 
~astically during the depression, and in consequence church expenditures 
td to be curtailed. City-wide expenditures declined from $1,167,719 in 
>26 to $704,168 in 1936, or from an average of $13,270 per church to 
27Tulsa Tribune, January 2, 1932, p. 20. 
281bid., January 12, 1932, p. 4. 
29Ibid., October 11, 1932, p. 9. 
142 
,581.30 The following tables indicate. depression effects on total 
penditures of two of Tulsa's largest denominations, Baptists 
thodists, by major congregations: 31 
ngregation 
,rs t. • ........ 
11Uanuel ••••••• 
,rth Trenton •• 
:ndal 1 •••••••• 





(le Station ••• 
,ringdale ••••• 
~mple . •••.••.. 
:inity •••••••• 
mgregation 
~rs t ••.• •.•••• 
livers i ty ••••• 
:. Pauls •••••• 
trkview ••••••• 
>se Hill •••••• 
~thel-Baldwin. 
~st Tulsa ••••• 
BAPTIST EXPENDITURES32 
1929 1930 1931 
$9,961.53 $10,793.88 $6,906.88 
$1,770.99 1,850.92 817.95 
$ 38.11 264. 53 86. 7 5 
$ 60.25 19.75 32.91 
$ 39.00 119. 05 122.35 
$ 241. 77 228.67 100.29 
$-------- 59.33 1.65 
$-------- 118.47 291.02 
$-------- 188.93 156. 70 
$-------- 83.85 64.62 
$-------- 190. 53 115. 79 
$-------- 3.20 1.25 
$-------- 15.00 23.25 









1930 1931 1932 
$11,909. $9,085 $7,024 
1,825 1,272 1,032 
2,613 2,182 1,342 
259 159 129 
409 380 277 
35 78 65 
























30aeligious Bodies, 1926, p. 357; Religious Bodies. 1936, p. 435. 
31These figures, published by the denominations concerned, may not be 
1tirely trustworthy. The decline in Methodist expenditures during 1933, 
,r example, seems exceptionally sharp. It nevertheless appears safe to 
~cept the validity of trends indicated by these statistics. 
32 
Minutes of~ Twenty-Fourth Annual Convention of~ Baptist Gener-
~ Convention of Oklahoma (Shawnee: The Oklahoma Baptist Press, 1929), pp. 
23-124; Minutes of~ Twenty-Fifth Annual Convention of the Baptist 
aneral Convention 2!_ Oklahoma (Shawnee: The Oklahoma Baptist Press, 1930), 
p. 80-81; Minutes of Sh! Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention of~ Baptist 
aneral Convention of Oklahoma (Shawnee: The Oklahoma Baptist Press, 1931), 
p. 73-74; Minutes of~ Twenty-Seventh Annual Convention 2f the Baptist 
aneral Convention of Oklahoma (Shawnee: The Oklahoma Baptist Press, 1932), 
p. 107-108. 
33official Journal of the Thirty-Eighth Session of the Oklahoma Annual 
onference of the Methodist Episcopal Church (Cincinnati: Methodist Book 
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Many Tulsa churches were heavily in debt at the onset of the de-
ession, and the congregations had to make strenuous efforts to meet 
terest and principal payments. Special drives and financial plans were 
stituted both by denominational leaders and by leaders of local congre-
tions. H.B. Collins, Tulsa district superintendent of the Methodist 
iscopal Church, indicated in a 1930 report to the Annual Conference 
eting how severe this problem •as: 
Thirteen baaks. within the bounds of the Tulsa district have 
closed their doors this year. Regardless of the statements 
of optimists that the b~d financial conditions are largely 
a state of mind, it is our opinion that some very grim and 
concrete facts caused the state of mind. Serious and 
threatening debts upon nine churches of the district have 
brought worry and heavy burdens upon pastors and laymen •. 
Beautiful, commodious and attra~tive church buildings 
are to be desired but our people would better worship in a 
tent, a rou_gh tabernacle, or a rented room, than to assume 
obligation~ which are to be a millstone around the neck of 
Methodism for a generation. Overburdened with debt, pastors 
and churches find it difficult, and in some cases impossible, 
to put on an effective program for World Service stewardship 
and evangelism.34 
Because of these financial problems, much of the relief which Tulsa's 
.urches had formerly given had to be taken over by other agencies. Conse-
,ently, many ministers felt a sense of defeat in accomplishing the good 
.fe for their members. They felt a responsibility to see that the work 
,ncern Press, 1929), p. 188; Official Journal of~ Thirty-Ninth 
:ssion of the Oklahoma Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal 
~ (Cincinnati: Methodist Book Concern Press, 1930, p. 282; Official 
1urnal of the Fortieth Session of the Oklahoma Annual Conference of the 
:thodis~Ej>i;copal Church (Cincinnati: Methodist Book Concern Pref;;,~ 
131), p. 376; Official Journal of the Forty-First Session of~ Oklahoma 
mual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church {Cincinnati: Methodist 
10k Concern Press, 1932), p. 76; Official Journal of the Forty-Second 
:ssion of the Oklahoma Annual Conference 2!. the Methodist Episcopal 
~ {Cincinnati: Methodist Book Concern Press, 1933), p. 162. (Here-
:ter cited as Official Journal of the Oklahoma M •. E. Church 1929, 1930, 
131, 1932, 1933.) - - - --
34olticial Journal of~ Oklahoma~.!• Church, 1930, PP• 222-223. 
Lich they had previously controlled through the church was properly 
Lrried out by other organizations. They, therefore, supported, and, 
, some extent, came to regard themselves as leaders of social, pollti-
Ll and economic reform. -
In interpreting the secula.r order and proposing reforms for it, 
lese Tulsa Protestant leaders of churches. necessarily moved away from 
,nservative religious policy. They emphasized man's initiative and 
,ility to achieve progress. They contended that man could give a ra-
Lonal interpretation to God's message to man. And, in assuming these 
,ctrinal positions, they turned back to the Calvinist-Lutheran Re-
,rmation theol.ogy. 
One direct social effect of the Great Depression on Tulsa, then, 
lS the partial secularization of religion. Relief activities~once per-
,rmed by the church were completely divorced from it, and taken over by 
:her organizations. When the Tulsa ministers reached out to claim 
sadership over new reforms, they further secularized religion, even 
1ough they were actually attempting to spiritualize economics and 
,litics. 35 
Tulsa's clergymen were also affected in a more personal way by the 
~eat Depression. Pastors' salaries seem to have suffered from a decline 
1 contributions. Although available statistics do not cover all of the 
tty's churches, it can be definitely established that the salaries of 
Lnisters in the Methodist Episcopal Church were reduced. The following 
able indicates the extent of these reductions. 36 
35»uring the nineteen-twenties, Tulsa ministers rarely lectured on 
1siness or politics. Sermons which were delivered on these subjects 
aldom, if ever, proposed their reform. 
36 Official Journal of~ Oklahoma!•!• Church, 1929, p. 180; Of-
!£!!! Journal of the Oklahoma!•!• Church, 1930 2 p. 270; 0fficial 
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METHODIST MINISTERS I SAIARIES 
)ngregation 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
ir st Church.' ••• $8400 8400 8400 7680 6750 
11iversity •••••• $4280 4600 4600 3100 1800 
t. Paul •••••••• $4600 4600 4105 4200 4200 
ark View ••••••• $156a 1337 1500 1180 720 
ose Hill ••••••• $1240 .1300 1400 1000 1000 
The Great Depression, therefore, seems to have carried with it many 
mplications for the churches of Tulsa. A definite increase in church 
embership was registered during this period of financial crisis, despite 
he fact that the general population of the city increased almost negli-
ibly. Some students of religion maintain that churches which are dominant 
row. The reasoning is that those groups which have the largest member-
hips in any community have a larger proportion of'their natural constitu-
ncies than do the groups which are in the minority. Moreover, where 
hurches are weak their incoming members do not find them. 37 This survey 
,f depression effects in Tulsa supports such an hypothesis. The city's 
:our largest denominations, Baptist, Roman Catholic, Presbyterian and 
~thodist, all registered sizeable gains in membership. 
The depression may also have had a positive effect on religious edu-
:ational programs. In general the same denominations registered numerical 
;ains in this area as in the category of church membership. The gains 
,ere not so great, however, and there was one notable exception. This 
,robably reflects the fact that while more people joined churches during 
:he depression, they failed to participate actively in the total church 
Journal of the Oklahoma H• !• Church, 1931, p. 368; Official Journal of 
~he Oklahoma H• !• Church, 1932, p. 68; Official Journal of the Oklahoma 
!•!•Church,~, p. 150. 
37Kincheloe, Research Memorandum 2!l Religion During the Great~-
pression, p. 15. 
14b 
t'ograms. 
Contributions to the Tulsa churches declined during the depression, 
nd as a result expenditures did also. Since a great many of the city's 
~u.rches had accumulated large debts during the prosperous twenties, the 
ecline in revenues placed church officials under a great strain. 
inisters were also made keenly aware of the state of the times by the 
ecessity of counseling individuals who were unemployed or on relief, 
nd who had other financial problems. Aside from these professional re-
ationships with the economic crisis, the ministers suffered personally 
s their salaries were drastically reduced. All this was reflected in the 
.es sage of the church. 
Ministers spoke more and more on secular subjects as the depression 
,regressed. Most of them attributed the hard time to the sins of the 
.ndividual. They anticipated the return to the church, which at least in 
,art actually occurred. But they singled out two groups for special 
:riticism. The capitalists, in their opinion, had been most reeponsible 
:or the depression because they had employed corrupt business methods. 
~he politicians likewise were blamed for doing nothing to regulate the 
:onduct of big business. The opinions of the ministers in political 
iatters, however, may be best described as "middle of the road," since 
:hey saw nothing wrong with the existing institutions, but quarreled in-
stead with the way in which they were being used. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE. IMPACT ON THE FAMILY 
Almost every Tulsa family was probably affected in some way by the 
;reat Depression. The nature and extent of the effect depended on a 
Large number of varied factors. It seems certain, however, that the 
Level of income of each family was the most important of these factors. 
the 36,970 families living in the city in 1929 represented most occu-
1 pations and nearly every level of wealth. Family activities center 
iround the home, and many families consider the.house to be the home. 
~or this reason, in any study of depression effects on the family, the 
expenditures of these social units for shelt~r are significant. The 
amount paid by the family for housing probably reflects, at least to 
some extent, the total sum which it is able to pay. 
The census bureau estimated that 13,852 Tulsa families owned or 
2 ~ere paying on their homes in 1929. Indeed, the percentage of home-
owners in the Tulsa population was much greater than that of any other 
Oklahoma city. This probably resulted from favorable conditions in 
the nineteen-twenties. An almost unlimited supply of land was avail-
able near the industrial districts for the building of houses for 
~orkers. This property could be landscaped at little cost. Probably 
lunited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Population, VI: Families 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1933), p. 1069 
(hereafter cited as Census 2£. Families). 
21bid., p. 1071. 
1 b_ 7 
more important, however, was the intense competition among the various 
building contractors of the city. The boom period of the preceding 
decade resulted in over-building by this industry and meant lower costs 
for home-buyers.3 
Those Tulsans who had bought homes prior to the depression, how-
ever, did not in a majority of cases purchase the cheaper units. Only 
1,733 city dwellings were valued at less than $3,000. 4 On the other 
hand, some 3,107 of them were valued at better than $10,000. 5 In fact, 
the value of property owned by Tulsans was greater than that of the 
nation as a whole, as_ the following chart indicates: 6 
Per-Cent Ownershi:e 
Value of Housing Tulsa United States 
Less than $1,000 4.1 7.6 
$1,000 to $1,999 4.6 5.4 
$2,000 to $2,999 4.0 5.1 
$3,000 to $3,999 9.6 11.1 
$5,000 to $7,499 22.7 22.3 
$7,500 to $9,999 24.9 21.9 
$10,000 to $14,999 10.0 9.4. 
$15,000 to $19,999 8.9 8.6 
$20,000 or more 6.2 3.4 
The purchase of many of these homes during the supranormal 
economic period of the twenties, of course 9 created big problems for 
7 
the depression family. A large number of foreclosures resulted. Much 
resentment toward money-lenders and other protest actions developed 
3southwestern Bell Telephone Company, Economic Survey of Oklahoma 
(St. Louis: General Conmercial Engineering Department, Bell Telephone 
Company, 1929), p. 258. 
4census of Families, p. 1071. 
5Ibid. 
6 
lb id. , p. 17. 
7see the discussion of the Independent Party in Chapter VI. 
Lmong many of the city's families. Extracts from a letter on the 
natter by a Tulsa citizen offers a sample of this sentiment: 
A certain man in 1929 bGught a home in Tulsa, made a 
payment of $15,000 cash and assumed a mortage of 
$14,500. Yes, it was a very nice home! He was a man 
of ability and accustomed to some measure of success. 
But a catastrophe not of his own making struck down 
his income .. 
Result: Foreclosure. Judgment. Forced sale on 
a frozen market. Another American family made home-
less; deprived even of their necessities, for of course 
the money-lende~ tilUst be protected as to his capital.a 
Considering that Tulsa was a metropolitan area, few of its 
families lived in apartments and flats during the years of depression. 
>lost, a total of 21,510 families, lived in private residences. The 
Largest single category of Tulsa's rent-paying families, numbering in 
111 4,369, paid $75 or more in rent per month. 'The next largest group 
>f families in private residences were those who paid $15 or less per 
9 nonth. There were 3,823 families in this group. This means that 
>etter than one-third of the families of Tulsa who rented private re-
sidences lived in either the most expensive or the least costly housing 
available. 
Such a condition suggests that the economic distribution of Tulsa's 
families was slightly irregular. Alepough comparable statistics for 
the entire United States are not available, one would expect to find 
the bulk of the renters concentrated around the middle of the scale 
rather than at the upper and lower extremes. This was definitely the 
:ase for ten of the other leading cities of the country. It appears, 
therefore, that through some quirk in its natural development Tulsa 
8 
Tulsa Tribune, February 29, 1932, p. 8. 
9~ Study of City Markets, 1928-1929 (Philadelphia: The Curtis 
Publishing Company, 1929), p. 165. 
150 
10 failed to provide the usual economic opportunities to its citizens •. 
The middle group on Tulsa's private residence rental scale, those 
paying from $35 to $45 per month, totaled only 2,262 families. 
Renters of residences valued at from $45 to $75 per month accounted 
for 6,601 of Tulsa's families, while those living in shelters of 
this type renting for more than $15 but less than $35 numbered· 
4,995! 11 
Apartments in the city provided living quarters for 729 families. 
The owners of this type of housing unit very definitely catered to the 
more wealthy element. Apartments renting for more than $75 per month 
were occupied by 368 families. There were 286 families living in those 
requiring payments of from $60 to $75 per month. In contrast, only 
fifty-five families lived in the apartments of the city which rented 
for less than $45 monthly. 12 
The dominance of the upper class as occupants of the city's flats 
was only slightly less marked.13 For this type of shelter families 
totaling 272 paid at least $75 per month. The total number of families 
occupying flats renting for $60 to $75 each month was 539. Six-
hundred and forty-one justified their occupancy with payments of from 
$45 to $60 per month. This means that of the 2,129 families living 
in flats, 1,452 were paying more than the average rental of $53. 
lOA natural surplus of executives, who are generally willing to 
pay high rents, may well have been a contributing factor. 
11~. 
12~ Study of City Markets, 1928-1929, p. 165. 
13An apartment differs from a flat in that the former is a part 
of a divided building while the latter occupies an entire structure. 
J. .'1 
·operty owners extracted rents of from $35 to $45 per month from 315 
;milies, while the other 362 occupants of flats in the city paid less 
(an $35. 14 
Rental. statistics, therefore, indicate that Tulsa property-owners 
ire prospering in the pre-depression yaars. They were, indeed, re-
iiving rental payments that exceeded the median charge from better 
tan half of the occupants of all three types of housing. The apparent 
~llingness of so many peoplf, to pay higher rents suggests two inter,. 
1ting possibilities. Probably a considerable number of families were 
LYi•g high•r shelter costs tha.a they could with ease. Any slight re-
ljustmeat of their ecoaomic status would therefore aacessitate the 
1aadonment of these quarters. The abnormal aumber paying higher rents 
~obably raised the prices of all housing cons1derably, and thus forced 
le families oa the lower rungs of the economic scale to live in 
1arterswhich strained their ability to pay. 
I 
Regardless of whether these theories are valid, the property owner 
lose income came from the leasing of homes was severely affected by the 
ipression. The possessor of high priced housing quickly lost many of 
Ls renters, who moved to less expensive quarters. Some families, how-
rer,could not afford to move, nor could they pay their rents. One 
Lndlord expressed his viewpoint on the matter: 
I believe the property owners are in worse condition than 
the ~enants, because tenants can move. I believe there are 
~enty per cent or more tenants unable to pay their rents. 
That is one reason property owners can't pay their taxes.15 
The condition of landlords made them the worst enemies of transients 
14!. Study 2!, City Markets, 1928~1929, p·:. 165. 
15.:rulsa Tribune, April 14, 1932, p. 18. 
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d the greatest friends of the made-work programs of Tulsa. In early 
32 they attempted to organize a Taxpayers and Citizen's Vigilante 
ague, and, although the movement was ultimately unsuccessful, the 
scussion concerning it casts much light on the viewpoint of the de-
essed property owner of the city. The group pushing for the organi-
tion of such a league demanded that all "contractors doing work for 
e city of Tulsa and Tulsa county ••• be required to use legal residents 
d taxpayers who have ••• helped build Tulsa. 1116 They also advocated a 
ratorium against building and loan payments, a halt of receiverships 
d foreclosures of mortgages, and reductions in the salaries of city 
d county government officials. ''We should also investigate the loan 
ark companies who are preying upon the unfortunate citizens of our 
ty, compel them to operate upon legitimate lines or drive them from 
e city •1117 
The families in Tulsa forced to accept relief were those most aware 
the depression. A total of 5,283 families fell into that category 
.ring the first three years of the depression. Some 3,470 of these 
hi 1 788 d h h 25 i d d . 18 re w te, ~· Negro an t e ot er were Mex can an In 1an. 
might be expected that the family with the largest number of members 
,uld be most drastically affected by the downturn in the business cycle • 
. is does not seem to have been the case. In fact, 1,416 had no children 
19 
. all, and 1,025 had :mly one child. Almost half of the families on 
16Tulsa Tribune, April 14~ 1932, p. 18. 
17rbid., April 30, 1932, p. 28. 
1~ederal Emergency Relief Administration~ Unemployment Relief 
~ Number .Q!!!. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 
134), PP• 86~87. 
19~. 
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ilief, therefore, were of the smallest size. The larger the family, 
le least likely it was to be on relief. Rec.ognition must be given to 
le obvious fact that there were fewer large families than there were 
11811 ones. This natural factor no doubt accounts for much of the differ-
lce. The following chart indicates the number of relief families by 
Lze : 20 
ASS TOTAL FAMILIES COMPRISING 
1 2 3 4 5 
>tal S,283 771 1,416 1,025 820 542 
lite 3,470 409 858 670 597 396 
tgro 1,788 360 552 353 220 140 
:her 25 2 6 2 3 6 
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
>'tal 313 196 119 49 20 8 4 
1ite 236 149 97 37 11 6 4 
!gro 73 45 22 12 9 2 0 
::her 4 2 0 0 ·o 0 0 
In addition to its obvious economic difficulties, the Tulsa family 
1 relief had problems of a psychological nature. Most of them were 
1oroughly discontented with the state of their financial affairs. They 
ere especially unpappy over their dependence on relief. The statements 
f relief administrators refer again and again to the professed willing-
ass of these people to work for what they received. Saio one such of-
Lcial in the spring of 1932: 
Too many persons, seeing the groups of idle men on the streets 
brand them as bums and loafers who wouldnut work if they got the 
chance. It is the chance they need. They come in here and tell 
me that they have literall! walked the souls /;ic/ off their 
shoes looking for work •••• 1 - -
~is authority went on to state that the spirits of the unemployed heads 
f families were being broken by their inability to obtain work, and 
2°Federal Emergency Relief Admiaistrat:f.on. 9 Unemp_loyment Relief Census 
eport Number QB!., pp. 86-87. 
21Tulsa Tribune, March 2, 1932, p. 7. 
1dicated that this was leading to broken homes: 
Broken spirits and discouragement come with a man having 
to go home and tell his wife again that he has failed to 
find a job. This continued failure has led to many men 
deserting their families in the belief that the welfare 
agencies would car·e for the wife and children while the 
men would shift for themselves.22 
1other person who·had been working as a volunteer in writing grocery 
~ders for the unemployed commented: ''We now have ••• fifty big strong 
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111 begging for work for themselves. n23 Another relief official expressed 
1e same conviction and documented it with cases out of the files·of the 
iency in which she worked. One family, which included nine children, was 
ttempting to earn money for food by selling newspapers. An unemployed 
ainter and paper hanger was offering to do anything in order to keep his 
24 
ro daughters in high school. 
While these officials spoke with vigor about the unhappiness caused 
~r.the family by its necessity to take relief, the unemployed themselves 
-~ 
ld not remain silent. In a letter to the editor of the Tulsa Tribune 
1e made the following remarks: 
today about sixty able-bodied men went to the commissary 
and carried away a week's rations and will loaf a week and 
then go back for another helping. And each day in every 
week ••• /we have to/ follow the same routine •••• At this 
same time the city has a contract to construct a viaduc·t 
over the railroads at Utica Avenue, for which they will have 
to pay the contractor cash. For just what reason can't the 
men who are living on charity (when they don't like to) go 
down there and tear down the old wooden structure and repay 
the city for the provisions they got the day beforez25 
22.rulsa Tribune, March 2, 1932, P• 7. 
23lli!•, January 4, 1932, P• 8. 
24Ibid., March 2, 1932, P• 7. 
25Ibid., June 16, 1932, p. 8. 
155 
nother person in the ranks of the unemployed relief recipients directed 
pungent appeal for work through the same medium: 
I am writing this letter hoping that it may be the means of 
my obtaining work. Have been a reader of the paper ever 
since it was established •••• However, I am not reading it 
now for the reason I have not the price. I am a landscape 
gardener and florist, and I know the care of chickens. I 
do not use tobacco in any form, neither do I drink. In 
other words, I am strictly sober. A small wage with a 
suitable place to live would be satisfactory to me. 26 
rganizations among the unemployed, in particular the Independent Party 
nd the Tulsa Inunediate Relief Association, further indicate this feeling 
f dissatisfaction with a dependent status.27 
Despite this fact, there was a continued effort on the part of many 
espected local citizens to convince the public that degeneration was not 
·ar away if something was not done to furnish the unemployed with jobs. 
he best summary of the literature of this campaign perhaps appeared in 
.n editorial in the Tulsa Tribune which declared: 
Hundreds of good steady workers in Tulsa who have been forced 
to appeal to charity agencies for help during the depression 
are yet facing a tragic loss of the energy and self-reliance 
necessary to self-support even in normal times. When unem-
ployment is long delayed, those who are at first uncomfortable 
at the necessity for seeking assistance and grateful for what.-
ever is given become demanding and grasping. After the initial 
embarrassment of a first recourse to charity is overcome it is 
easy to find work, accept a position of dependence, rely on the 
agency and criticize its methods.28 
'his is merely one example of the steady stream of such expression. One 
ronders how many workers gave in to a permanent state of dependence simply 
,ecause they had heard so many times that it was inevitable. E. B. Howard 1 
26Tulsa Tribune, January 27, 1932, p. 14. 
27 See Chapter VI. 
28tulsa Tribune, March 26, 1932, p. 26. 
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Tulsa County "made-work" administrator for the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation, once commented that the ''fear of losing the chance to work 
has been instilled in many of the men dependent on made-work jobs by 
efforts of 'humanitarians' to shut down the program when the weather 
turned cold.1129 
These predictions of irreparable character damage constantly an-
tagonized the families on relief. Even more disturbing, however, were 
the efforts of some local citizens to force their standards of conduct 
on families dependent on ~elief agencies for their subsistence. The 
lack of independence among these families made them susceptible to 
criticism of their personal habits by their providers. Some of this 
showed up in an inoffensive way in the city's c~mmissary program in its 
second stage, when only a prescribed ration was permitted. It revealed 
itself in a more destructive form in criticisms of dress, attitude, and 
habitual indulgences. A good example can be seen with respect to cigaret 
smoking. On this subject one citizen declared: "How is it they can find 
money to buy cigarettes but have none to buy bread. We believe in charit 
but when we help a poor fellow, we would prefer he did not blow smoke in 
30 
our face." The latter type of critism, however, never gained much 
currency with Tulsa officialdom. 
Tulsa's families on relief maintained a remarkably good spirit despit 
the criticisms, inconveniences, and general discomfort which they had to 
endure. It was because of their full cooperation with city officials 
that most of the relief programs were successful. Nowhere is this 
29 
Tulsa Tribune, December 18, 1932, p. 4. · 
30 ~., February 25, 1932, p. 18. 
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.llingness to cooperate better indicated than in connection with Tulsa's 
Leant lot garden program. 31 Many made an effort to carry their indi-
;dual participation in the program beyond the size which the free seed 
.lotment allowed. One man drove a truck for the Family Welfare Society 
iring the winter in order to save enough money to buy a sack of seed 
~tatoes. Then, as he described what followed: 
••• 1 went down to a hardware store on First Street and asked 
'em what I could do to earn some seed. They set me to work, 
and I got a lot more. Then I worked Qut planting some tomatoes 
for another feller and I got a bunch of tomatoes. I'm going 
to have just lots to eat this year.32 
le garden program, like all the relief services, had its problems, and 
: one point the administrators were forced to distribute something less 
1an a variety of seed. A Tulsan who had been unemployed for a full year 
~peared at relief head~uarters in April of 1932 requesting seed. The 
Eficials had only beets available. Apparently only mildly discouraged, 
1e man collllll8nted: 
Mister, you can live on beets, We pretty near lived on 'em 
last year. I always plant beets when I can get 'em. Why, 
my wife, she put up 36 one-half gallon jars of beets last 
sullllll8r. We got lots of <folks to eat 'em too. Five of us 
at home, and then some of my older children who's away come 
back and say: 'Dad, mother, how's the beets?' And mother, 
she gets out a half-gallon of beets. And boyl sometimes 
there's some left and sometimes there isn't.3~ 
All this is not to say that relief recipients never criticized the 
rograms created to benefit them, but for the most part these protests 
are mild. One group opposed the favoritism which was shown to the heads 
f families. This group was composed mostly of single men and women who 
ad dependents. They believed that the relief priority given to family 
3lsee Chapter 11. 
32 Tulsa Tribune, April 29, 1932, p. 3. 
33Ibid. 
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iads was perfectly right, but asked consideration for themselves also, 
Lintaining that they had: 
cared for parents, educated young brothers and sisters, made 
investments in real estate, which they ••• lost to the mortgage 
companies, and now ••• /found7 themselves out of money and not 
any work or financial-aid to be had.34 
few Tulsa reliefers objected also to the fact that many of the city's 
ltail merchants employed individuals who were not so much in need of 
>rk and income as they were. As one complained: 
Go into the offices and you will find that young women, usually 
married, and sometimes. living at home, are given the salary so 
that she might dress more elegantly. Note the fur coats on the 
streets at;:the noon hour. Even go into the offices of the 
Community Fund and you will find a large number of young boys 
and girls, some from the exclusive homes of the South side. 
Also many married women, whose husbands have good jobs; the 
secretary and her sister being members of th~ latter class. 35 
>me, though not so many, also criticized the nature of the work they 
lre given to do in the Tulsa made-work program, considering themselves 
1amed by tasks like picking up scraps .and leaves in the parks and on 
leant lots. 
By far the greatest volume of protest which came from the ranks of 
ie relief families, however, was directed at the city's special com-
Lssary plan during the second winter of its operation. The low cost of 
1e rations led many to believe that they were not being given enough to 
Lve on.36 Moreover, although the ration was wholesome and adequate, 
~s ingredients were not particularly appetizing to some, consisting of 
timmed milk in powdered form, meal and flour and ground beef. The meat 
34tulsa Tribun.e, December 5, 1932, p. 8. 
35 Tulsa World, March 28, 1932, p. 8. 
36 
Tulsa Tribune, October 27, 1932, p. 16. For additional details on 
ae program see Chapter IV. 
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.s mixed with about twelve percent powdered milk to create a sausage 
·meatloaf, and was the most unpopular item in the diet. These ex-
·essions of dissatisfaction with food supplies by the commissary soon 
~sided, however, and some of the reliefers even became defenders of 
Le program. Their initial flurry of protests seem even less unjust 
Len one considers that the commissary ration had its critics.among 
1lsa relief officials, and, indeed, even made an enemy of one national 
,urnal. An editorial in The Christian Century denounced the plan in 
Le following terms: 
••• a menu whose monotony might not be revolting to livestock, 
but can't be any more appetizing to modern humans than were 
the quail of the desert which in thirty days proved too many 
for the ancient Israelites. And then there's the spectacle 
of a young commonwealth of vast resources; in which the best 
that the free expression of sturdy individualism could produce, 
after forty years, is a city of redundant skyscrapers, mort-
gaged cathedrals and two cent charity meals! That there 
should be any pride in the accomplishment shows how utterly 
detached from the rational conduct of life our social order 
now confesses itself to be.37 
Of all Tulsa families, those most disturbed by the loss of their 
conomic independence were the white collar workers. To them the prestige 
actor was apparently as important as the basic desire to provide for 
h.eir own. Probably no:other group in Tulsa, however, achieved more 
ympathy for their predicament. In past years they had contributed to 
harity agencies regularly. Now they were forced to turn to the same 
gencies for aid. Their reluctance to do this prompted the adoption of 
special policy in their behalf by the Community Fund. Such persons 
ere asked to bring their problems before the agencies through special 
.ppointments which would avoid publicity. An official of the Fund 
ustified the policy with the statement that: ."People of this type 
37"Editorial," The Christian Century, XLIX, (April 20, 1932), p.500. 
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itate to join the regular lines of charity seekers and come to find 
mselves in desperate straits."38 One relief administrator declared 
tit ,i,as "heart breaking" when she came across the name of some 
son on the unemployment lists whom she had known in "happier times.n39 
While most of the white collar workers wanted to keep their condi-
ns as little known as possible, they had the same desire as other 
e earners to register a protest against their situation. While the 
ustrial laborer turned to the Independent Party or to the Tuls~ 
~diate Relief Association or some similar organization, the white 
lar workers looked elsewhere. The Socialist Party, with its economic 
:erpretation of history and its general intellectual orientation, 
~ed to be a satisfactory instrument for expres~ing the protest of many 
•fessional and clerical workers. w. L. Garver, secretary of the 
:ialist Party of Tulsa,,:credited this factor as being responsible for 
1 rise in strength of the party just prior to the election of 1932.40 
1pice the fact that Oklahoma's Socialists were denied the ballot in 
.s presidential campaign, Norman Thomas, the Socialist candidate, de-
rered a political speech in Tulsa. He was greeted by an overflow crowd 
some 4,500 when he spoke in the city's Convention Hall. 41 
The disenfranchisement of this party by the state election board 
,ught about a liberal protest in the city. This protest drew support 
,m non-Socialists, even from some very orthodox Republicans. When the 
38Tulsa Tribune, January 25, 1932, P• 1. 
391!?.!!., June 18, 1932, p. 8. 
40Ibid., December 10, 1932, p. 28. 
41 Ibid., October 18, 1932, p. 4. 
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1lsa Socialists began raising a fund to question the state's electoral 
>te and called for contributions in the name of the "right of suffrage," 
: was reported that considerable revenue poured in. 42 Even more signi-
Leant was the action of Richard Lloyd Jones, editor and publisher of 
1e Tulsa Tribune, and an active campaign worker .for President Hoover, 
E presenting the issue to the Supreme Court of the United States. His 
:ttter read: 
Has the Supreme Co~rt of the United States the power to protect 
the franchise rights of American citizens? If not, are those 
rights without protec~ion? I am not a Socialist and will not 
vote for Thomas. But in the interest of the American freedom 
of ballot and as an American citizen I respectfully ask, has 
the Supreme Court of the United States no power on its own 
motion to reverse the Supreme Court of Oklahoma which today 
ruled that Lth!./ Socialist Party cannot appear on the national 
ticket to be voted by Oklahoma citizens next November 8? Has 
any state the power to disenfranchise a national party of the 
Socialists' proportions? By all the processes of reasoning of 
the Oklahoma SQpreme Court, any state or group of states could 
have disenfranchised all those who voted for Theodore Roosevelt 
on the Progressive ticket in 1912, and the Republican party 
could never have started. Has the Supreme Court of the United 
States no power, no duty to protect the freedom of conviction 
and the rights of franchise of every American citizen? Should 
not the people's highest court now establish precedent by de-
ciding and ordering that no state can obstruct a national 
election143 
~ere is little doubt that the action of Jones, and lesser expressions 
f sympathy with the Socialists by others, was the product of their ex-
erience in seeing the fa~lies of white collar workers lose their income 
nd then have their political voice stifled. For Jones, and the others 
swell, had an intimate acquaintance with and respect for the members 
f these families. 
The family, of course, formally begins to function in our society 
42Tulsa Tribune, October 28, 1932, p.15. 
431!?.!!!., September 27, 1932, p. 16. 
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ly after a legal marriage ceremony. The number of marriages in any 
ar in any city depends upon a variety;of factors--some known and some 
t known--that induce people to marry. In Tulsa it appears that the 
scent of the business cycle induced people to refrain from the act. 
e marriage rate in the city, however, did not fall off abruptly in the 
rst year of the depression as it did'..in the sociologists' typical 
erican city, Middletown.44 Instead it continued a steady climb in 
mbers which had began in 1926, and reached an all time high of 1,956 
rriages in 1929. This undoubtedly reflects the fact that the latter 
ar was considered by most Tuisans to be perhaps the most prosperous in 
e history of the city. The full effects of the business slump were 
t registered until late in 1930. 
The fall off in marriages between 1929 and 1930 was negligible, the 
te being reduced only from 1,956 to 1,871. Then followed, however, a 
arp descent to 1,449 ~n 1931, and a further decline to 1,144 in 1932.45 
seems certain that this lessening of those marrying was attributable, 
least to some extent, to the depressed economic conditions. The county 
44Robert S. and Helen Merrill Lynd, Middletown in Transition (New 
rk: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1937), p. 152. 
45 United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Marriage 
d Divorce, 1928 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 
30), p. 82; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
rriage !!!£. Divorce, 1929 (Washington: United States Government Printing 
£ice, 1931), p. 82; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
nsus, Marriage!!!£. Divorce, 1930 (Washington: United States Government 
inting Office, 1932), p. 83; United States Department of Commerce, 
reau of the Census, Marriage~ Divorce, 1931 (Washington: United 
ates Government Printing Office, 1933), p. 68; United States Department 
· Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Marriage and Divorce, 1932 (Washington: 
ited States Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 24. (Hereafter cited 
Marriage !!,g_ Divorce, ~; 1929; 1930; 1931; · 1932. 
163 
rriage license clerk thought so. On one occasion he commented: "In 
e depression the old saying that two can live as cheaply as one has 
en found lacking by the young people, and they are afraid to take the 
ws. 1146 At another time he issued a statement to the press which blamed 
e slump in marriages on general business conditions, stating that many 
ospective grooms were coming in for licenses without sufficient funds 
pay the fees. 47 There seems to have been two major ways, therefore, 
which the depression lowered the Tulsa marriage rate. Both i~volved 
e ability to meet financial necessities. Some who would have liked to 
rry postponed the event for fear that they would be unable to provide 
r the upkeep of the home. Others were willing to marry but did not have 
e funds required to make it legal. 
The divorce situation in Tulsa during the early years of depression 
s an unusual one. The theory has been advanced many times that while 
or business conditions cause a decline in the marriage rate, they do the 
me for the number of divorces. Divorces, however, did not decrease as 
ch as marriages in Tulsa, and the city's number still remained high as 
mpared to the rest of the nation. In 1929 there were 1,307 divorces, 
1930, 1,250, in 1931, 1,058, and in 1932 there were 970.48 In all, 
en, despite the fact that marriages should theoretically be greater in 
mber than divorces, marriages declined by 812, while divorces dropped 
only 337 in the first three years of the depression. 
46Tulsa Tribune, December 17, 1932, p. 8. 
47Ibid., May 7, 1932, p. 2. 
48 Marriage and Divorce, 1928, p. 82; Marriage~ Divorce, !.2l2., p. 
; Marriage~ Divorce, !2lQ, p. 83; Marriage~ Divorce, 1931, p. 68; 
rriage ~ Divorce, 1932, p. 24. 
164 
Since the decline in the divorce rate was hardly noticeable ~rom 1929 
1930, many Tulsans did not see the reduction as resulting from the de-
ession. Some of them, indeed, believed that the economic crisis was 
using the large number of divorces rather than contributing to a de-
ease. An economist on the staff of the University of Tulsa believed 
.at the high numbe~ of divorces resulted from the frustration of the 
onomic desires of an abnormal number of men who had been earning between 
,,000 and $15,000 per year. He further commented: 
There is to be sure a.substantial number of divorces due to 
absolute poverty. But that number is essentially the same 
in Tulsa as in other cities, Oklahoma City for example. Our 
surplus must come from the groups in our citizenship that 
the average city does not have. 49 
professor of biology at the University agreed w.ith his colleague that 
.e divorce rate was associated directly with the depression. As to the 
.fferences between the rates of Oklahoma City and Tulsa, he felt a "tenor 
optimism~.' caused by "sound economic reasons" was the explanation.SO 
A leading psychiatrist believed that Tulsa was a city of "four-
.ushers" and that this necessarily led to a high divorce rate. Tulsa, 
L his opinion, was no longer a boom town economically but still was 
Make no mistake about it, the major reason for divorce here 
or anywhere else is maladjustment in the sex life. In the 
~ity of Tulsa you have a most unstable assortment of people. 
They are pleasure seeking and unsettled in temperament. I 
believe that there is a greater number of ke~t women in Tulsa 
than in any other city in the United States. 1 
A woman lawyer wko specialized in settling marital difficulties among 
49Tulsa Tribune, June 23, 1931, p. 4. 
SOibid. 
511bid., June 24, 1931, p. 3. 
J.O;, 
1e poorer classes considered "poverty and drink" as the causes of most 
Ethe strife and discontent which was leading to Tulsa county divorces. 
1e too, therefore, believed that economic conditions influence the di-
Jrce rates. She was -convinced that the city was one of extremes--
Jverty and wealth. As to those impoverished she had discovered that 
divorce in most of these cases has just one meaning for women--alimony." 52 
ne great wealth of the upper economic group resulted in loose conduct 
ocially which, in turn, resulted in divorce. 53 If the major motive be-
ind the Tulsa divorce proceedings started by women was alimony, however, 
any females dfsirous of their "freedom" were frustrated after January of 
932. At that time, Judges. s. Clendinning, following 1,1p.,his.'liberal 
tand on mortgage foreclosures, began in numerous cases to reduce alimony 
,ayments previously ordered. In cases which were now brought before him, 
lendinning was slow to grant alimony where no children were involved, 
.nd slower still to send men to jail if they could not meet the payments 
54 .ater. 
The number of births in Tulsa did not decline during the first three 
·ears of the depression. As a matter of fact, they increased yearly until 
.932, when they declined only slightly. Perhaps the depression stimulated 
:ather than reduced births. This might have been caused by a new soli-
larity on the part of the family in the face :of· the business slump. More-
,ver, idleness and the lack of funds for amusement and entertainment 
~robably contributed. In considering birth statistics, of course, the 
52Tulsa Tribune, June 21, 1932, p. 5. 
53Ibid. 
541!!!!!., January 12, 1932, p. 8. For a discussion of Clendinning's 
earlier liberal decisions, see Chapter VI. 
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actor of delayed results must be recognized. Thus the decline in birth 
ates would not show until later in the depression. Unplanned births also 
ave to be considered. The following table indicates the number of Tulsa 
irths for the early depression years,55 
Year Number 
1928 ••••••••••••••• 2,186 
1929 ••••••••••••••• 2,214 
1930 ••••••••••••••• 29266 
1931 ••••••••••••••• 29293 
1932 ••••••••••••••• 2,114 
The Great Depression thus had some important implications for the 
:amilies of Tulsa. Many of them had purchased homes, some of them quite 
ixpensive, during the boom period of the nineteen-twenties and now had to 
rage a hard struggle to keep them. Tulsa's renter families also were in 
:iany cases dislocated since they could no longer afford to pay as much as 
Eormerly. There was, therefore, considerable intra-city migration on the 
>art of the families of Tulsa. Other families could not afford to move, 
tnd their failure to leave quarters for which they could not pay resulted 
Ln eviction or a turn to charity. Either way the families of Tulsa's 
Landlords were affected, and they became an effective pressure group for 
lnti-transient and made-work programs. 
55united States Department of Commerce 9 Bureau of the Census, Births, 
,tillbirths and Infant Mortality~ 1928 (Washington: U. S. Government 
~rinting Office 9 1930) 9 p. 108; United States Department of Commerce, 
aureau of the Census, Births, Stillbirths and Infant Mortality, 1929 
(Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931), p. 156; United 
;tates Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Births, Stillbirths 
and Infant Mortality, 1930 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office 9 
1932), p. 162; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Births, Stillbirths and Infant Mortality, 1931 (Washington: U. s. Govern-
nent Printing Office, 1933), p. 112; United States Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, Births, Stillbirths and Infant Mortality, 1932 
(Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934) 9 p. 104. Illegiti-
lll8te birth records are of questionable accuracy, but indications are 
that the number slightly increased. 
l C)/ 
The families on relief suffered the most. They were not only forced 
olive on little, but in many cases were subjected to intense criticism 
swell. In addition they were disturbed by continued prophecies of their 
~pending doom to a life as parasites. In spite of these difficulties 9 
owever, they maintained a good spirit during the early years of the de-
ression. Only a minority of the reliefers criticized the programs which 
ere established to relieve them, and generally these protests were not 
njust. 
The most embarrassed .group among the relief families, and the unem-
loyed generally, were the former white collar workers. Many of them at-
empted to register their protest through the Socialist Party. This turn 
o Socialis~ and the state's denial of the ballot to them, produced a 
articular current of liberalism in the city. 
The number of new families formed in Tulsa during the depression were 
ew, and many old ones broke up. Marriages sharply declined with the 
usiness cycle, but the number of divorces seems to have been raised by 
.he depression. Births showed some increase each year until 1932 but de-
lined a little in that year. Without doubt, every Tulsa family was af-
:ected in some way when the Great Depression descended upon the city. 
CHAPrER IX 
THE IMPACT ON EDUCATION 
The Great Depression directly affected education in Tulsa by reducing 
1chool revenue. Reduced funds made retrenchments necessary. While the 
langer always exists that curtailments of this type will hamper the ef-
:ectiveness of the schools, the first three years of the financial crisis 
lid not bring this experience to Tulsa. 
Most of the schools of the nation reacted to the problem of reduced 
Eunds by releasing part of their personnel. In 'many instances this re-
,ulted in "large classes, crowded classrooms, in~reased absences, lowered 
~tandards, lower quality of work, and finally because of ••• lost faith in 
1 1:he schools, less income from taxes." Salaries formed eighty per cent of 
1:he Tulsa school budget in pre-depression days, and necessarily had to 
2 :ome in for some consideration in any effort at retrenchment. It was 
possible to achieve a lower salary outlay either by reducing the earnings 
~f teachers or by dismissing a portion of them. The first step taken by 
the Tulsa Board of Education was a straight percentage reduction of 
teachers' salaries. A system-wide lowering of ten-per-cent was the 
1Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Associa-
tion, Research Memorandum~ Education,!!!. the Depression (New York: Social 
Science Research Council Bulletin Number Twenty-Eight, 1937), pp. 7-8. 
2 United States Department of the Interior, Office of Education, 
Biennial,Survey £! Education, 1928-1930 (Washington: United States Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1932), p. 310. (Hereafter cited as Biennial Survey 
1928-1930). ---
168 
rincipal item in economies effected in drafting the 1931-1932 school 
udget. An attempt was made, however, to retain salary schedules as a 
eal feature of teachers' contracts. Rather than freezing salary 
chedules, Tulsa granted its normal increases scheduled, and then made 
he cut. Increases were halted only to the extent that the usual bonuses 
or foreign travel and summer session work were discontinued.3 
As further reductions were required, higher salaries were trimmed 
'irst and most drastically. The lower salaries were reduced only as a 
.ast resort. In 1932-1933 all persons who had salaries higher than the 
·evised schedule provided were cut fifteen per-cent. Although the change 
~snot mandatory for administrative leaders, they took this curtailment 
.n salary voluntarily. A five per-cent reduction was made in the salaries 
•f those who had been receiving below $1600 a year. 4 Although the. 
1alaries of beginning teachers were not so much affected as the pay of 
1xperienced teachers and supervisors, they were somewhat lessened. The 
:ulsa schools now paid entering women teachers $t,260 per year and startini 
11en teachers $1,530 annually. The minimum salary previous to the depressi< 
tad been $1,900 for men and $1,600 for women. 5 
In spite of the good intentions of the Tulsa Board, it was forced to 
:elease seventeen teachers prior to the 1932-1933 term. No particular sex 
,as discriminated against in these dismissals. In many cities married 
,omen were released at the beginning of the depression, but this was not 
ione in Tulsa. Nor did the Tulsa Board in the first three years of the 
3Tulsa World, September l, 1932, p. 12. 
4Tulsa Tribune, August 25, 1932, p. 2. 
5National Education Association, Department of Superintendence and 
Research, Educational Circular Number Three, 1932, p. 3. 
epression consider discharging unmarried females in order that more men 
ith families could have work. The ratio between the sexes, as is indi-















.s a result of a policy of dismissing teachers with least seniority first, 
:he average age of the Tulsa teacher, however, did increase. By 1932 
romen teachers averaged thirty-five years of age, while men teachers were 
,n the average thirty-six. 7 
Where retrenchment was effected by reducing members, staff reorgani-
:ation became necessary. Several methods were used to increase the work 
Load of the remaining teachers, and thereby fill the gap in the staff. 
~irst and most important was an increase in the size of classes toward an 
lverage of forty. Major school systems throughout the count~y were al-
8 ready above this point when Tulsa made its move. In addition, three 
administrators were given teaching assignments. 9 
To avoid heavily over-loading the teachers, the Tulsa Board resorted 
to other tactics as well. A rule was introduced requiring a higher testin 
10 
average for admitting under-age children to school. This resulted in 
6Biennial Survey, 1928-1930, p. 125; United States Department of the 
Interior, Office of Education, Biennial Survey of Education, 1930-1932 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 127. 
(Hereafter cited as Biennial Survey, 1930-1932). 
7Tulsa Tribune, February 7, 1932, p. 10. 
~ational Education Association, Department of Superintendence and RE 
search, Educational Circular Number One, 1931, p. 4. 
9Ibid. 
lONational Education Association, Department of Superintendence and 
Research, Educational Circular Number~' 1933, p. 4. 
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ome reduction in enrollment. The device of double-promotion was used 
udiciously in the elementary schools to help balance the size of classes. 
:very such pupil elevation saved the taxpayers approximately $40. Double-
1romotions were used only when pupils were developed sufficiently to merit 
,romotion. The actton was b·ased on intelligence tests and the judgment of 
11 ,rincipals and teachers. Some of the seventeen teachers who were droppec 
Erom the school system were saved by curriculum rearrangements. For 
~xample, two teachers in the junior high schools were saved by ~n adjust-
ment of time spent on English and on Industrial Arts or Home Economics in 
:he seventh grade. The school health department as a separate unit was 
aliminl!,t~d, its salaries being included with those for instructional em-
;;_ ... f,) 
?loyees, with the justification that "the purpose and intent of the health 
i ... 
department is instructional service. 1112 All employees in the health depar 
nent were forced to obtain teaching certificates from the state board of 
education before signing contracts for. 1932-1933. 13 Finally, the line of 
division between the two junior high schools was moved. The boundary was 
relocated in such a manner as to eliminate small classes in both schools. 1 
Before any of these reductions were made by the Tulsa Board in the 
areas of instruction and personnel, huge curtailments were effected in the 
system's construction and upkeep expenditures. Building programs were 
halted, and only worn-out equipment was replaced in the existing structure 
The only repairs made were those "necessary to preserve the investment of 
llTulsa World, September 10, 1932, P• 6. 
12Tulsa Tribune, October 14, 1932, P• 4. 
13~., August 28, 1931, p. 2. 
14narlow' s Weekly, August 29, 1931, p. 6. 
172 
1 taxpayer. 1115 Expenditures of this type were reduced from $794,177 in 
?7-1928 to $92,286 in 1931-1932. 16 
Superintendent of Schools Merle Prunty determined to enlist his 
lching staff in the economy effort. They were, therefore, instructed 
lCerning the school budget. Prunty explained the procedure used: 
First, get the teachers together and decide what to teach, 
that is building a curriculum. Then, assemble the teachers 
again and determine the best and most economical way of 
presenting this material ••• third ••• make the teachers aware 
of the entire budget structure.17 
Actually the Tulsalschooh·,creceived.,a large sharei.of ta,:al expendi-
res .... :Indeed, they received a far greater sum than the educational 
stems of most towns during the early depression years. The percentage 
the total payroll which education received, however, steadily declined. 
1929 60.5 per-cent of the city expenditures were for the schools, in 
30, 56.3, in 1931, 55, followed in 1932 by a slight gain to 56.7 per-
:nt.18 
Not until the beginning of the 1932-1933 school term did the members 
Tulsa's teaching profession begin to warn the people that retrenchment 
LS likely to damage or was already damaging the schools. In an address 
• the staff of the system at the beginning of that year, Prunty pointed 
1t several ways in which teachers could seek to gain greater support from 
l5Harlow's Weekly, April 2, 1932, p. 8. 
16Biennial Survey, 1928-1930, p. 192; Biennial Survey, 1930-1932, p. 
~3. 
l7Tulsa Tribune, January 17, 1932, p. 4. 
18united States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, ™' County, and Municipal Survey of Government Employment and Payrolls, 
~29 through 1938, "The City of Tulsa and Tulsa County Oklahoma" (Washing-
:>n: The United States Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 8. · 
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a public. He suggested that teachers, regardless of what grades they 
1ght, could impart to their pupils facts about school organization and 
iget. Comparison, he suggested, could be made between school costs and 
a costs of entertainment. This was the fundamental element in a long 
~ge program to cultivate the support of the next generation. Second, 
urged teachers to visit the homes of their students to inquire about 
e well-being of the child. This would, he felt, win the support of the 
rent. Prunty also advised the mailing of letters, reports and other 
terials to the parents which emphasized the important points in the 
hools' service. Finally, he urged that teachers and principals take a 
rger part in civic and community life. In this way they could win for 
e school the approval of those who could lead in efforts to improve the 
.tuation. He concluded: 
••• the keynote of recovery from today's conditions must be 
careful planning in the light of facts and needs ••• recovery 
must inevitably be slow and gradual. The schools can help 
by placing their own house in order, by recognizing the re-
lationship between taxation and the general economic life 
of the nation, and by insisting that the money which is 
spent for the schools shall be spent with the utmost ef~. · 
ficiency at the point where it will accomplish the most 
good.19 
Enrollment in the Tulsa schools increased only slightly during the 
Lrly years of the depression. During the 1929-1930 school term the 
>tal enrollment was 32,083. It arose only to 32,328 by the 1931-1932 
:hool term. The increase in average daily attendance from 24,443 to 
S,792 was somewhat greater than the rise in enrollment. Since the 
:hool population, meaning all those under the law eligible to go to 
chool, increased by almost nine thousand during this period, it seems 
19Merle Prunty, ''What Can We Do?" The Oklahoma Teacher, 14 (February, 
933), p. 14. 
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;ely that the depression had some effect on the number in attendance. 
this was true, the fact that more students attended regularly might 
m that the group no longer in school normally showed up less often 
: classes. There seems to have been no significant change in the sex 
:io. of those in school. Boys outnumbered girls 16,104 to 14,974 in 
i school year of 1929-1930, and the girls, with 16,052 enrolled, gained 
ly slightly on the boys, who had 16,276 in school, in 1931-1932. 20 
Whatever the case may have been with respect to attendance and en-
llment, there is little doubt that the depression created special 
>blems for the students of these years of economic crisis. This is 
>hatically indicated by the several policies adopted by the school 
ministration during these years to aid the unfortunate students. Few, 
any, Tulsa school children were deprived of education through inability 
purchase the necessary books. Appropriations of the Oklahoma legisla-
re for free text-books had never been adequate, but the Tulsa system 
i managed a partial distribution of books on its own during the nineteen-
anties. In the elementary schools all texts were loaned to students. 
1ior high school students received their books for required subjects 
ae, but had to purchase those to be used in optional subjects. It was, 
erefore, the students from the ninth grade upwards, if they were in poor 
,nomic condition, who had the most severe problem to face in the de-
ession. 
School administrators adopted a policy in the 1929-1930 school term 
ereby students would not have to worry over the text-book problem. In 
ses where students or their parents were· able to show that they actually 
2~iennial Survey, 1928-1930, p. 125; Biennial Survey, 1930-1932, 
127. 
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tld not purchase the volumes, any student could obtain free texts in 
tuired subjects. The student or parent simply applied to the principal 
the school for his district, who immediately wrote an order for the 
>ks. The school authorities then drew upon the county for the cost. In 
a meantime an investigation was made to determine the true facts in each 
;e. If the condition of the student and family had been correctly stated, 
! student remained in possession of the books. No publicity attended the 
1uirements. This was purposefully arranged in order that the students 
1ld not be embarrassed.21 
Although Tulsa had an attendance and guidance department before the 
pression, its functions and policies were considerably altered by the de-
ine in business. A placement service was est~blished within it to seek 
rk for high school students. Many students were enabled to continue in 
nool as a result of the part-time-work they received through this service. 
e placement bureau also sought permanent jobs for the graduates of the 
gh schoot. 22 Many other students were able to continue attending school 
rgely because of the ten-cent lunch which was made available or by 
23 
othes that were provided. 
The most important change which is observable in the activities of the 
lsa schools during the first three years of the depression related to 
e curriculum. Although no courses were completely dropped, at least one 
w course was added, and significant alterations were made in the existing 
bjects. The most profound developments took place in the social science 
21Tulsa World, September 9, 1932, p, 12. 
22Tulsa Tribune, November 14, 1931, p. 6 •. 
23see Chapter II. 
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urses, and these changes were directly caused by the down-turn in the 
siness cycle and the reconstruction of thought caused by that decline. 
alizing, as a result of the depression, that there had to be some 
cial planning if the American culture level was to be maintained, the 
cial sciences were selected as the area where this kind of training 
uld be provided. 
A new curriculum of social studies was worked out by a committee of 
lsa teachers, headed by assistant superintendent Will French, and put 
to operation with the beginning of the 1932-1933 school year. As a 
urse of study, it represented an evaluation of all material taught in 
e social sciences and in reading courses. The material was arranged in 
instructional pattern that ran through the fourth, fifth and sixth 
ades and the entire junior high school period. 
French and his committee believed that the social sciences are con-
rned with the whole process of living. They did not think that a certain 
riod could be set aside each day for the study of each of the social 
ience disciplines. Rather they considered the problem to be one of 
iding "all education in the schools to magnify the social importance 
the things which are read and studied." They rejected the theory of 
e social sciences which calls for the teaching of straight facts. The 
ogram which they attempted to set up called for an interpretation of the 
cts. The plan worked out in Tulsa was allied to the indoctrination phi-
sophy of education which had developed in the late nineteen-twenties and 
rly nineteen-thirties at Teachers College, Columbia University. This 
.ilosophy recognized education as a social tool with which children's 
24 
,cial attitudes could be shaped. 
24Harlow's Weekly, February 11, 1932, p. 4. 
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The Tulsa committee developed six social viewpoints as the core of 
course. Rearrangement of material and reintegration of courses was 
done with these objectives in mind. The six social viewpoints were: 
1. Social change is both inevitable and desirable ••• The 
adult generation can no longer pass on ••• solutions to social 
problems. Children should be taught to be expectant of 
social change. 
2. Social and economic planning is necessary. Maximum bene-
fits from change can be achieved only when it is a guided and 
directed movement. The rotting fruits of a planless social 
and economic order are now everywhere more evident. 
3. Interdependence is a fact of modern social living. De-
sirable plans of social welfare cannot be reached through a 
program of isolation .and sectionalism. 
4. Competition and its inherent individualism ••• has been 
emphasized to a degree not justified in present day living. 
5. Tolerance must break down prejudices. Deep-rooted, un-
reasoned prejudices obstruct the stream of social progress. 
6. Human beings are more important than things. The prime 
purpose of American government is to protec~ people not 
property.25 
;h the adoption of these objectives, the Tulsa schools brought a stern 
lictment against the American institutions and ideology whic~ the Great 
,ression had caused to be questioned. 
A new course which obtained a place in the Tulsa curriculum during 
1 1932-1933 term also indicates the influence of the depression on the 
itructional program. The course was entitled: "Making the Most of One's 
'.sure Time." A local administrator attempted to justify the course: 
The time when schools needed to apologize for teaching children 
worthy use of leisure time is past. We are going to have leisure 
whether we want it or not. It is being forced on us. And it is 
up to the school to find pleasant, profitable, social and valua_ble 
use for leisure time.26 
Before the end of 1932 the Tulsa schools had definitely felt the im-
~t of the Great Depression. The curriculum was most importantly 
25Tulsa Public Schools, Teacher's Guide~ the Social Studies, (Tulsa: 
>lie Schools, 1932), p. i. 
2~arlow's Weekly, July 1, 1933, p. 15. 
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:ected by the depressed conditions. For the first time the school at~ 
~ted to form certain basic student social attitudes. The schools were 
:ed quickly with the problem of lowered revenues, but the reduction was 
: so great as it was in many other American cities. Teachers' salaries 
:e lowered, and eventually a few teachers were released. Employment 
Licies of the Tulsa school system, however, did not discriminate against 
nen--married or single. 
Larger classes were necessary, but the Tulsa schools had been well 
low the national average in this respect prior to the depression, and 
e increase created no major problem. Various other methods were used to 
11 the gap caused by the decrease in teachers. The first voices were 
ised by the teachers of Tulsa against retrenchments late in 1932, pro-
sts which would grow ever louder in the years to follow. 
The depression may have reduced enrollment, since fewer of those 
igible to attend actually went to school during this period. Several 
,ecial services were provided for the unfortunate student by the schools 
. order that he could continue to attend. These included free text-
,oks, aid in obtaining part-time employment, the ten-cent school lunch, 
Ld sometimes clothing. The depression consequences for the city's edu= 
Ltional system, while severe, do not appear to have been as drastic as 
,r some of the other institutions of Tulsa. 
CHAPTER X 
SUMMA.RY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Tulsa first felt the full force of the Great Depression during the 
.ter of 1931. Some unemployment and deprivation preceded that date, 
the rather unusual nature of the city's economic institutions ob-
red it. An international event, the depression had many roots, but 
haps its major cause was over-expansion of business in the nineteen-
nties. In Tulsa, which had never developed a diversified economy, 
crisis was precipitated by over-production in the oil industry. 
The depression was not sudden, but it was unexpected, and Tulsa, 
e the rest of the nation, was unprepared to cope with the critical 
blem of unemployment, Oklahoma law vested relief responsibility in 
county, but Tulsa County's funds proved inadequate to meet the needs 
the people during the first depression winter. A private organization, 
Family Welfare Society, had to come to the rescue. City officials 
moted two employment bureaus and encouraged businessmen to keep all 
loyees at work in their plants, but nevertheless the crisis deepened. 
Eventually, as conditions failed to improve, Tulsa adopted a made-
k program in which the unemployed were given jobs on public projects. 
kers in this program were paid in scrip, a form of credit slip. This 
ld be used to buy food and clothing wholesale in a specially established 
missary or in payment for necessary items such as shelter, lighting, 
t and water. Subsidiary programs provided the unemployed with free 
gs and medical attention, assisted them in retaining possession of 
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1eir housing and public utility service, and distributed some clothing. 
:hool children were later the beneficiaries of a ten-cent lunch. Tulsa 
1thorities were strongly hostile toward transients throughout the crisis, 
1t the discovery of squalid migrant camps finally induced them to aid 
1ch persons with temporary room and board. 
The temporary success of these quickly drafted policies was deceptive. 
teir adoption promoted a variety of disputes. Exacting investigations of 
tndidates for the made-work program produced friction between Tulsa of-
'.cials and the administrators of Governor Murray's state relief program. 
Len Murray attempted to establish soup kitchens in the city, the conflict 
LS intensified. Locally, the supervisors of public and private charity 
ire soon at odds. They disagreed mainly over methods of dispensing relief, 
:onomic expediency was the predominant objective of the city, while the 
in-public agencies demanded time-consuming and costly professional social-
irk techniques. 
Perhaps the sharpest of the struggles, however, resulted from the 
1unty's continued failure adequately to finance Tulsa relief work. Un-
1le to do so in 1931, the county commissioners were unwilling to do so in 
132. The county's attitude won the disapproval of relief recipients, the 
.ty administration, professional charity agencies and many private citizen~ 
large group of Tulsa women, representing the social clubs of the city, 
1dertook to strengthen this opposition by uniting these diverse groups. 
1e successfully organized Emergency Council threatened to ask the Oklahoma 
:torney-General to intervene, but this move did not inspire the county to 
.cept a larger share of the charity burden. Undaunted by this failure, 
Le Council next undertook to petition the Excise Board, an agency throught 
1 be legally capable of altering the controversial county budget. Al-
.ough the Excise Board enlarged the relief allotment, the raise was 
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nsiderably inadequate. Consequently, the city was forced to continue 
oviding most of the required finances. 
During this financial controversy, many charges of inefficiency and 
veral hints of political corruption were directed at the county com-
ssioners. Dr. John E. Brindley, a tax expert, subsequently investi-
ted Tulsa county government, and proved the validity of several of these 
arges. But even honesty would not have been enough. Maximum results 
re not being achieved with the money which was available •. Tulsa was 
sperately in need of a more effective relief-dispensing organization. 
City authorities seem first to have recognized this need in the fall 
1931. At that time Tulsa was obviously facing another crisis in its 
tempts to aid the unemployed. The city's origi~al made-work program had 
en allowed to lapse. Its single summer replacement was a substantially 
adequate vacant-lot garden program. These developments partly were 
used by the shortage of funds, but they also reveal the failure of Tulsa 
ficials to fully comprehend the depression's scope. The results of this 
op-gap seasonal approach to relief were not encouraging. The controv•rsy 
tween public and private charity methods, the uncooperative financial 
licy of the county commissioners, and the need to serve ever greater 
mbers of the deprived were just as discouraging. 
Having identified these shortcomings, many Tulsa authorities were now 
nvinced that relief must be centralized. The Chamber of Commerce took 
e lead by appointing a fact-finding committee to survey depression-
sociated charity work in the city •. Declaring cooperation to be essential, 
e fact-finders recommended the creation of a Central Emergency Cotmllittee 
Five. This body would attempt to eliminate duplication of effort by 
isting agencies, and replace the dole with employment wherever possible. 
ty, county, and private charity organs quickly approved the proposal, 
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d shortly the first Committee of Five was appointed. Virtually every 
pect of Tulsa's relief program was now brought under the committee's 
ntrol. 
The most controversial obligation of the Committee of Five was the 
1-important task of selecting basic procedures for aiding the unemployed 
Tulsa. At least three different types of relief had been proposed. 
e group led by the city administration, wanted another made-work program. 
hers, including federal representatives, preferred a system of.direct 
d. They argued that made-work was more expensive and that it did not 
ach all who were in need. Still another faction suggested leaving the 
ole problem to the state. Tulsans differed sharply also aa to how their 
ogram should be financed. Mayor Watkins wanted ,to use $900,000 in il-
gally collected taxes, rather than returning it to the taxpayers. Sever-
others, who of course favored direct relief, wanted to grow food or buy 
wholesale from farmers for distribution to the needy. A few city resi-
nts advocated the establishment of a cooperative farm where men could 
rk for their food. A final proposal was that _.-the necessary extra income 
accumulated by a raise in water rates. 
After considerable debate, the Committee of Five adopted essentially 
J 
.e same program the city had used the previous winter. Again, the major 
,atures of Tulsa's relief organization were to be a system of made-work 
1d a commissary. Rejecting all proposed financial plans, committee 
:mbers agreed that part of the water department I s budget should be di-
:rted to finance a $100,000 reservoir and extensive playground improve-
:nts in Mohawk Park. In order to curtail all unnecessary expenditures, 
1ey ordered a more thorough investigation of all applicants for aid. 
:cognizing, however, that :this program still could not provide enough 
ibs for all the unemployed, the committee encouraged various supplementary 
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!Sures to support it. Private citizens were urged to give temporary 
rt-time jobs to the unemployed. Tulsa's club women, at the request 
the committee, made a special effort to secure work for women who had 
st their positions because of the depression. The city street depart-
nt replaced machinery with additional men, with regular department em-
oyees donating a portion of their income to provide salaries for the 
~ workers. 
The Committee of Five also revised and expanded the commissary. Now 
nverted into a central purchasing agency, it aided the relief work of 
th city and county. The former open-shelf grocery store procedure was 
andQned. Major John Leavell devised a standard ration which was distri-
ted to all participants in the city's program. At the amazing low cost 
forty-two·:cents, food containing 2800 calories was provided. The 
ther unattractive nature of the diet provoked some criticism, both lo-
lly aad nationally, but the complaints were mostly mild. The fact that 
her cities, states and even foreign countries eventually established 
~ller commissaries reveals the ultimate success of the plan. 
The Committee of Five was outstanding for its accomplishments in 
·ganization. The smoothly operating machine which it created enabled 
1lsa effectively to care for its vastly increased number of dependent 
1milies during the opening months of 1932. In dealing with the sadly fa-
.liar problem of finances, however, the Committee of Five failed as com-
.etely as its predecessors. With their entire program stalled, the dis-
iuraged committee members resigned in early spring. Still desiring to 
Lke work, city officials searched unsuccessfully for a means. A bond 
Lle to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was attempted, but that new 
1deral agency seemed disinterested. Tulsa then intended to reduce the 
lze of the bonds and sell them locally, but a legal obstacle thwarted 
1~ 
1is plan also, 
Varied minor programs, none publicly sponsored, had to fill the 
lcuum. Too few citizens agreed to hire the unemployed as part of a 
!mpaign to beautify Tulsa. City and county employees and some business-
en boosted relief with individual contributions, but the total col-
ections were negligible. In the summer of 1932, therefore, Tulsa re-
reated to soup-kitchen style charity. At key city locations, firemen 
ispensed rations donated by farmers and gathered by voluntary organi-
ations such as the Tulsa Immediate Relief Association. 
Tulsa's relief population was unexpectedly saved by the federal 
overnment. In July, 1932, Congress permitted the Reconstruction Finance 
orporation to make temporary loans to the most depressed states. Gover-
or Murray quickly qualified Oklahoma for such a loan, and Tulsa, which 
arlier had rejected state aid, requested a portion of the funds. After 
ome discussion, Murray granted the city $146,000 for a new state-
upervised made-work program. The program eventually gave 1,000 Tulsans 
.hree days work weekly at $2.40 per day. Nor were the ladies neglected. 
romen were employed making clothes for the needy and as secretarial help 
.n charity agencies. In federal intervention, therefore, Tulsa finally 
:ound a solution for its persistent and crucial problem of relief finance. 
Meanwhile, government aid seeming ineffective, Tulsa's unemployed 
:ormed various organizations to improve their own position. The largest 
Lnd most active of these groups was the Independent Party. The Party 
>lamed the depression on capitalistic greed, but proposed no radical solu-
:ions. Partly because of their agitation, Tulsa's courts limited mortgage 
Eoreclosures, the water department continued s~pplying destitute Tulsans, 
lnd hospitals lowered medical costs for the unemployed. Closely watching 
relief administration, the Independents found men working full schedules 
LQJ 
Eor the city in return for food, and insisted they be paid regular wages. 
~lthough the practice was halted, Tulsa officials would not grant b~ck 
~ay. Contending that the county should supervise relief, the Party then 
iemanded termination of the Committee of Five and all its policies. 
~hen this demand was also rebuffed, they requested a state investigation 
of city charity work. Mrs. Mabel Bassett, Oklahoma Commissioner of 
Charities and Corrections, conducted an inquiry, but completely approved 
Tulsa's program. 
Opposed to a dole, the Independent Party advocated distributing 
available work among all the jobless. In Tulsa, however, business 
leaders feared higher labor costs, and government officials believed em-
ployment proration would strain public budgets and delay vital projects. 
With both public and private enterprise opposing their policy, the party 
attempted to secure direct Committee of Five representation. City and 
county agencies had already chosen four members of this body. Charging 
industrial domination of the committee, the Independents demanded the 
right to select the fifth officer. Should that privilege be denied, they 
hoped for the acceptance of their proposed solution to the unemployment 
problem as consolation. Needing public support badly, the original com= 
mittee members added a pro-labor spokesman, and shortly all officially 
approved proration. Because the policy was recommended rather than 
ordered, however, few industries and public projects were prorated. Al-
though never fully successful locally, the Independents sent an out-
standing representative to the Memphis Unemployment Relief Conference 
in August, 1931. United States Senator Elmer Thomas, a leading Con= 
gressional monetary reformer, persuaded the Conference to condemn the dol 
and propose national proration. 
Hoping to regain their independence, some party members and other 
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lssatis fied Tulsans established a large Arkansas colony. With fertile 
:>il and many other resources available, the project seemed economically 
:>und. The colonists formed a government and planned educational and 
eligious facilities.· The land was collectively held at first:P but e.2.{".h 
ettler could, for a modest investment, eventually own an individual 
ortion. Cooperation and typical frontier ingenuity prevailed at: the 
tart, but a monotonous diet and severe financial difficulties soon dis 0 • 
upted harmony. In Tulsa, moreover, Dr. Herbert Clough, the colony's 
ounder, after charges of ~isappropriating funds, resigned his post. 
ith tempers short, a minor quarrel over rations soon erupted into a 
·iolent struggle for governmental control. National gu&rdsmen quelled 
:he disorder, but peace was not completely restored until the "rebels" 
rere expelled and a new regime installed. And, although temporBlrily sus-
:ained by the enterprise, these migrant Tulsans never really prospered. 
Members of the Tulsa Immediate Relief Association lacked interest in 
:olonization, but they also attempted to look after themselves. The 
\Ssociation, among other projects, gathered farmers' crops on shares and 
livided the produce among its membership. After providing for its own 
1eeds, the Association rendered vital help to less fortunate city resi-
ients. This group's success inspired the development of additional self= 
:ielp associations in Tulsa. All these organizations, by advertising their 
11iewpoint, helped develop a better understanding between the dispensers 
and recipients of relief. 
The mental and physical adjustments of Tulsans to the problem of un= 
employment relief are mostly obvious. Other depression=engendered social 
modifications in the city, though just as important, are far less ap= 
parent. Both directly and indirectly, the vastly changed economic 
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.ircumstances altered the social groups and institutions of the com= 
lUnity by reshaping individual conceptions of their roles, vaifo<e,s and 
.esirability. Thus, the depression had a significant impact on re-
.igion, on the family-, and on education. 
The economic crisis brought about a great spiritual resurgence 
.moag the people of Tulsa. This is evidenced by a substantial increase 
.n membership in the various religious denominations of the city. Re-
ived religious feeling was not limited to selected faiths, but en-
ompassed them all. Grea~est membership increases, however, were made 
y the larger denominations of the city--the Baptist, Methodist and 
.oman Catholic establishments. Accelerated participation in the activi-
ies of the church, especially in the area of r~ligious -education, indi-
ates that new spiritual alliances were not shallow. ·The depression 
aturally reduced the income of the churches, and consequently placed 
imitations on the expenditures of the.worshipping organizations. Unable 
o continue their normal charity work in the emergency,· the ministers of 
he city's various denominations began to speak out more on the social 
,roblems of the times. Blaming the economic plight on the bosses of big 
usiness, they advocated a solution which proved very similar to that 
hich was later carried out by Roosevelt. 
Fewer Tulsa families were established during the first three years 
f the depression. Although it is impossible to prove that the de= 
ression helped reduce the number of marriages,_ many local citizens be-
ieved this to be the case. The crisis undoubtedly broke up some city 
amilies, but divorces did not increase greatly. Births do not seem to 
ave declined importantly between 1929 and 1932. Those families of Tulsa 
n relief were, of course, most extensively affected by the depression. 
ew families enjoyed economic dependence, and •oat hoped and worked for 
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L return to their previous status. Nevertheless, all seemingly appre-
:iated the aid given, and they directed little criticism at either the 
Lmount or methods of relief. 
Some retrenchment was necessary in education, but Tulsa appears to 
lave fared better in this area than many American cities. Every effort 
,as made to avoid reducing the quality of schooling during the emergency. 
~ few teachers lost their employment, and all were forced to accept less 
>ay, but the instructional staff was not seriously overloaded. Classes 
Lncreased in size, but tQe city's classes were well below the national 
lverage before the depression. The most important consequence of the 
aconomic crisis for Tulsa education was changes in the curriculum. In 
~he social science courses, Tulsa's educators r~jected traditional con-
:epts of rugged individuali~m and laissez-faire economics, and made an 
affort to promote social planning. 
Since the stock market crash in October of 1929, the economic 
collapse had affected nearly every Tulsan and most city organizations. 
Jobs had been lost, business firms closed, relief provided, attitudes 
altered, controversies sparked and resolved, new organizations created, 
and the traditional functions and characteristics of homes, schools, 
churches, and even governments modified. And no end was yet in view for 
the Great Depression. 
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Sketches the economic structure of Tulsa, aad reveals the high 
optimism of the city's leaders on the eve of the depression. 
~ulsa Public Schools. Teachers' Guide £2 ~ Social Studies. Tulsa: 
Public Schools, 1932. 
Designed to aid Tulsa teachers in achieving the new depression-
inspired objectives of the system's social science program. 
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Articles and Essays 
Another Way to Make Jobs." Literary Digest. 112 {January 23, 1932), p. 
35. 
An outside commentary on the Tulsa made-work project as it 
evolved under the Committee of Five's direction. 
1unham, Arthur •. "Pennsylvania and Unemployment Relief." Social Science 
Review. 8 {.Juae:,.1934), pp. 246-288. 
The commissary originated by Tulsa was later adopted by the 
state of Pennsylvania. This article describes the complications 
which resulted. 
'Editorial." The Christian Century. 49 {April 20, 1932), p. 500. 
Sharply critical discussion of the Leavell commissary plan 
adopted by Tulsa in the winter of-1932. 
landy, Robert T. "The American Religious Depression, 1925-1935." 
Church History. 29 {March, 1960), pp. 3-17, especially page 9. 
Argues that it was aa already depressed Protestantism which 
was overtaken by the economic crisis. 
'Is the Depression Killing Family Life?" Literary Digest. 112 {March 12, 
1932), P• 21. 
Briefly summarizes the attempt of unemployed Tulsaas to es-
tablish a colony in the hills of Arkansas. Includes a photograph 
of the colonists captioned: "The Spirit of Never-Say-Die." 
Pruaty, Merle. ''What Can We Do?" Oklahoma Teacher. 14 {February, 1933), 
p. 14. 
Speech by the Tulsa Superintendent of Schools suggesting methods 
which teachers ia the system could use to cope with educational 
problems resulting from the depression. 
''What to Feed Hungry Children During the Depression." Literary Digest. 
112 {February 6, 1932), pp. 24-25. 
Discusses the rations distributed to those on relief by the 
Leavell commissary ia Tulsa. 
Wilson, Robert. "Transient Families." Th!, Family. 16 {December, 1930), 
PP• 243-251. 
Describes the migrant camps established in and around Tulsa at 
the outset of the depression. 
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Government and Other Printed Documents 
:deral Emergency Relief Administration. Unemployment Relief Census 
Number One. Washington: United St~tes Government Printing Office, 
1934. pp. 86>=87. 
Made b~£ore the incr~ased feder~l aid brought about by the 
New Deal actually reached Tulsaus unemployed, the statistics com-
piled by this survey accurately describe the relief population of 
the city during the. ~a.:r1y years of the depress ion. The figures 
given as to the size of dependent families were especially•useful • 
. nutes of Eh!, Twenty-Fourth Annual Co~vention of~ Baptist General 
Convention of Oklahoma. Shawnee: The Oklahoma Baptist Press, 1929. 
~nutes of the_ Twenty=Fifth Annual Convention of the Baptist General 
Convention of Oklahoma. Shawnee: The Oklahoma Baptist Press, 1930. 
lnutes of the Twenty=SixthAnnual Convention of ill Baptist General 
Convention of Oklahoma. Shawnee: The Oklahoma Baptist Press, 1931. 
Lautes ~ the Twenty=Seventh Annual Convention of the Baptist General 
Convention of Oklahoma. Shawnee: The Oklahoma Baptist Press, 1932. 
Used collectively, the statistics for Tulsa's Baptist congre-
gations in these yearly publications yield vital evidence of im-
portant changes in such church matters as membership, finances and 
activities. 
Eficial Journal of the Thirty-Eighth Session of~ Oklahoma Annual 
Conference of .!:h!_ Methodist Episcopal Church. Cincinnati: The 
Methodist Book Concern Press, 1929. 
Eficial Journal of £h!. Thirty=Ninth Session of the Oklahoma Annual 
Conference of the Methodist Episcop~1 Church. Cincinnati: The 
Methodist Book Co~cern Press, 1930. 
Eficial Jour~$l of the Fortieth Session 2f !h!, Oklahoma Annual Con= 
ference of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Cincinnati: The 
Methodi2t Book Concern Press, 1931. 
Eficial Journal of the Forty=First Session of £.h!. Oklahoma Annual Con-
ference of th~ Methodist Episcopal Church. Ciacinnati: The 
Methodist Book Concern Press, 1932. 
Eficial Journal of the Forty=Second Session of the Oklahoma Annual 
Confereace of £h!. Methodist Episcopal Church. Cincinnati: The 
Methodist Book Co~cern Press» 1933. 
SigDificant trends and important chaRges in the membership, 
finances and program of Tulsa 0 s Methodist !piscopal denomination 
can be visualized when the data in these volumes are presented to-
gether. The amnual reports of the Tulsa district superintendent 
often refer to the depressed conditio~sp and thus also are profit= 
able readin.g. 
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.ahoma Department of State. Revised~ of Oklahoma, 1910. 
lk, R. L. Tulsa, Oklahoma City Directory, 1929. Kansas City: R. L. 
Polk Company, 1929. 
lk, R. L. Tulsa, Oklahoma City Directory, 1932. Kansas City: R. L. 
Bolk Company, 1932. 
A comparison of the 1929 and 1932 directories reveals much 
of the institutional impact of the depression. 
1te of Oklahoma. Annual Report of ~ Department of Labor. Bulletin 
Number 10-A for the Period Ending June 30, 1962. Oklahoma City: 
The State of Oklahoma, 1932. 
Includes a detailed discussion of the role of Tulsa and the 
state at the Memphis Unemployment Relief Conference in August, 1931. 
Also contains valuable material on the state relief program, which, 
of course, affected the city. 
ited States Congress. Congressional Record. LXV, 2280, 6322; LXX, 
3204-3205; I.XX.I, 1793; I.XII, 654-660, 665; I.XIII, 12399; LXXIV, 50, 
194-197, 316, 4787-4797; LXXV, 1194-1195, 3910, 3915, 4024-4025. 
Debates ia Congress oa public works and other relief proposals 
which were partially produced in Tulsa, and which were introduced 
ia Congress by Senator Thomas. 
ited States Coagress. Official Congressional Directory. 74th Congress, 
lsf Session, 1935. Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1935. pp. 93-94. 
An offfctal congressional biography of Senator Thomas • 
. ited States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and 
Means. Soldiers' Adjusted Compensation Heariags. 68th Coagress, 
2ad Session, 1924. Washington: United States Government Priatiag 
Office, 1924. PP• 36-40. 
Reveals the support given by Senator Thomas to a proposal to 
complete payment of the World War I veterans bonus. 
Lited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Births, 
Stillbirths .!!.5!, Infant Mortality.!!. the Birth Registration!!!!. of 
the United States, 1928. Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1930, p. 108. 
lited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Births, 
Stillbirths .!!.5!, Infant Mortality in the Birth Registration!!!!. of 
the United States, 1929. Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1931. p. 156. 
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lited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Births, 
Stillbirths !!!2. Infant Mortality~~ Birth Registration~ 
.2! ~ United States,~. Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1932. p. l6i. 
1ited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Births, 
Stillbirths and infant Mortality l:!!_ ~ Birth Registration~ 
2f ~ United States, !!1!_. Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1933. p. 112. 
aited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. ·Births, 
Stillbirths and Infant Mortality~ tine Birth Registration~-
of ~ United States, 1932. Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1934. p. 104. 
In combination these statistics indicate the trend as·to births 
in the early years ot the depression. 
Rited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Census of 
Religious Bodies, 1926. Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1930. 
aited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Census of 
Religious Bodies,~. Washington: United States Government 
~inting Office, 1941. 
Extremely useful in any analysis of religious trends during the 
depression. Includes the denominational figures on membership, 
Sunday School scholars, teachers ~nd classes, and expenditures. 
Total figures are also given-for all of Tulsa's worshipping organi-
zations. 
aited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Fifteenth 
Census of!!!!. United States: Manufactures, !212.• Washington: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1933. 
Reveals the number of Tulsaas employed by the various kinds of 
enterprises, and thus enables the drawing of conclusions as to which 
groups of workers suffered most from the depression. 
rnited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Fifteenth 
Census of the United States, Population, VI: Families. Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1933. 
Shows the number and size of all Tulsa families. When used 
together with other data, these statistics help to reveal the extent 
of the depression's impact on the family. 
Jnited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth 
Census .. .!!! the United States: Characteristics of £.h!, Population, 1940. 
Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943. Part 5. 
These figures, when compared with similar 1930 statistics, indi· 
cate fundamental alterations in the nature and size of Tulsa's.popu-
lation during the depression decade. 
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lited States Department of Oommerce, Bureau of the Census. Marriage 
and Divorce, 1928. Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1930. p. 82. 
Lited States Department of Conunerce, Bureau of the Census. Marriage 
!!l5!, Divorce, 1929. Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1931, p. 82. 
Lited States Department of Conunerce, Bureau of the Census. Marriage 
and Divorce, !21Q. Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1932. p. 83. 
Lited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Marriage 
!!!2. Divorce, 1931. Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1933. p. 68. 
1ited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Marriage 
and Divorce, 1932. Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1934.--;:--24. 
Fluctuations in the number of Tulsans marrying and securing 
divorces during the early years of the economic crisis become ap-
parent when the data in these volumes are grouped together. 
iited States Department of the Interior, Office of Education. Biennial 
Survey of Education, 1928-1930. Washington: United States Govern-
ment Printing Office, 193e. p. 310. 
r1ited States Department of the(:!nte,;ior(:off:iice·,:of,:Education. Biennial 
Survey of Education, 1930-1932. Washington: United States Govern-
ment Office, 1934. p. 27. 
Contain a variety of statistics on the educational system of 
Tulsa including the number of schools, teachers and pupils, average 
daily attendance figures, and the proportion of the school budget 
expended on the various phases of the total program. 
nited States Department of Labor. Industrial Employment Survey 
Bulletin. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 
1921-1930. 
Describes industrial activity in Tulsa on a monthly basis 
throughout the nineteen-·twenties and reveals the effect of in-
creases and declines in production on the workers in each major 
business. An aid to ascertaining critical weaknesses in the 
city's economy which made it more susceptible to depression. 
nited States Department of Labo~. Monthly Report 2£. the Activities of 
State and Muncipal Services Cooperating~~ United States Em~ 
ployment Service. Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1929-1932. 
Indicates the number of Tulsans who registered at employ-
ment bureaus each month, the number of jobs which were then 
listed with these agencies, and the number of registrants who 
were successfully placed. It therefore is a valuable, though 
imperfect, gauge of the severity of the depression in the city. 
Newspapers 
low's (Oklahoma City) Weekly, 1929-1932. 
In addition to excellent coverage of the state's relief 
program, this publication devoted a full page or more of each 
issue during the depression to the efforts of Oklahoma to cope 
with problems caused by the economic crisis. With its aid,. 
therefore, Tulsa's relief organization can be compared with 
those of its sister cities and relationships between state and 
local agencies definitely ascertained. 
~~Times, 1929-1932. 
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Its references to Tulsa, though rare, help to indicate which 
depression reactions of the city's residents·attracted the greatest 
national interest. 
:..!!. Spirit, 1929-1932. 
Official news publication of the Tulsa Chamber of Commerce. 
Reprinted many key documents relating to the city's relief 
program, and gave detailed coverage to the work of the Committee 
of Five. 
Lahoma City Times, 1931-1932. 
Valuable for its detailed treatment of those Oklahoma City 
depression problems and policies which extended their influence 
to Tulsa. 
lsa Tribune, 1929-1932. 
A good source on all Tulsa attempts to aid the unemployed and 
the disputes and complications which resulted from these efforts. 
Frequently valuable for its interviews of the impoverished. 
Editorially it reflects the liberal Republican viewpoint of the 
depression. 
lsa Unionist-Journal, 1928-1932. 
Represents the attitude of organized labor and the working-
man in general as to the proper types and methods of relief and 
other depression-related problems. 
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~ World, 1928-1932. 
In discussing controversial issues which resulted from the 
economic crisis, it expresses the views of conservative Democrats. 
Gives substantial treatment to all phases of Tulsa's depression 
policy. 
Unpublished Material 
lsa) Family Welfare Society. Report of the Year's Work, 1931. 
Shows both the severity of the depression and the major part 
played by this agency in soothing the ills of the Tulsans most 
critically a·ffected. 
Llsa) Report of the Mayor's Committee on Unemployment. February, 
March, April and May, 1931. 
Llsa) Report of the Subcommittee on Transients. Mayor's Committee 
on Unemployment. February 15, 1931. 
1lsa) Report of the Subcommittee on Free School Lunches. Mayor's 
Committee on Unemployment. May, 1931. 
1lsa) Report of the Central Clothing Dispensary. Mayor's Committee 
on Unemployment. April, 1931. 
1lsa) Report of the Subcommittee on Free Public Utilities. Mayor's 
Committee on Unemployment. May, 1931. 
1lsa) Report of the Subcommittee on the Cultivation of Vacant Lots. 
Mayor's Committee on Unemployment. June, 1931. 
Mimeographed records in the files of the Tulsa Mayor's Officeo 
Rewarding both as first hand evidence and in arriving at an accuracy 
estimate for the various secondary sources used. Unfortunately, 
reports seem to have been called for only when problems were 
critical. 
ulsa) Report of the Fact Finding Committee. Tulsa Chamber of Commerce. 
October, 1931. 
The Committee of Five materialized as a result of this report. 
ulsa) Report of the Central Emergency Committee of Five. October 10, 
1931. 
'ulsa) Minutes of the Committee of Five. October 15, 1931. 
~lsa) General Order Number One. Central Emergency Committee of Five. 
October 25, 1931. 
:'ulsa) Relief Plans Under Consideration. Central Emergency Committee of 
Five. N. D. 
lsa) Report of the Subcommittee on Made-Work. Central Emergency 
Committee of Five. N. D. 
lsa) "The Leavell Commissary Plan." Special Report of the Central 
Emergency Committee of Five. N. D. 
lsa) "Weekly Report of the Commissary Subcommittee." Central 
Emergency Committee of Five Report. Weekly ia December, 1931 
and January, February, and March, 1932. 
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The records of the CoDDittee of Five's work, though in some 
cases uadated, are apparently relatively intact. These documents, 
of course, are necessary to any complete discussion of Tulsa re-
lief after the summer of 1931. 
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